Missouri Realty, Inc. v. Ramer, 214

Decision Date28 April 1958
Docket NumberNo. 214,214
Citation140 A.2d 655,216 Md. 442
PartiesMISSOURI REALTY, Inc. v. William Lee RAMER et al.
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

Francis D. Murnaghan, Jr., Baltimore, for appellant.

John W. Hessian, Jr., and Arnold Fleischmann, Towson (Smalkin, Hessian, Martin & Taylor, Towson, on the brief), for William Lee Ramer and others.

No brief and no appearance for Board of Zoning Appeals of Baltimore Co.

Before HENDERSON, HAMMOND, PRESCOTT and HORNEY, JJ., and JOHN B. GRAY, Jr., Special Judge.

PRESCOTT, Judge.

On July 20, 1956, the appellant sought a reclassification in the zoning for residential purposes of certain real estate, consisting of about 26 acres of land located in Baltimore County, from R. 6 Zone (cottage or semi-detached) to R. G. Zone (group housing). After a hearing upon appellant's petition, the Zoning Commissioner of said county determined that the reclassification should be granted upon the grounds that the change in the character of the neighborhood since the original zoning warranted the same, and it would not be detrimental to the health, safety or general welfare of the community involved. Certain protestants, the appellees herein appealed the decision of the Commissioner to the Board of Zoning Appeals (Board) (now the County Board of Appeals) of said county. Following another hearing, the Board also granted the requested reclassification, and the appellees petitioned the Circuit Court for a writ of certiorari. That court then reversed the action of the Board upon the grounds (1) that there was not sufficient evidence of a change in the character of the neighborhood, and (2) the reclassification would result in traffic congestion and hazard, and unduly burden the overcrowded condition of the schools.

Before discussing these findings of the trial court separately, it may be well to state the law that governs our consideration of both. The appellees suggest the statute that permits review of the action of the Board by the Circuit Court for Baltimore County on the petition of aggrieved persons is broader than many such statutes, and permits a wider scope of review by the trial court than the decisions of this Court have stated is allowed. This Court, on several occasions, has so recently ruled on this question that it requires no extended discussion. For some of the cases, see Offutt v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 204 Md. 551, 562, 105 A.2d 219; Kroen v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 209 Md. 420, 427, 121 A.2d 181; Hardesty v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 211 Md. 172, 177, 126 A.2d 621. The scope of such review is succinctly stated in the Offutt case, supra, 204 Md. at page 562, 105 A.2d at page 224, as follows:

'We cannot disregard the general rule that in an appeal from a decision of a zoning board, the court will not substitute its own judgment as to the wisdom or soundness of action taken by the board, but will decide only whether or not such action was arbitrary or discriminatory and illegal. It is not the function of the court either to zone or to rezone, but only to decide whether the board properly applied the applicable law to the facts. The court should not substitute its own judgment for the judgment of the board if the question decided is fairly debatable. If there is room for reasonable debate as to whether the facts justified the board in deciding the need for its action, the decision must be upheld. It is only where there is no room for reasonable debate, or where the record is devoid of supporting facts, that the court is justified in declaring the legislative action of the board arbitrary or discriminatory.'

It is a principle of universal recognition that zoning once imposed, is not static. If it could not be altered with the changing conditions that surround us in the world today, progress would be retarded, and many of the advantages, logically expected from zoning, would be lost. Restrictions on the use of property that are reasonable today may be so unreasonable under different conditions in the future as to amount to confiscation. Zoning officials, when properly authorized, have the authority to alter zone lines from time to time when there are substantial changes in conditions and such alteration has a reasonable relation to the public welfare. Offutt v. Board of Zoning Appeals, supra, 204 Md. 557, 105 A.2d 221.

This Court has also held that the action of the Board is entitled to a presumption of reasonableness and constitutional validity. Kroen v. Board of Zoning Appeals, supra, 209 Md. 426, 121 A.2d 184. This presumption, though less strong in instances of rezoning than in cases of original zoning, is a substantial one genuinely to be accorded by the courts.

It remains for us to apply the principles, as above stated, to the matters for our determination.

I.

Did the evidence before the Board make the question of whether there had been a sufficient change in the neighborhood since the original zoning to warrant a reclassification fairly debatable? The land involved is situated in the Ninth Election District of Baltimore County to the west of Old Harford Road at Diehl Avenue. It is at the center of an area bounded by the major streets: Taylor Avenue to the south; Joppa Road to the north; Oakleigh Avenue to the west; and Old Harford Road to the east. On the west, the subject property is adjoined by a parcel of approximately 25 acres which, although originally zoned R. 6, or its equivalent under prior zoning regulations, 1 was reclassified for group housing in June 1951. To the north of the subject property, and separated from it by a parcel of approximately 5 acres owned by the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore of a width of approximately 500 feet, is another area comprising approximately 22 acres for which reclassification to permit group houses was granted in May, 1955. Group housing was in the course of construction on this parcel on August 22, 1957. To the immediate northwest of the last mentioned parcel there is still another parcel of approximately 33 acres which was reclassified for group housing in March, 1952. Said parcel has since been acquired as a future school site by Baltimore County. To the south of the subject property is vacant land and to the east a contractor's storage yard and repair shop. To the southeast, the land is devoted to cottage residential and commercial use.

Mr. Lemmon, a real estate appraiser, consultant and investor of long experience, pointed out that the Ninth Election District of Baltimore County in which the subject property lies has undergone marked urbanization since the original zoning in 1945. Large scale commercial, office, institutional and governmental development has since occurred. The Baltimore County Director of Planning testified that there has obviously been a great deal of change of all kinds since 1945. In 1945, the entire district was essentially rural. Of 12,721 building permits granted in that district since the original zoning,...

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30 cases
  • Chapman v. Montgomery County Council
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • November 18, 1970
    ...from the application to reclassify property zoned as residential to commercial or industrial * * *.' Missouri Realty, Inc. v. Ramer, 216 Md. 442, 449, 140 A.2d 655, 658 (1958). To the same effect see Judge Prescott's restatement of his dictum in Ramer, supra, in Hyson v. Montgomery County, ......
  • MacDonald v. Board of County Com'rs for Prince George's County, 427
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • May 5, 1965
    ...its R-6 classification. That alone is not, however, an absolute bar to reclassification. Zoning is not static. Missouri Realty, Inc. v. Ramer, supra, 216 Md. at 447, 140 A.2d 655. It is, nevertheless, necessary to show error in original zoning or in its equivalent, comprehensive rezoning, o......
  • Woodlawn Area Citizens Ass'n v. Board of County Com'rs for Prince George's County
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • January 21, 1966
    ...prior decision. We must not permit zoning to become static. As Judge Prescott, for the Court, aptly said in Missouri Realty, Inc. v. Ramer, 216 Md. 442, 447, 140 A.2d 655, 657 (1958): 'It is a principle of universal recognition that zoning once imposed, is not static. If it could not be alt......
  • Montgomery County v. Greater Colesville Citizens Ass'n, Inc.
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • September 1, 1986
    ...County Board, 234 Md. 259, 199 A.2d 216 (1964); Trustees v. Baltimore County, 221 Md. 550, 158 A.2d 637 (1960); Missouri Realty, Inc. v. Ramer, 216 Md. 442, 140 A.2d 655 (1958). The "reasonably probable of fruition in the foreseeable future" test is functionally a mechanism for gauging the ......
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