Missouri River Telephone Co. v. City of Mitchell
| Decision Date | 19 April 1908 |
| Citation | 116 N.W. 67,22 S.D. 191 |
| Parties | MISSOURI RIVER TELEPHONE COMPANY, Plaintiff and respondent, v. CITY OF MITCHELL, Defendant and appellant. |
| Court | South Dakota Supreme Court |
CITY OF MITCHELL, Defendant and appellant. South Dakota Supreme Court Appeal from Circuit Court, Davison County, SD Hon. Frank B. Smith, Judge Affirmed Preston & Hamlett Attorneys for appellant A. E. Hitchcock Attorneys for respondent. Opinion filed Apr 19, 1908
This is an action to restrain the defendant from interfering with the construction and operation of a long distance telephone line within its limits, except by reasonable regulation and control. The decision of the learned circuit court, containing numerous findings of fact, concludes as follows:
“(1) That the action taken by the defendant, the city of Mitchell, through its city council, gave the plaintiff consent and privilege for the plaintiff to erect and operate long-distance telephone line within said city, and that after said consent and privilege was given by the said defendant to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff had acted upon said consent and privilege by erecting said telephone line and expending large sums of money therefor, the defendant Is without authority of law to remove said telephone line from said city and prevent the plaintiff from operating the same according to the form and manner attempted by the defendant;
(2) that the plaintiff is entitled to a judgment against the defendant permanently restraining the defendant from preventing the plaintiff from constructing, maintaining, and operating said line according to the consent and privilege which has been granted by the defendant to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff is entitled to recover its costs and disbursements in this action, and that defendant’s counterclaim be dismissed.”
After entry of judgment and notice of intention to move for a new trial, but before such motion was heard, the court, upon plaintiff’s application and upon notice to the defendant, amended its decision by adding to the findings of fact the following:
“The court further finds that the plaintiff in this action, if the defendant be allowed to carry out its intention in debarring the plaintiff from operating its said telephone line within the said city of Mitchell, will be financially damaged, and that it would be extremely difficult to ascertain the amount of the compensation which would afford the plaintiff adequate relief for such damage, and the plaintiff is without remedy at law in the premises.”
Upon the trial of an issue of fact by the court, its decision must be given in writing. In giving the decision, the facts found and the conclusions must be separately stated, Rev. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 276, 277. There should, of course, be a finding upon each material issue of fact, but the only conclusion required is the opinion of the court as to what relief either party is entitled to upon the facts established by the pleadings and evidence. If the relief granted is warranted by the established facts, it is not material whether right reasons, or any reasons, are assigned by the trial court for granting it. The best form of decision by a trial judge is a statement of the facts established by the pleadings and evidence, followed by the conclusion that upon the facts so found the plaintiff (or defendant, as the case may be) is entitled to judgment, specifying in general terms the nature of the judgment. Whether, in the case at bar, it would be extremely difficult to ascertain the amount of compensation which would afford adequate relief if the plaintiff was unlawfully prevented from continuing to operate its telephone in the defendant city, whether it had an adequate remedy at law, and was therefore not entitled to the relief demanded and granted, was conclusion of law, depending upon the established material facts, and necessarily involved in the decision that plaintiff was entitled to a permanent injunction. The amendment was, therefore, wholly immaterial, and not reversible error, even, if the court was without power to amend its decision by adding thereto an inadvertently omitted finding of fact—a proposition upon which no opinion is expressed.
The argument of appellant’s counsel in support of the contention that the facts found by the trial court do not sustain its conclusions of law is founded upon a misapprehension as to the source of the plaintiff’s rights. Its franchise was derived from the state, not from the city. It is a corporation created by and existing under state laws. The nature and extent of its rights depend on the will of the Legislature, limited, so far as this case is concerned, only by the provision of the state Constitution that no telephone line shall be constructed within the limits of any city without the consent of its local authorities. Const. SD art. 10, § 3. While this provision limits the power of the state Legislature, it grants no legislative power to the municipal council. Though the Legislature may not authorize the construction of a telephone line in any city without the Tatter’s consent, the city has no power to impose any conditions or establish any regulations other than those permitted by the Legislature. Adding to the statute the constitutional provision regarding consent, the law applicable to the issue here involved is expressed in the following language:
...
To continue reading
Request your trial