Mitchell v. Bishop

• Decision Date: 23 December 1968
• Docket Number: No. 5346,5346
• Citation: 245 Ark. 899,435 S.W.2d 91
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
• Parties: Lonnie B. MITCHELL, Appellant, v. O. E. BISHOP, Appellee.

Page 91

435 S.W.2d 91

245 Ark. 899

Lonnie B. MITCHELL, Appellant, v. O. E. BISHOP, Appellee.

No. 5346.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Dec. 23, 1968.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 20, 1969.

McMath, Leatherman, Woods & Youngdahl, John P. Sizemore, Little Rock, and Gaughan, Laney, Barnes & Roberts, Camden, for appellant, Rafael Guzman, Fayetteville, of counsel.

Joe Purcell, Atty. Gen., Don Langston, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.

JONES, Justice.

This case presents an excellent example of the inadequacy of the judicial machinery in our dual court system for final disposition of a criminal case where a confession is used in evidence against the one who makes it, and under modern interpretation and concepts of the due process clauses of Amendments 5 and 14 of our Constitution. The question now before this court, and one which we anticipate will be here again, is whether a confession made by Lonnie Mitchell, more than nine years ago, was voluntarily made without coercion.

The appellant, Lonnie Mitchell, was convicted of the crime of rape in Union Country, Arkansas, in March 1959, and sentenced to death by electrocution. He admitted the rape in a recorded confession, the recording was played to the jury at his trial, and upon appeal to this court the conviction was affirmed. (Mitchell v. State, 230 Ark. 894, 327 S.W.2d 384.) The appellant then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Jefferson County Circuit Court, the application was dismissed and was affirmed by this court on appeal. (Mitchell v. State, ex rel. Henslee, 233 Ark. 578, 346 S.W.2d 201.) Appellant then filed an original application with this court for permission to file a petition for a writ of error coram nobis in the trial court relative to his sanity at the time of the trial. This application was denied. (Mitchell v. State, 234 Ark. 762, 354 S.W.2d 557.) Appellant then instituted habeas corpus proceedings in forma pauperis in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas and the petition was denied on the grounds that he had not exhausted his state remedies. (Mitchell v. Henslee, 208 F.Supp. 533.) An appeal was taken to the U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, from the order of the District Court denying the petition, and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court. (332 F.2d 16.) On remand to the District Court, hearing was had in which appellant testified and the District Court filed an opinion in support of its conclusions denying the petition. (Mitchell v. Stephens, 232 F.Supp. 497.) Appellant again appealed from that decision to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals and argued five points for reversal.

In a thorough, analytical opinion, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals took up and disposed of each of the points raised by the appellant in their proper order. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, however, with the District Court's conclusions that the appellant effectively waived the question of coercion in connection with his confession by not raising that question at his state trial, and the court summarized and concluded its holding as follows:

'In summary, therefore, on the confession point, we hold that this record does not establish involuntariness as a matter of law or that Mitchell effectively waived the issue of coercion; that the district court's determination that the defense claim as to the absence of assistance of counsel has no substance is adequately supported by the record; but that, under Jackson v. Denno (378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908, 1 A.L.R.3d 1205), Mitchell is entitled to an independent state court determination as to the voluntariness of his confession. * * *

The order of the district court dismissing the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is reversed and the case is remanded with directions to grant the State of Arkansas a reasonable time to afford Mitchell an appropriate hearing on the issue of voluntariness of his rape confession or, in the alternative, a new trial.' (353 F.2d 129.)

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that:

'* * * (U)nder Jackson v. Denno, Mitchell is entitled to an independent state court determination as to the voluntariness of his confession.'

In commenting on Mitchell's contention in the federal court, that his court appointed attorney failed to present his defense of coercion, the court of appeals at page 145 of the Federal Report said:

'It is to be observed again that as to some of these facts there is sharp conflict in the evidence. Thomas and others testified of free access to Mitchell and of frequent consultations. It is true that the coercion issue was not raised and its existence was even specifically denied by counsel during the trial. But if Mr. Thomas' testimony is to be accepted, this was a matter of definite and deep concern to him. He reviewed it with Mitchell, but he was given no material with which to work. In any event, it is before the court now and Mitchell, as we have held above, is to have his day in court on this claim and must then make his case if he can.' (Emphasis supplied.)

Upon remand to the Union County Circuit Court, the appellant was afforded an open court hearing before Judge Crumpler on April 25, 1967, and the appellant was present in court with his parents and his attorney at this hearing.

At the hearing afforded the appellant on April 25, 1967, the appellant's attorney and the state's attorney agreed to submit the matter to the trial judge on the records already made in the state and federal courts. The attorneys waived oral arguments, both sides submitted briefs, and with the exception of Sheriff Bishop's short addition to his previous testimony, as to attorney Thomas visiting the appellant in jail, no additional evidence was offered by the state and no additional evidence at all was offered by the appellant. The trial judge, of necessity, made his findings of fact and conclusions of law from the records before him, which were the same records that were before the circuit court of appeals when that court remanded the case with directions to...