Mitchell v. Caldwell
| Decision Date | 26 October 1957 |
| Docket Number | No. 5599.,5599. |
| Citation | 249 F.2d 10 |
| Parties | James P. MITCHELL, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, Appellant, v. Joe P. CALDWELL, Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Eugene R. Jackson, Atty., U. S. Dept. of Labor, Washington, D. C. (Stuart Rothman, Sol., Bessie Margolin, Asst. Sol., Sylvia S. Ellison, Atty., Washington, D. C., and Earl Street, Regional Atty., U. S. Dept. of Labor, Dallas, Tex., on the brief), for appellant.
John Barksdale, Okmulgee, Okl. (D. F. Rainey, Okmulgee, Okl., on the brief), for appellee.
Before BRATTON, Chief Judge, and PHILLIPS and BREITENSTEIN, Circuit Judges.
Pursuant to the authority vested in him by the Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq., the Secretary of Labor instituted this action against Joe P. Caldwell, engaged in business under the trade name Caldwell Enterprises, to recover for T. R. Harwell overtime pay in the amount of $1,203.50 alleged to be due under the act. The court found among other things that the defendant was engaged in the production of crude oil on leases in Oklahoma; that substantially all of the oil was regularly sold and delivered in commerce to points outside of Oklahoma; that Harwell was employed by the defendant for the period commencing January 1, 1954, and ending March 1, 1955; that his duties included operating, maintaining, and repairing the pumps, engines, tanks, pipe lines, and other equipment utilized in the production of the crude oil; that he was paid at the rate of $325 per month; that he was never paid any overtime compensation; that the defendant did not keep detailed records of the working hours of Harwell; that such failure was due to defendant's erroneous conception that Harwell was employed in an executive capacity within the meaning of the act; and that the fragmentary records kept by Harwell and other introduced evidence implied that Harwell worked some in excess of forty hours per week but did not establish the extent and amount of such overtime as a matter of just and reasonable inference. Concluding as a matter of law that the employee failed to discharge the burden of proof, judgment was entered for the defendant; and the Secretary of Labor appealed.
The principal attack upon the judgment is that the court erred in holding that appellant failed to sustain the burden of proof resting upon him. It was clearly implied in the findings of the court that Harwell worked some in excess of forty hours per week. The crucial finding upon which the case turned was that the evidence failed to establish with the required degree of certainty the amount of such overtime work. In a case of this kind to recover overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the burden rests upon the employee to show that he performed overtime work for which he was not properly compensated and to show the extent and amount of such work as a matter of just and reasonable inference. When the employee proves that he did in fact perform overtime work for which he was not properly compensated and produces sufficient evidence to show the extent and amount of such work as a matter of just and reasonable inference, the burden shifts to the employer to come forward with evidence of the precise amount of the work performed or with evidence to negate the reasonableness of the inference to be drawn from the evidence of the employee. And if the employer fails to produce such evidence, it is the duty of the court to enter judgment for the employee, even though the amount be only a reasonable approximation. Anderson v. Mount Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 66 S.Ct. 1187, 90 L.Ed. 1515; Porter v. Poindexter, 10 Cir., 158 F.2d 759; Handler v. Thrasher, 10 Cir., 191 F.2d 120.
Coming to the evidence and viewing its sufficiency in the light of the general rule...
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Bustillos v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Hidalgo Cnty.
...v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. at 686-87; Wirtz v. Lieb, 366 F.2d 412, 414 (10th Cir. 1966)(Murrah, J.); Mitchell v. Caldwell, 249 F.2d 10, 11 (10th Cir. 1957)(Bratton, J.); Doty v. Elias, 733 F.2d 720, 725 (10th Cir. 1984); Brubach v. City of Albuquerque, 893 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1224 (......
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Bustillos v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Hidalgo Cnty., CIV 13-0971 JB/GBW
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