Mitchell v. City of Horicon
| Decision Date | 03 July 1953 |
| Citation | 264 Wis. 350,59 N.W.2d 469 |
| Parties | MITCHELL et al. v. CITY OF HORICON. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
Thomas, Orr, Isaksen & Werner, Madison, for appellants.
Clarence G. Traeger, Horicon, for respondent.
We consider that sec. 70.111(9), Stats. requires the tractors in question to be put on the tax roll. Horse or power drawn farm machinery is that which is dragged around by horses or power units but the language of the statute does not suggest to us that the legislature by this section also meant to exempt the pulling power, either animal or mechanical, in addition to the object drawn. The tractor does not become a part of the exempt machinery which it draws any more than the horse does. Appellants contend that the tractor which moves by its own power falls within the description of a power drawn machine. That involves an uncommon use of language. 'Self-propelled', 'automotive', or 'power driven' machine or vehicle would be usual and customary terms applicable to tractors but since the legislature puts the mechanical power plant on a parity with the horse in its description of the machinery to be exempt, it is our conclusion that in granting the exemption the legislature was referring to machinery having no means of propulsion of its own but dependent for movement on some outside force.
The complaint alleges that it was the legislative purpose to make available to farmers in the spring extensive stocks of farm equipment and to aid this purpose, by encouraging dealers to carry large stocks, the legislature exempted farm machinery from the usual May 1st assessment and tax liability. It is also alleged that from 1941, when the italicized portion of the statute, supra, was enacted, until 1950, when the State Department of Taxation instructed assessors to assess farm tractors in dealers' hands, it was the practice of local assessors generally, if not invariably, to regard the tractors as exempt. In so far as these may be allegations of material fact, they are admitted by the demurrer and respondent's argument that they are not true cannot be entertained. Demurrers concede the truth of material statements of fact.
Practical construction, it is true, has its place in the interpretation of statutes whose meaning is doubtful. The trouble with that argument here is that it is a fundamental rule of taxation that, if there is doubt, the doubt must be resolved against the party claiming an exemption. Albion v. Trask, 1950, 256...
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...from taxation are to be strictly construed against to taxpayer and in favor of the taxing authority. Mitchell v. City of Horicon, 1953, 264 Wis. 350, 352, 59 N.W.2d 469; and Comet Co. v. Wisconsin Department of Taxation, 1943, 243 Wis. 117, 123, 9 N.W.2d 620. However, there is some division......
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...Justice BEILFUSS joins in this concurring opinion. 1 Bolick v. Gallagher (1955), 268 Wis. 421, 67 N.W.2d 860; Mitchell v. City of Horicon (1953), 264 Wis. 350, 59 N.W.2d 469.2 Sizer v. Clark (1903), 116 Wis. 534, 540, 93 N.W. 539. See also 55 Am.Jur., Vendor and Purchaser, p. 496, sec. 28.3......
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...allegations as are material statements of fact. Statements which are conclusions are not admitted by demurrer. Mitchell v. City of Horicon, 1953, 264 Wis. 350, 59 N.W.2d 469. 'A demurrer to a complaint admits all the facts therein well pleaded, but it does not admit erroneous conclusions dr......
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