Mitchell v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue

Decision Date15 December 2008
Docket NumberNo. 2518–04.,2518–04.
Citation131 T.C. No. 15,131 T.C. 215
PartiesLARRY G. and Maria A. Walton MITCHELL, Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
CourtU.S. Tax Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

P–W received distributions during 2001 made pursuant to a QDRO after her ex-husband retired from the U.S. Air Force. Ps did not include the 2001 distribution in income when they filed their joint 2001 Federal tax return. R issued a notice of deficiency in which he determined that Ps were liable for income tax on the distribution.

Held: Distributions received by P–W are income to P–W and are includable in petitioners' taxable income.

Larry G. and Maria A. Walton Mitchell, pro se.

Michael R. Skutley, for respondent.

OPINION

GOEKE, Judge.1

Respondent determined a deficiency of $1,471 in petitioners' Federal tax for 2001. The issue for decision is whether $5,126 received by petitioner Maria A. Walton Mitchell (petitioner) for her interest in her former husband's military retired pay is includable in her gross income. For the reasons stated herein, we hold that it is.

Background

The following facts are stipulated or are not disputed by the parties. The parties' stipulation of facts and the accompanying exhibits are incorporated herein by this reference.

Petitioners resided in California at the time that the petition was filed.

Before her marriage to Larry G. Mitchell, petitioner was married to Bobbie Leon Walton. At the time of their marriage, Mr. Walton was on active duty in the U.S. Air Force (USAF). Mr. Walton and petitioner separated in 1985. Pursuant to a final judgment entered by the Superior Court of the State of California (superior court) their divorce became final on August 29, 1986. On August 1, 1990, Mr. Walton retired from the USAF after 26 years on active duty and began receiving military retired pay. Petitioner subsequently petitioned the superior court with respect to her interest in Mr. Walton's military retired pay. On January 2, 1991, the superior court entered an order (order) which stated in pertinent part:

2. Servicemember [Mr. Walton] retired from the United States Air Force on August 1, 1990, with fully vested retirement rights and benefits, a portion of which are community property of Servicemember and of Servicemember's former spouse,

* * *

4. * * * [Petitioner] is now entitled to an order dividing the military retirement to the extent same was earned by Servicemember during the marriage to * * * [her].

* * *

8. * * * [Petitioner] shall be awarded as her sole and separate property, one-half (1/2) of the community property interest in Servicemember's net disposable military retirement pay as set forth in the California case of Mansell v. Mansell decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on May 30, 1989, wherein the net disposable military retirement pay is defined as the net after deducting (a) amounts owned [sic] by the military member to the United States; (b) required by law to be deducted from total pay, including employment taxes, and fines and forfeitures ordered by courts-martial; (c) properly deducted from Federal, State and [sic] income taxes; (d) withheld pursuant to other provisions under the Internal Revenue Code; (e) deducted to pay government life insurance premiums; and (f) deducted to create an annuity for the former spouse (10 U.S.C. # 1408 (a)-(4)-(A)-(F)).

9. The community property interest in the Servicemember's net disposable retirement pay is determined to be 48.7%.

10. * * * [Petitioner's] interest in Servicemember's net disposable retirement pay is determined to be 24.35%.

Attached to the order was a factsheet titled “DIRECT PAYMENTS FROM U.S. AIR FORCE RETIRED PAY PURSUANT TO THE UNIFORMED SERVICES FORMER SPOUSES' PROTECTION ACT” (factsheet). The factsheet stated in pertinent part:

j. Taxes may be held only from the Air Force retiree's pay. Funds may not be held for taxes from the ex-spouses portion. For further information, we refer you to the nearest Internal Revenue Service office.

Sometime in 1991 petitioner began receiving monthly payments from the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) for her interest in Mr. Walton's military retired pay pursuant to the order. For the taxable year 2001 she received payments from DFAS in the aggregate amount of $5,126. DFAS issued to petitioner a Form 1099–R, Distributions From Pensions, Annuities, Retirement or Profit–Sharing Plans, IRAs, Insurance Contracts, etc., for the taxable year 2001 which reported both the gross distribution and the taxable amount as $5,126 and the amount of Federal income tax withheld as zero.

Petitioners timely filed a joint Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, for 2001 but did not report the $5,126 distribution that petitioner received from DFAS. On November 10, 2003, respondent issued to petitioners a notice of deficiency for the taxable year 2001. In the notice respondent determined that petitioners failed to report the $5,126 in their gross income.

On February 9, 2004, petitioners filed an imperfect petition. On March 26, 2004, petitioners filed an amended petition alleging that taxes were to be taken into account before petitioner was issued her share of Mr. Walton's retirement benefits and that if petitioner's share were taxed, it would be subject to double taxation.

A trial was held on June 24, 2005, in Los Angeles, California.

Discussion

Petitioners argue that taxes should have been withheld on the entire amount of the pension payments disbursed to Mr. Walton before petitioner was paid her share. Petitioners maintain that if petitioner is required to pay Federal income tax on her share, then Mr. Walton's pension is being subject to double taxation, both on disbursement to Mr. Walton and again when petitioner receives her share. Respondent argues that tax was withheld only on Mr. Walton's share of the military pay, not on petitioner's share.2

Petitioner's interest in the military retired pay was determined according to the laws of the State of California. In the State of California, community property principles apply in divorce proceedings. Consistent with these principles, each spouse is considered to have a one-half ownership interest in all property earned by either spouse during the marriage. See Cal. Fam.Code sec. 2550 (West 2004). In McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 101 S.Ct. 2728, 69 L.Ed.2d 589 (1981), the Supreme Court held that the Federal statutes then governing military retirement pay prevented State courts from treating military retirement pay as community property. In response to McCarty, Congress enacted in 1982 the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1983, Pub.L. 97–252, sec. 1002, 96 Stat. 730 (1982), which added section 1408 to title 10 of the United States Code. Under 10 U.S.C. sec. 1408(c)(1) (2006), a State court may treat disposable military retired pay in a divorce proceeding either as property solely of the servicemember or as property of the military retiree and his or her spouse in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction of the court. If a divorce was effective before February 3, 1991, only the disposable retired pay, which is the total monthly retired pay to which a member is entitled less, inter alia, amounts properly withheld for Federal, State, or local income taxes, may be treated as the property of the member and his spouse. 10 U.S.C. sec. 1408(a)(4) (1988); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (NDAA), Pub.L. 101–510, sec. 555(b)(3), (e)(2), 104 Stat. 1569, 1570 (1990).

Under California law post- McCarty, military retirement benefits earned during marriage are community property. Casas v. Thompson, 42 Cal.3d 131, 228 Cal.Rptr. 33, 720 P.2d 921, 925 (Cal.1986); see Gillmore v. Gillmore, 29 Cal.3d 418, 174 Cal.Rptr. 493, 629 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal.1981).

While State law determines the nature of a property interest, Federal law determines the Federal taxation of that property interest. United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190, 91 S.Ct. 1763, 29 L.Ed.2d 406 (1971). Furthermore, the tax liability for income from property attaches to the owner of the property. Eatinger v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.1990–310 (citing Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334, 60 S.Ct. 554, 84 L.Ed. 788 (1940), Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5, 12, 57 S.Ct. 330, 81 L.Ed. 465 (1937), Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 51 S.Ct. 58, 75 L.Ed. 239 (1930), and Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 50 S.Ct. 241, 74 L.Ed. 731 (1930)).

As a general rule, the Internal Revenue Code imposes a tax on the taxable income of every individual. See Sec. 1. For purposes of calculating taxable income, section 61(a) defines gross income as “all income from whatever source derived” unless otherwise specifically excluded. Gross income specifically includes amounts derived from pensions. Sec. 61(a)(11). Military retired pay constitutes a pension within the meaning of that section. See Eatinger v. Commissioner, supra (“A military retirement pension, like other pensions, is simply a right to receive a future income stream from the retiree's employer.”); sec. 1.61–2(a)(1), Income Tax Regs.; sec. 1.61–11(a), Income Tax Regs. (“Pensions and retirement allowances paid either by the Government or by private persons constitute gross income unless excluded by law.”); see also 10 U.S.C. 1461(a) (2006) (defining the Department of Defense Military Retirement Fund).

Under section 402(a) a pension distribution is normally taxed to the distributee. Pursuant to section 402(e)(1)(A), the spouse or former spouse is treated as the distributee with respect to distributions allocated to that spouse pursuant to a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO), and such distributions therefore become taxable income to that spouse. The spouse receiving the distribution pursuant to the QDRO is also known as an “alternate payee”. Secs. 402(e)(1)(A), 414(p)(8).

A domestic relations order (DRO) qualifies as a QDRO only if it: (1) Creates or recognizes the existence of an alternate payee's right to, or assigns to an alternate...

To continue reading

Request your trial
8 cases
  • Wienke v. Comm'r
    • United States
    • U.S. Tax Court
    • 14 Octubre 2020
    ...ownership of community property income, while Federal law determines the Federal taxation of that income. See Mitchell v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 215, 218 (2008) (citing Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190). Under California community property law, each spouse owns a one-half interest in the community es......
  • Koprowski v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue
    • United States
    • U.S. Tax Court
    • 6 Febrero 2012
    ...in a small tax case gives rise to collateral estoppel (or "issue preclusion") is controversial, cf. Mitchell v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 215, 221-239 (2008) (Holmes, J., concurring) (discussing the collateral estoppel effect of small tax cases); but in this case we do not face the question wh......
  • Dickerson v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue
    • United States
    • U.S. Tax Court
    • 6 Marzo 2012
    ...isa question of fact * * * state law determines precisely what property is transferred"), aff'g T.C. Memo. 1985-595; Mitchell v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 215, 218 (2008) (stating State law determines the nature of a property interest and Federal law determines the Federal taxation of that pro......
  • Griggs v. Comm'r
    • United States
    • U.S. Tax Court
    • 7 Enero 2013
    ...favor on the basis of the trial record, we need not and do not reach respondent's collateral estoppel argument. See Mitchell v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 215, 217 n.2 (2008). ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT