Mitchell v. First Call Bail & Sur., Inc.

• Decision Date: 09 October 2019
• Docket Number: CV 19-67-M-DLC
• Citation: 412 F.Supp.3d 1208
• Parties: Eugen Deshane MITCHELL, Shayleen Meuchell, on their own behalf and as next friend of B.M., Plaintiffs, v. FIRST CALL BAIL AND SURETY, INC., Allegheny Casualty Company, International Fidelity Insurance Company, The Montana Civil Assistance Group, Michael Ratzburg, Van Ness Baker, And jason Haack, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Montana

412 F.Supp.3d 1208

Eugen Deshane MITCHELL, Shayleen Meuchell, on their own behalf and as next friend of B.M., Plaintiffs,
v.
FIRST CALL BAIL AND SURETY, INC., Allegheny Casualty Company, International Fidelity Insurance Company, The Montana Civil Assistance Group, Michael Ratzburg, Van Ness Baker, And jason Haack, Defendants.

CV 19-67-M-DLC

United States District Court, D. Montana, Missoula Division.

Signed October 9, 2019

412 F.Supp.3d 1213

Alexander H. Rate, Elizabeth K. Ehret, American Civil Liberties Union of Montana, Missoula, MT, Andrea Woods,Pro Hac Vice, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, New York, NY, Blythe H. Chandler, Toby J. Marshall, Terrell Marshall Law Group, PLLC, Seattle, WA, Bryan C. Tipp, Sarah M. Lockwood, Tipp Coburn Schandelson PC, Missoula, MT, for Plaintiffs.

Jeffrey Russel Kuchel, Matthew A. Baldassin, Crowley Fleck PLLP-Missoula, Missoula, MT, for Defendants.

ORDER

Dana L. Christensen, Chief Judge United States District Court

Before the Court is Defendants First Call Bail and Surety, Inc. ("First Call"), Allegheny Casualty Company ("Allegheny"), International Fidelity Insurance Company ("Fidelity"), and Michael Ratzburg's (collectively "Surety Defendants") Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint (Doc. 20), and Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 47). For the reasons explained, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and denied in part and its Motion to Strike is denied. All of the claims at issue in the Motion to Dismiss will go forward, except Plaintiffs' strict liability claim which will be dismissed.

BACKGROUND

Today, the majority of defendants charged with a felony use a commercial surety to post bail. (Doc. 1 at 21.) The commercial bail bond functions as a contract between the state, the defendant who promises to appear at a future court date, and the bond agent who acts as a surety of that promise. 8 C.J.S. Bail § 160. If the defendant does not appear, a court will forfeit the bond, giving the bond company the right to redeem its value against the defendant. Although, most courts permit a grace period by which the bond company can produce the defendant in order to avoid forfeiture. E.g. , Mont. Code Ann. § 46–9–503.

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As between the defendant and the local bond company, the defendant pays a nonrefundable premium, typically ten percent of the bond, in exchange for the bond agent's services. (Id. at 37.) Behind the scenes, large insurance companies underwrite these bonds. (Id. at 27.) The bond premium paid by the defendant is shared between the bond agent and the insurance company. (Id. at 29.) In exchange for support and services the insurance company offers the local bondsman, the insurance company typically requires the bond agent to pay into a "build-up fund" to cover the cost of forfeiture. (Id. at 32, 34.) For the insurance company, the bail bond is a low risk investment. (See id. at 30.) But the bondsman plays a high-risk game. At most, he stands to gain his portion of the premium. In the event of forfeiture, he stands to lose ten times as much. (Id. at 37.) To minimize this risk, the bondsman works with a bond recovery agent, colloquially known as a bounty hunter. The bounty hunter makes its money by retaining approximately ten percent of the total bond if he successfully captures the defendant. (Id. at 38.)

In early January 2017, Eugene Mitchell was arrested for driving with a suspended license and without proof of insurance. The court set bail at $1,670. Unable to pay, Mitchell's wife (Sheyleen Meuchell) entered into a private bail bond agreement with First Call (a local bond agency) to secure Mitchell's release. Allegheny and Fidelity were sureties on the bond. In exchange, Meuchell paid a $228 nonrefundable premium which Ratzburg (the owner of First Call) agreed to take in two installments. Meuchell paid $115 at the time of signing and paid the second installment approximately one week later. (Id. at 2–3.)

In the agreement signed by Meuchell and Mitchell (the "Agreement"), First Call reserved certain rights including the right to change the terms of the agreement and to use physical force to apprehend and arrest Mitchell in the event he did not appear in court. (Doc 1-1.) Meuchell was hurried as she signed the contract and Mitchell had no opportunity to review its terms. (Doc. 1 at 4.)

On April 19, 2017 Mitchell failed to appear for court. (Id. ) Two days later, Ratzburg hired Van Ness Baker, Jr., who is the Vice President of an organization called the Montana Civil Assistance Group ("MCAG") to arrest Mitchell. (Id. at 10–11.) Ratzburg issued a document entitled "Arrest of Defendant on Bail Bond" which "authoriz[ed] and empower[ed] Van Ness Baker it's [sic] representative and its stead, to arrest and detain" Mitchell. (Id. at 11.) Ratzburg also incorrectly informed MCAG that Mitchell still owed the second premium payment. (Id. ) Montana law allows commercial bond sureties to arrest and surrender those who have failed to appear in court. Mont. Code Ann. § 46–9–510. Montana otherwise does not impose a license requirement or regulate the practice of bounty hunting. (Id. at 26.)

MCAG is a paramilitary group. It recommends its members carry semiautomatic rifles to be the "last line of defense against any threat" to our nation. MCAG performs for-hire bounty hunting services, typically retaining about ten percent of the total bail bond amount.¹ (Id. at 12.)

Upon hire, members of MCAG were deployed to search for Mitchell. (Id. at 13.) They staked out his home over the weekend and surveilled his neighborhood. (Id. )

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Meuchell was aware she was being watched but did not know why. (Id. at 13–14.) At one point, when a guest arrived at the couple's house, MCAG members surrounded the visitor's car with their guns drawn for approximately twenty minutes while they questioned the driver and her teenage daughter. (Id. at 14.)

At approximately 9:20 p.m. on April 23, 2017, members of MCAG forcefully kicked in the door and entered the couple's home with their weapons drawn. (Id. ) They entered the bedroom where Mitchell and Meuchell were lying in bed with their four-year old daughter. (Id. at 14–15.) With guns pointed at the family, someone gave the order not to move. (Id. at 5.) Mitchell was escorted from the room where he was handcuffed, arrested, and taken to the Ravalli County Detention Center, approximately an hour away. (Id. ) MCAG filled out a field report and someone called Ratzburg during the arrest to notify him that the "team was securing Mitchell." (Id. at 15.)

When MCAG arrived at the jail, they produced Ratzburg's petition. (Id. at 16.) However, the officers initially refused to accept Mitchell because MCAG did not have an arrest warrant signed by a judge. (Id. ) Officers then began to work up an unlawful detainment charge against MCAG for their unlawful arrest of Mitchell.² (Id. at 17.) The five bounty hunters present for the break-in have since been charged with assault with a weapon, aggravated burglary, unlawful restraint, accountability for aggravated burglary, and criminal mischief as a result of the incident. (Id. at 2.)

LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 12(b)(6) motions test the legal sufficiency of a pleading. Under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a pleading must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Rule 8 "does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal citations and quotations omitted). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). A claim has facial plausibility when the court can draw a "reasonable inference" from the facts that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Knievel v. ESPN , 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005).

Legal conclusions, on the other hand, are not entitled to the same presumption of truth. Dismissal is proper where there is either a "lack of a cognizable legal theory" or "the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory." Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept. , 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990) ; Graehling v. Village of Lombard, Ill. , 58 F.3d 295, 297 (7th Cir. 1995).

When ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court generally cannot consider material outside the complaint. Branch v. Tunnell , 14 F.3d 449, 453 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara , 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002). Nevertheless, a court may

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consider exhibits submitted along with the complaint where the exhibits are: (1)...