Mitchell v. Fujitec Am., Inc.
| Docket Number | 1:20-cv-363 |
| Decision Date | 21 March 2022 |
| Parties | DARRYL MITCHELL, Plaintiff, v. FUJITEC AMERICA, INC., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
This action is now before the Court on Defendants Fujitec America Inc. (“Fujitec America”), Fujitec Co., Ltd. (“Fujitec Co.”), and Fujitec America's Chief Executive Officer Gary Krupp's (collectively the “Fujitec Defendants”) Motion to Partially Dismiss (Doc. 21) Plaintiff Darryl Mitchell's Amended Complaint (Doc. 19). For the reasons explained below, the Court GRANTS the Motion (Doc. 21) IN PART and DENIES it IN PART.
BACKGROUND[1]
Mitchell began working as in-house counsel for Fujitec America in 2012.[2] (Am. Compl., Doc. 19, #227). In 2013 Fujitec promoted him to Chief Legal Officer, the position he maintained until Fujitec terminated his employment in early 2020. (Id. at #227, 236). That parting of ways gave rise to this lawsuit.
According to Mitchell, near the end of 2019, he approached Gary Krupp, Fujitec America's Chief Executive Officer, to inquire about what Mitchell believed were pay inequities relating to Mitchell's compensation. (Id. at #230). In particular, Mitchell, an African American, alleges that he complained to Krupp about making less than “similarly-situated Caucasian counterparts.” (Id. at #230-31). Krupp declined to discuss the issue, and rejected Mitchell's request for increased compensation. (Id. at #231). Mitchell further claims that, at about this same time, Krupp began stripping job responsibilities from Mitchell and interfering with Mitchell's access to information that Mitchell contends was important to his professional duties. (Id.).
A few weeks after Krupp denied Mitchell's request for additional compensation, Krupp came to Mitchell's office to inform him that another Fujitec employee, Shawnez McKenzie, had filed a complaint against Mitchell with human resources. (Id. at #232). Krupp, along with Fujitec's Controller, Daiji Yoshimura, who was also present for the meeting, declined to provide any specifics about McKenzie's allegations. (Id.). But, immediately after the meeting, Krupp asked Mitchell to report to a conference room where Fujitec's outside counsel Betsy Turner, retained to investigate the complaint, interviewed him. (Id. at #232-33).
During the interview, Mitchell learned that McKenzie had alleged that Mitchell sexually harassed her. Specifically, McKenzie claimed that Mitchell had “propositioned” her. (Id. at #233). Further, McKenzie stated that Mitchell had allegedly grabbed her by the waist in the office breakroom. (Id.). Questions posed to Mitchell by Turner further suggested that McKenzie had asserted to human resources that Mitchell visited her at her home, and had engaged in inappropriate conversation during a ten-minute phone call. (Id. at #233-34).
The next day, Fujitec placed Mitchell on administrative leave. (Id. at #234). A day after that, Fujitec denied Mitchell access to the company's “computers and telecommunication system.” (Id.). Mitchell further claims that, contrary to Fujitec's policy for workplace investigations, the company refused to provide status updates throughout the review process. (See Id. at #234-35).
On January 21, 2020, Mitchell learned from a co-worker that Krupp had shared details surrounding McKenzie's allegations to other “non-authorized” employees. (Id. at #235). This discussion allegedly occurred during a social gathering for dinner and drinks. (Id.). Mitchell believes none of the employees present had a “need to know” about McKenzie's complaint or the ensuing investigation. (Id.).
On February 3, 2020, Krupp asked Mitchell to bring his Fujitec laptop to work on February 5, 2020, so that the company could install “new anti-virus software.” (Id. at #235-36). When Mitchell showed up that day, he discovered that his badge no longer provided him access to the company building. (Id. at #236). Krupp met Mitchell and escorted him to a conference room. Once there, Krupp told Mitchell that the company determined Mitchell had violated Fujitec's sexual harassment policy, and that Mitchell was terminated, effective immediately. (Id.). Mitchell claims that, in doing so, Krupp refused to provide any details regarding that determination, once again contrary to Fujitec policy. (Id.).
According to Mitchell, McKenzie fabricated her sexual harassment allegations. (Id. at #237). Mitchell further claims that she did so because Mitchell, in his capacity as Chief Legal Officer, had investigated McKenzie and one of her colleagues for alleged workplace misconduct. (Id.). Given that incident, McKenzie brought allegations against Mitchell “to shield herself from otherwise legitimate employment action, i.e., termination for poor job performance.” (Id.). Mitchell believes that any “thorough and complete investigation” would have revealed the falsity of the charges against him, but that the company failed to conduct one because of its preordained decision to terminate him. (See Id. at #238).
All of that said, it is not entirely clear that Mitchell is asserting that his alleged violation of the sexual harassment policy was even the basis for his termination. That is so because Mitchell separately alleges that Krupp informed Mitchell that the primary reason for his termination was that Mitchell had withheld information regarding wrongdoing by Fujitec's former Chief Financial Officer, Ray Gibson. (Id. at #239). And Krupp may have relied on that reason despite the fact that the Gibson incident occurred “years prior” to Mitchell's termination and Mitchell's knowledge about Gibson's misconduct only “arose out of rumors.” (Id.).
In any event, Mitchell appealed his termination pursuant to Fujitec's written workplace policies. (Id. at #240). Mitchell contends that Fujitec failed to abide by the procedures set forth in those policies. (See generally Id. at #240-42). On March 11, 2020, Fujitec informed Mitchell that it was denying his appeal. (Id. at #241).
Based on these facts, Mitchell filed a twelve-count Complaint (Doc. 1) against McKenzie, Krupp, Fujitec America and Fujitec Co. (the Japanese parent corporation). He asserted Ohio-law claims for (1) wrongful termination in violation of public policy (called a Greeley claim); (2) defamation; (3) invasion of privacy (Krupp only); (4) false light (Krupp only); (5) breach of implied contract; (6) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (7) promissory estoppel; and (8) intentional infliction of emotional distress. He also asserted claims for discrimination and retaliation under both Title VII (two counts) and corresponding state law (two counts).
In response to the Complaint, both McKenzie and the Fujitec Defendants filed motions to dismiss (Docs. 10, 11). The Court issued its Opinion and Order (Doc. 18) on those motions on February 8, 2021. The Court found that Mitchell plausibly stated a promissory estoppel claim with respect to all defendants except McKenzie and a claim for defamation against all Defendants other than Fujitec Co., Ltd. (See Op., Doc. 18, #195, 216). On all other claims, though, the Court held that Mitchell had failed to state a claim. (See Id. at #223-24). But the Court dismissed many of those deficient claims without prejudice, granting Mitchell leave to submit an amended complaint to remedy the pleading defects the Court identified. (Id. at #224).
Mitchell filed his Amended Complaint (Doc. 19) on March 6, 2021. This time, McKenzie filed an Answer (Doc. 20) and did not move to dismiss Mitchell's remaining claims against her. But the Fujitec Defendants again moved to dismiss (Doc. 21) many of the claims in Mitchell's Amended Complaint (Doc. 19), arguing that Mitchell's factual allegations failed to rectify the relevant deficiencies in his original Complaint (Doc. 1). Mitchell responded in opposition (Doc. 23) on April 12, 2021, and the Fujitec Defendants replied in support (Doc. 26) on May 4, 2021. The matter is now fully briefed and before the Court.
At the motion to dismiss stage, a complaint must “state[] a claim for relief that is plausible, when measured against the elements” of a claim. Darby v. Childvine Inc., 964 F.3d 440, 444 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Binno v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 826 F.3d 338, 345-46 (6th Cir. 2016)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, in other words, [Mitchell] must make sufficient factual allegations that, taken as true, raise the likelihood of a legal claim that is more than possible, but indeed plausible.” Id. (citations omitted).
In making that assessment, the Court must “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff accept its allegations as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Bassett v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation omitted). That is true, however, only as to factual allegations. The Court need not accept as true Mitchell's legal conclusions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, the well-pled facts must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level, ” such that the asserted claim is “plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 546-47. Under the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard, courts play an important gatekeeper role, ensuring that claims meet a plausibility threshold before defendants are subjected to the potential rigors (and costs) of discovery. “Discovery, after all, is not designed as a method by which a plaintiff discovers whether he has a claim, but rather a process for discovering evidence to substantiate plausibly-stated claims.” Green v. Mason, No....
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