Mitchell v. Garland

• Docket Number: Civil Action 20-3083 (RC),Re Document 13,18,19
• Decision Date: 09 March 2022
• Parties: RODRICK L. MITCHELL, Plaintiff, v. MERRICK GARLAND, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

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RODRICK L. MITCHELL, Plaintiff, v. MERRICK GARLAND, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 20-3083 (RC)

Re Document Nos. 13, 18, 19

United States District Court, District of Columbia

March 9, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR FED. R. CIV. P 56(D) RELIEF AND GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

I. INTRODUCTION

Rodrick Mitchell alleges that a supervisor removed him from a desirable position at the Federal Bureau of Prisons based on his race. When Mitchell complained about the discriminatory environment he faced, another official allegedly retaliated against him by marking him absent from work. Defendants the Attorney General and the Bureau of Prisons respond to Mitchell's Title VII claims with evidence to suggest that Mitchell was reassigned not because of his race, but because of an ethical lapse. They also say that he was marked absent only because he failed to timely request leave, and they move for summary judgment. But because Mitchell has not yet had sufficient opportunity to obtain evidence of his own to counter this version of events, the Court grants his motion for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) and denies the summary judgment motion as premature. Defendants also move to dismiss for failure to state a claim, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), but based solely on the allegations in the complaint and reasonable inferences drawn in Mitchell's favor, Mitchell has plausibly alleged Title VII discrimination and retaliation claims. The Court denies Defendants' motion to dismiss, except insofar as it relates to the Bureau of Prisons, which is not a proper defendant in a Title VII action.

II. BACKGROUND

A little over a year before his retirement from a twenty-eight-year career with the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), plaintiff Rodrick Mitchell found himself entangled in a discrimination dispute. Compl. ¶ 7, ECF No. 2; Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Opp'n Defs.' Mot. Dismiss or for Summ. J. and Pl.'s Mot. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d) Relief at 6, ECF No. 18-1 (“Opp'n”). Eventually, Mitchell filed a Complaint in this Court, in which he alleged that he spent the bulk of his career, from 1992 to 2018, as a Telecommunications Specialist at the GS-13 level. Compl. ¶ 7. One of his duties in this position was to work as BOP's Contracting Officer Representative (“COR”), for BOP's Land Mobile Radio systems program, which involved procurement of communication devices for BOP facilities. Id. ¶ 8. Mitchell did not get along with his ultimate supervisor, Facilities Management Branch Chief Ponciano Rangel, III. Rangel, a “Mexican-American, ” mistreated Mitchell, an “African American, ” in a variety of ways, including by telling Mitchell he did not trust him, speaking to him disrespectfully, denying him training opportunities, claiming that his reports were inaccurate, canceling his work travel plans on short notice, and belittling him in front of co-workers. Id. ¶¶ 6, 9-10. “[S]everal times” between 2014 and 2018, Rangel told Mitchell he wanted to remove him as the COR for Land Mobile Radio systems. Id. ¶ 9.

Mitchell complained about Rangel's behavior to the BOP Ombudsman, but to no avail- the Ombudsman did not even speak with Rangel about the complaint. Id. ¶ 11. So, at some point “[p]rior to August of 2018, ” Mitchell told Rangel “that he intended to file an Equal Opportunity complaint against him.” Id. ¶ 12. Things still did not improve for Mitchell, and in fact, they got worse: On August 16, 2018, Mitchell found out that Rangel had arranged for him to be removed as the COR for the Land Mobile Radio account and replaced him with William Lee, a “Native American Male.” Id. ¶¶ 13-14. Nobody explained why. Id. ¶ 14. And it was not as if others were facing similar reshuffling. Steven Tompkins, a “Caucasian Male” GS-13 Telecommunications Specialist who also worked under Rangel, never heard that Rangel wished him removed from his position and did not receive the same criticism or scrutiny that Mitchell did. Id. ¶ 15.

A few months passed before Mitchell's work-related troubles flared up again. Mitchell's immediate supervisor Seth Norman was furloughed during the January 2019 government shutdown, so Theresa Ideo, a “Caucasian Female, ” temporarily supervised Mitchell. Id. ¶ 16. On January 14, 2019, the BOP's offices were closed because of bad weather. Id. ¶ 17. That morning, Mitchell submitted a request to use “annual work leave” to take the day off; he did not work remotely that day. But Ideo denied the request and marked Mitchell as Absent Without Leave (“AWOL”), which meant that Mitchell did not receive pay for the eight-hour day. Id. Ideo then tried to mark Mitchell AWOL again, even though Mitchell had notified her in advance that he would be taking sick leave. Id. ¶ 19.

Mitchell unsuccessfully complained about these events before BOP's Equal Employment Opportunity Office and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Id. ¶ 5. Then he sued the Attorney General^[1] and the BOP itself in this Court. In Count I, he alleges that his supervisors' actions amounted to unlawful discrimination on account of his race, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Id. ¶¶ 20-28. In Count II, Mitchell alleges that his removal as the COR for Land Mobile Radio, Ideo's marking him as AWOL, and Ideo's attempt to mark him AWOL a second time were all acts of retaliation for his various discrimination complaints, and therefore also violated Title VII. Id. ¶¶ 29-32. Mitchell seeks $250, 000 in compensatory damages. Id. at 7.

Defendants Garland and the BOP (the “Defendants”) responded with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, or, in the alternative, for summary judgment in their favor. Defs.' Mot. Dismiss or for Summ. J., ECF No. 13. They attached documentary evidence in an effort to show that Mitchell's Complaint tells only half the story. See Defs.' Statement of Material Facts Not in Genuine Dispute, ECF No. 13-2 (“SUMF”). They claim that BOP removed Mitchell as the COR for Land Mobile Radio not because of his race, but rather because of an ethics violation. Mitchell was working on a solicitation of bids to replace the radios at a BOP detention Center in Puerto Rico, and Motorola was competing for the contract. Id. at 4. While in Puerto Rico for a site visit, Mitchell went out to dinner with Cindy Hare, a sales representative for Motorola, on August 13, 2018. Id. A Facebook post documenting this outing came to the attention of BOP authorities. Catherine Scott, the Chief of the BOP Acquisitions branch, determined that the dinner created “an appearance of impropriety and a possible violation of the Procurement Integrity Act.” Id. (citation omitted). She informed Rangel and referred the incident to BOP's Office of Internal Affairs. Id. Thus, on August 15, Rangel directed Norman to remove Mitchell as the COR for Land Mobile Radio and to reassign him to be the COR for the Private Branch program. Id. at 4-5. According to Defendants, Norman was planning on reassigning Mitchell away from Land Mobile Radio anyway, because he wanted to “reorganiz[e] the work of each staff member.” Id. at 5. The Internal Affairs Investigation determined that Michell had indeed violated BOP policy for procurement officials. Id.

Defendants claim to have an explanation for the AWOL determination too. Mitchell, along with other staff, had been told at a May 2018 meeting, in a December 2018 email, and in a January 8, 2019 email that he had to request any unscheduled leave before the start of his scheduled shift. Id. at 5-6. During the shutdown, as the January email made clear, this meant that Mitchell was required to request any leave from Ideo in advance of his shift. Id. On January 14, the Office of Personnel Management notified employees who, like Mitchell, were eligible for telework that they would have to either telework or use leave while offices were closed due to inclement weather. Mitchell did not telework on January 14, nor did he request leave in advance (or at all), so Ideo marked him AWOL. Id. at 7. The same, as it happened, was true of Tompkins. Id.

Defendants are not the only ones who seek to rely on circumstances beyond those mentioned in the Complaint. In his Statement of Disputed Facts filed in response to Defendants' motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, Mitchell for the first time notes that he filed a complaint in August 2018 about a sexual relationship between Rangel and Ideo. Opp'n at 2. According to Mitchell, this complaint, too, was a reason for his retaliatory removal as COR for Land Mobile Radio. Id. at 15. In addition to arguing that both Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal and summary judgment are inappropriate on the merits, Mitchell asserts that summary judgment is premature and requests the opportunity to engage in discovery pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d). Opp'n at 1.^[2]

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim” sufficient to give the defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests. Fed.R.Civ.P 8(a)(2); accord Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam). A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) “tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint” under that standard; it asks whether the plaintiff has properly stated a claim. Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, ...