Mitchell v. King

• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Writing for the Court: Before HOUSE; LOISELLE
• Citation: 363 A.2d 68,169 Conn. 140
• Parties: Jesse MITCHELL et al. v. Francis J. KING et al.
• Decision Date: 15 July 1975

Page 68

363 A.2d 68 169 Conn. 140 Jesse MITCHELL et al.
v.
Francis J. KING et al. Supreme Court of Connecticut. July 15, 1975.

Page 69

[169 Conn. 141] Richard M. Sheiman, Deputy City Atty., for appellants (defendants).

Gerald T. Weiner, Bridgeport, for appellees (plaintiffs).

Before [169 Conn. 140] HOUSE, C.J., and LOISELLE, MacDONALD, BOGDANSKI and LONGO, JJ.

[169 Conn. 141] LOISELLE, Associate Justice.

The named plaintiff, a minor, hereinafter designated the plaintiff, was permanently expelled from high school as a result of his alleged participation in a gang assault upon a student. The alleged attack occurred on September 28, 1972, on the grounds of Central High School in Bridgeport prior to the commencement of the school day. During the period of the plaintiff's expulsion his mother expended the sum of $859 for private school tuition. In an action brought to the Court of Common Pleas, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff enjoining the defendant board of education from continuing the expulsion and awarding $850 to the plaintiff's mother, Anna Mitchell, who had joined personally as a plaintiff in the action. The defendants have appealed from that judgment.

In rendering judgment for the plaintiff, the court based its decision solely on the ground that § 10-234 of the General Statutes, which authorizes a school board to expel any student found guilty of 'conduct inimical to the best interests of the school' ¹ and [169 Conn. 142] under which the plaintiff was expelled, was invalid as an illegal delegation of legislative power. The legislative power to delegate is not unlimited. To be constitutionally sustained, 'it is necessary that the statute declare a legislative policy, establish primary standards for carrying it out, or lay down an intelligible principle to which the administrative officer or body must conform, with a proper regard for the protection of the public interests and with such degree of certainty as the nature of the case permits, and enjoin a procedure under which, by appeal or otherwise, both public interests and private rights shall have due consideration.' State v. Stoddard, 126 Conn. 623, 628, 13 A.2d 586, 588. No declaration of legislative policy is contained

Page 70

in § 10-234; however, title 10 of the General Statutes, of which § 10-234 is a part, declares the state's special interest in the education of children. It can hardly be doubted that the statute in question was enacted pursuant to the policies and aims expressed in title 10 and more particularly articulated in §§ 10-4a and 10-220. Roan v. Connecticut Industrial Building Commission, 150 Conn. 333, 339-40, 189 A.2d 399.

It is true that the modern tendency is liberal in approving delegation under broad regulatory standards so as to facilitate the operational functions of administrative boards or commissions, and it is unrealistic to demand detailed standards which are impracticable. Forest Construction Co. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 155 Conn. 669, 679, 236 A.2d 917. A statute, however, which forbids or requires conduct in terms so vague that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process. Baggett v. Bullitt, [169 Conn. 143] 377 U.S. 360, 367, 84 S.Ct. 1316, 12 L.Ed.2d 377; Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322. Laws must give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited so that he may act accordingly. Also, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide adequately delineated standards for those who apply them. It is a basic principle of due process that a statute is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined. See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 59 S.Ct. 618, 83 L.Ed. 888; see, generally, note, 'The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court,' 109 U.Pa.L.Rev. 67. A vague statute may inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected freedoms by having persons "steer far...