Mitchell v. Lancaster Milk Company

• Decision Date: 06 July 1960
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 6845.
• Parties: James P. MITCHELL, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, Plaintiff, v. LANCASTER MILK COMPANY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

185 F. Supp. 66

James P. MITCHELL, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, Plaintiff, v. LANCASTER MILK COMPANY, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 6845.

United States District Court M. D. Pennsylvania.

July 6, 1960.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Harold C. Nystrom, Acting Sol., Washington, D. C., Ernest N. Votaw, Regional Attorney, Marshall H. Harris, U. S. Dept. of Labor, Chambersburg, Pa., for plaintiff.

Arnold, Bricker, Beyer & Barnes, Lancaster, Pa., for defendant.

FOLLMER, District Judge.

This matter is presently before the Court on motions of the defendant to dismiss the action because the Complaint and "Amended Complaint" fail to state a claim against the defendant upon which relief can be granted, or, in the alternative, to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction.

On December 16, 1959, plaintiff filed a Complaint against defendant seeking to recover unpaid overtime compensation allegedly due Clyde Vanasdlen, an employee of the defendant, under the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1949 (Act of October 26, 1949, c. 736, 63 Stat. 910, 29 U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq.).

On February 12, 1960, plaintiff filed what he designated an "Amended Complaint" against said defendant seeking to recover unpaid overtime compensation allegedly due to John J. Strevig (also an employee of defendant) under the provisions of the aforesaid Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1949. It is actually an amendment to the Complaint which does not repeat the allegations of the original Complaint as to Clyde Vanasdlen but merely adds allegations as to the additional employee, John J. Strevig.

1. A. of both the motions to dismiss the Complaint and the "Amended Complaint" allege:

"The allegations in the Complaint ("Amended Complaint") bring the case within the exception of Section 7(c) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended, relating to first processing of milk;"

1. B. of the motion to dismiss the Complaint alleges:

"The complaint (as to Clyde Vanasdlen) was filed more than two years after August 15, 1957, the beginning date of the alleged violation, and, therefore, is barred by the limitation in Section 6(a) of the Portal-to-Portal Act which amended the Fair Labor Standards Act;"

1. B. of the motion to dismiss the "Amended Complaint" alleges:

"The Amended Complaint was filed more than two years after August 21, 1957, the beginning date of the alleged violation, as to John J. Strevig and, therefore, is barred by the limitation in Section 6(a) of the Portal-to-Portal Act, which amends the Fair Labor Standards Act;"

1. C. of the motion to dismiss the Complaint alleges:

"The Complaint fails to show authority in Mrs. Clyde Vanasdlen or any other person to act on behalf of or to receive payments alleged to be due to Clyde Vanasdlen."

1. C. of the motion to dismiss the "Amended Complaint" alleges:

"The Amended Complaint states a separate cause of action from the original Complaint, involving a distinct and different period under the applicable statute of limitations, and therefore the two cannot be combined in one suit."

2. of both motions allege, in slightly different verbiage, respectively:

(2. in first motion.) "In the alternative, to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter in that the Secretary of Labor has no authority to sue, under Section 16(c) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, unless his complaint alleges that the case involves an issue of law which has been settled finally by the Courts."

(2. in second motion.) "In the alternative, to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter in that the Secretary of Labor has no authority to sue on the cause of action alleged in the Amended Complaint, under Section 16(c) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, unless his Amended Complaint alleges that the case involves an issue of law which has been settled finally by the Courts."

As to 3 (A. B. and C.) in both motions, defendant, in its brief, states that "the plaintiff has now given to defendant the information requested, and defendant hereby withdraws its motion for a more definite statement." The motion for a more definite statement is, therefore, moot.

The reasons given by the defendant under 1 A. (both motions) will be considered first.

The allegations of the original Complaint and as amended bring the case within the exception of Section 7(c) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended relating to first processing of milk.

On January 30, 1959, the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, in the case of Mitchell v. Park, d. b. a. David Park Co., 36 Labor Cases ¶ 65,191, stated:

"The exemption from the maximum hours provisions of the Act provided by Section 7(c) for any employee employed in any place of employment where his employer is engaged in the first processing of cream into dairy products, is inapplicable. `First processing' as used in Section 7(c) means the first change in the form of raw materials. The weighing, sampling, testing, cooling, storing, and transporting of cream, described in Findings 6 and 7 are not `first processing' within the meaning of this Section because these activities do not change the form of the cream."

The ground rules for the construction of this Act are clearly set forth in Richter v. Barrett, 3 Cir., 1949, 173 F.2d 320, 324, where the court stated:

"The Fair Labor Standards Act is remedial and calls for a liberal construction, but each case must stand on its own facts. * * * Exemptions are to be restrictively interpreted. * * * It is the employer's burden to prove that the employee is exempt from the coverage of the Act. * * *"

In Barrett et al. v. National Malleable & Steel Castings Co., D.C.W.D.Pa.1946, 68 F.Supp. 410, 413, the court stated:

"It is a settled principle of law that a complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts which could be proved in support of the allegations set forth therein. Furthermore, the complaint should be viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, and the truth of the facts well pleaded, including facts alleged on information and belief, are admitted. * * *"¹

In Stratton et al. v. Farmers Produce Co., Inc., 8 Cir., 1943, 134 F.2d 825, 827, the court held that in actions under the Fair Labor Standards Act there is a special necessity "for having a detailed knowledge of all pertinent facts relative to the nature of an employer's business and of the work done for him by an employee, before attempting to reach a conclusion as to whether the employee is or is not entitled to the (wage and hour) benefits * * * of the Act."

In McComb v. Johnson, 8 Cir., 1949, 174 F.2d 833, in reversing the District Court which had dismissed an action under this Act because the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, the court stated, inter alia: (at page 834)

"* * * He (the plaintiff) may not be able to establish the claims stated in his complaint, but we think he is, at least, entitled to make the attempt. The issues tendered by the complaint are too important and far reaching to be decided upon an assumed state of facts gleaned from a pleading. * * * The District Court's prognostication of the outcome of this case may eventually prove to be correct, but it was premature and based upon indefinite inferences which may have no basis in fact. We have twice before had occasion to point out the impropriety of deciding questions of coverage under the Fair Labor Standards Act upon motions to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. * * The futility of attempting to terminate a lawsuit by granting such a motion, unless it presents a simple, definite, clear-cut issue of law, has been pointed out by this Court in many cases. * * *

"We have no doubt that if this Court were to decide the question of the applicability of the Fair Labor Standards Act to the defendants' operations upon the present record, a petition for certiorari by the party aggrieved would result in the remand of the case by the Supreme Court to the District Court for a more complete record."

Defendant is actually contending here "that plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action, because he has not negatived the applicability of section (7(c) of the Act.) Since this defense goes to the cause of action rather than jurisdiction, it is insufficient at law and should be stricken. A plaintiff in order to state a cause of action under the Fair Labor Standards Act is not required to allege that its exemptions are inapplicable. * * *" Tobin for and on behalf of Wiley v. Wilson, D.C.N.D.Ill.1951, 98 F.Supp. 131, 133.

At this time the Court is without facts from which it could make a definitive ruling on the question as to whether the allegations in the "Amended Complaint" bring the case within the exception of Section 7(c) of the Fair Labor Standards Act relating to first processing of milk.

As to 1 B.—Statute of Limitations (Both motions).

The original Complaint alleges violations as to employee Vanasdlen, during the period August 15, 1957, to April 30, 1958. The "Amended Complaint" added further alleged violations as to another employee, Strevig, during the period August 21, 1957 to July 1, 1959.

Section 7 of the Portal-to-Portal Act (29 U.S.C.A. § 256) provides that an action under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 shall be considered to be commenced on the date when the complaint is filed. Section 6 of the Portal-to-Portal Act (29 U.S.C.A. § 255) establishes a two year statute of limitations for actions to enforce any cause of action for unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime compensation, or liquidated damages under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The record indicates that the original Complaint here was filed December 16, 1959, and the "Amended Complaint" was filed February 12, 1960. There is no question that if the statute of limitations is properly...