Mitchell v. Libby, Civ. No. 75-211.
Decision Date | 23 March 1976 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. 75-211. |
Citation | 409 F. Supp. 1098 |
Parties | Adelaide MITCHELL v. Kenneth W. LIBBY et al. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Vermont |
Robert J. Kurrle, Montpelier, Vt., for plaintiff.
Richard H. Wadhams, Jr., Pierson, Affolter & Amidon, Burlington, Vt., for defendant Town of Stowe, Vt.
The defendant, Town of Stowe, has moved to dismiss Count II of the plaintiff's complaint wherein the plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as other relief, against the Town as a result of allegedly improper conduct by Town police officers in arresting the plaintiff. The predicate of the motion is that the plaintiff's complaint fails to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted because the Town is not a "person" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and thus is not subject to suit for damages under this statute. The defendant Town further asserts that since the plaintiff's only federal claim against the Town is under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, this court has no "federal question" jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, nor does it have any pendent jurisdiction over the state claims.
The plaintiff makes clear in Count II of her complaint that she does not seek to invoke jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for purposes of her asserted claim against the Town. This position is consistent with the Supreme Court opinions in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), and City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 93 S.Ct. 2222, 37 L.Ed.2d 109 (1973), to the effect that both monetary and equitable relief against a municipality are outside the ambit of section 1983.
In considering the present motion to dismiss, it is necessary to determine whether the plaintiff's complaint states a cause of action under the "federal question" jurisdiction provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 1331. More particularly, the issue is whether there exists a federal claim based directly upon the Fourteenth Amendment and the rights incorporated therein. Some support for such a cause of action is indicated in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971) ( ), and the concurring opinions of Justices Brennan and Marshall in City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 516, 93 S.Ct. 2222, 2228, 37 L.Ed.2d 109, 118 (1973). The panel decision of the Second Circuit in Brault v. Town of Milton, 527 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1975), would probably have been controlling in favor of the plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claim. But that court's en banc decision clearly recedes from holding that a direct cause of action exists under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 736-41. Therefore, such lower court decisions as Perzanowski v. Salvio, 369 F.Supp. 223, 228-31 (D.Conn. 1974), rejecting the direct cause of action argument, may be regarded as accurate reflections of the present state of the law in the Second Circuit. Hence the plaintiff's direct Fourteenth Amendment claim must fail.
Thus, questions of federal jurisdiction aside, if the Town has purchased liability insurance, a cause of action against it may exist under state law. See 24 V.S.A. § 901 ( ). Whether this court may take jurisdiction of such a claim is a question of both power and discretion.
The leading case on pendent jurisdiction is United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966). There the Court held that judicial power to entertain a pendent claim exists where there is a federal claim "sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction" and "the relationship between that claim and the state claim permits the conclusion that the entire action before the court comprises but one constitutional `case'." Id. at 725, 86 S.Ct. at 1138, 16 L.Ed.2d at 227. The Court further noted that "the state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative fact." Id. It appears that in the present case the federal claims against the Town officers and the state claims against the Town all "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact."
The court recognizes that in Gibbs, the Supreme Court stated:
Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed as well.
Id. at 726, 86 S.Ct. at 1139, 16 L.Ed.2d at 228. It should be noted, however, that in Gibbs the Court was speaking of a situation involving...
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