Mitchell v. Lowden

• Decision Date: 18 June 1919
• Docket Number: No. 12695.,12695.
• Citation: 288 Ill. 327,123 N.E. 566
• Parties: MITCHELL v. LOWDEN, Governor, et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

288 Ill. 327

123 N.E. 566

MITCHELL

v.LOWDEN, Governor, et al.

No. 12695.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 18, 1919.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Sangamon county; Elbert S. Smith, Judge.

Bill by John M. Mitchell against Frank O. Lowden, Governor, and others. From a decree dismissing the bill, complainant appeals. Affirmed.Green & Risley, of Mt. Carmel, for appellant.

Edward J. Brundage, Atty. Gen., Albert D. Rodenberg, of Springfield, Edward C. Fitch and Noah C. Bainum, both of Chicago, and Arthur R. Hall, of Danville, for appellees.

DUNN, C. J.

The Fiftieth General Assembly passed an act entitled ‘An act in relation to the construction by the state of Illinois of a state-wide system of durable hardsurfaced roads upon public highways of the state and the provision of means for the payment of the cost thereof by an issue of bonds of the state of Illinois.’ Laws of 1917, p. 696. By this statute it was enacted that a state-wide system of durable, hard-surfaced roads be constructed by the state upon its public highways, and that, for the purpose of providing means for the payment of the cost of such construction, the state, through its officers, be authorized to issue, sell, and provide for the retirement of bonds to the amount of $60,000,000. The sum of $60,000,000 to be derived from the sale of bonds was appropriated to the department of public works and buildings, and the act provided for the levy of an annual tax of an amount sufficient to pay the interest as it should accrue and the principal of the bonds at maturity, provided that no tax should be levied in any year in which a sufficient amount had been appropriated from other sources of revenue to pay the interest and principal of the bonds falling due that year. The construction of the state-wide system of roads was placed under the general supervision and control of the department of public works and buildings, which was authorized to cause the roads to be constructed at the earliest possible time consistent with good business management. It was declared that the general location of the routes upon which the proposed roads were to be constructed should be substantially as described in section 9, so as to connect with each other the different communities and principal cities of the state, provided that the department of public works and buildings should have the right to make such minor changes in the location of the routes as might become necessary in order to carry out the provisions of the act. Section 9 described the general location of 46 routes by naming the termini of each, giving the general direction of the road from one terminus to the other, and stating that such route afforded certain named places and the intervening communities reasonable connections with each other, covering the state with a network of roads reaching every county in the state. On February 19, 1919, John M. Mitchell, a citizen and taxpayer residing in Wabash county, filed a bill in the circuit court of Sangamon county against the Governor, secretary of state, auditor of public accounts, state treasurer, director of public works and buildings, and other officers of that department, the purpose of which was to have the act declared unconstitutional and the defendants enjoined from enforcing it. Objections were alleged to the manner of its adoption, to its title, and to its contents. The defendants answered, a replication was filed, the cause was heard upon the pleadings and evidence, and the court found the issues for the defendants and entered a decree dismissing the bill for want of equity, from which the complainant has appealed.

The cause was submitted at the April term, and, an early decision being desired on account of the public interest involved, a judgment was rendered at that term affirming the decree of the circuit court for the reasons now to be stated.

The objections made to the adoption of the act were that it was not constitutionally submitted to the people as required by section 18 of article 4 of the Constitution, and did not receive the majority of votes as required by that section.

Before the debt of $60,000,000 created by this act could be contracted, section 18 of article 4 of the Constitution required that the law authorizing it should have been submitted to the people at a general election and have received a majority of the votes cast for members of the General Assembly at such election; that the General Assembly should provide for the publication of the law for three months, at least, before the vote of the people should be taken upon the same; that provision should be made at the time for the payment of the interest annually as it should accrue, by a tax levied for the purpose or from other sources of revenue; and that the law levying the tax should be submitted to the people with the law authorizing the debt to be contracted. The act itself provided that before it should go into full force and effect it should, at the general election in November, 1918, be submitted to the people and receive a majority of the votes cast for members of the General Assembly at that election, and it directed that the secretary of state should cause publication of the act to be made once each week for three months, at least, before the vote of the people should be taken upon the act, in at least two daily newspapers, one published in Springfield and one in Chicago. The act was published in all respects in accordance with this direction, and the law was submitted to the people and voted on at the election in accordance with the terms of the act. The canvass of the vote by the state canvassing board showed the whole number of votes cast at the election was 975,545, the whole number of votes cast for members of the General Assembly was 898,821, the whole number of votes cast for the act was 661,815, and the whole number against the act was 154,296, and that the majority in favor of the act was 212,404. The appellant insists that the finding by the state canvassing board of this majority in favor of the act is erroneous, for the reason that the canvassing board had regard to the number of voters (898,821) who voted for members of the General Assembly instead of the number of votes cast by such voters for members of the General Assembly, which number of votes was three times the number of voters, and that by a proper construction of the law the majority of the votes cast at the election for members of the General Assembly was not cast for the act.

The objection to the submission of the act is based upon the requirement of the Constitution that ‘the General Assembly shall provide for the publication of said law for three months at least before the vote of the people shall be taken upon the same,’ and the argument is that only by the enactment of a statute can the General Assembly cause publication of the law to be made. There is no basis for this argument. The General Assembly may provide in the act itself, by separate resolution or by an independent law, for the publication. The object of the publication is to give notice to the people that they may have an opportunity to express their will by their votes. While the publication, if not authorized by the General Assembly, is of no validity, a statute is not necessary to confer authority. A vote directing it is sufficient. The statute which was enacted by the Legislature was really a law submitting to the people a proposition to be voted upon at the general election for a law on the subject of state roads, to become effective upon an affirmative vote by the people. The law submitting the proposition became effective on July 1st, and bound every one to comply with its provision to submit the proposal to a vote, and the secretary of state was bound to publish the law.

It is seriously contended, however, that the votes cast for members of the General Assembly were three times the number taken by the state canvassing board as the basis of its finding-that is, 2,696,463 instead of 898,821. The latter is the number of voters who cast votes for members of the General Assembly, and while the votes cast in favor of the law numbered nearly threefourths of all the voters, it is argued that the language of the Constitution, and the law itself, is not obscure or uncertain, but is definite and unambiguous and leaves no room for construction; that the total number of votes cast for members of the General Assembly was 2,696,463; that nothing less than 1,348,232 is a majority of that number; and that less than half that number of votes were cast in favor of the law. This is literally true, but it is perfectly clear that it is not the meaning of the Constitution that the law did not, therefore, receive a constitutional majority; for such meaning involves the absurdity of holding that the framers of that instrument, and the people in adopting it, intended to prohibit the creation of a debt, with the exception specified in section 18, unless the proposition for its creation should receive at an election a greater vote than all the electors were entitled to cast. It is conceivable that they might have desired to prohibit the creation of a debt, but not that they would take this indirect method of prohibiting while appearing to permit. A constitutional provision must be construed like a statute with reference to the object to be accomplished, and when the real purpose is apparent the language must be construed so as to carry the purpose into effect. It is not to be presumed that a provision was inserted in a Constitution or statute without reason or that a result was intended inconsistent with the judgment of men of common sense guided by reason. Not the letter of the law only, its mere words, but its spirit and object, must be taken into consideration, and when a particular intent to effect a specific purpose is manifest, respect must be paid to that intent. When the words of a statute, followed literally, lead to an absurd...