Mitchell v. LW FOSTER SPORTSWEAR COMPANY
| Citation | 149 F. Supp. 380 |
| Decision Date | 07 March 1957 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. 21029. |
| Parties | James P. MITCHELL, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, Plaintiff, v. L. W. FOSTER SPORTSWEAR COMPANY, Inc., a corporation, and Louis W. Foster and Howard S. Foster, individually, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Ernest N. Votaw, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.
Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, Philadelphia, Pa., for defendants.
The defendant corporation makes men's wearing apparel in the City of Philadelphia. The individual defendants, father and son, are officers of the corporation and had exclusive control over the management and operations of the corporation, regulating the employment of its more than 300 employees.
The Secretary of Labor has brought this action to enjoin the defendants from violating provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq., relative to overtime pay, record keeping, and delivery or sale of goods produced by employees employed in violation of the act.
The individual defendants contend that the complaint should be dismissed as to them for the reason that they are not "employers" within the meaning of the Act. Section 3(d) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 203(d), provides: "`Employer' includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee. * * *" It is not disputed that the defendant corporation was an employer under the act. Certainly the individual defendants in regulating the employment of the employees were acting in the interest of the corporation in relation to an employee. Hertz Drivurself Stations, Inc., v. United States, 8 Cir., 1945, 150 F.2d 923.
The individual defendants have also moved to dismiss the complaint as to them on the ground that they did not engage in business individually or act as employers individually, but acted only as agents of the corporate defendant. Concern was expressed that they might remain subject to mandatory provisions of an injunction, requiring, for example, the keeping of records, at a time after they might sever their connection with the corporation.
As I view the problem posed by the individual defendants it boils down to a question of the careful drafting of the injunction, if one be granted, and is a problem that can best be dealt with when the time comes for a decision on the merits.
The motion to dismiss is denied.
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Mitchell v. Stewart Brothers Construction Company
...8 Cir., 1956, 233 F.2d 717; Hertz Drivurself Stations, Inc. v. United States, 8 Cir., 1945, 150 F.2d 923; Mitchell v. L. W. Foster Sportswear Company Inc., D.C.Pa.1957, 149 F.Supp. 380. The facts of the case clearly demonstrated that both Donald and Roger Stewart actively supervised and reg......
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Wirtz v. Pure Ice Company
...717 (8 Cir. 1956); Hertz Drivurself Stations, Inc., v. United States, 150 F.2d 923 (8 Cir. 1945); Mitchell v. L. W. Foster Sportswear Company, Inc., et al., 149 F.Supp. 380 (D.C.E.D.Penn.1957). The provisions of Section 203 (d) of the Act, read in the light of Sections 206 and 207 thereof, ......
- Walker v. P. Ballantine & Sons
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Zygowski v. Erie Morning Telegram, Inc.
...is concerned. He came clearly within the statutory definition of an employer under Section 203. See Mitchell, Sec. of Labor, v. L. W. Foster Sportswear Co., Inc., D.C., 149 F.Supp. 380. Conclusions of 1. This court has jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties to this action pur......