Mitchell v. Meachum, 70689

CourtSupreme Court of Oklahoma
Citation770 P.2d 887
Docket NumberNo. 70689,70689
PartiesCarl Demetrius MITCHELL, Doc # 87999, Appellant, v. Larry MEACHUM, Director, et al., Appellees.
Decision Date15 November 1988

Appeal from the District Court of Atoka County; D.L. Scroggins, judge.

Inmate appeals the district court's vacation of a default judgment in his favor and subsequent dismissal of his case. Inmate challenges his transfer from the Horace Mann Treatment Center, Tulsa, Oklahoma, where he was assigned to house arrest status, to the Mack H. Alford Correctional Center, Stringtown, Oklahoma, and revocation of earned credits after he was found guilty in a prison disciplinary action based upon a violation of a city, state or federal law.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.

Carl Demetrius Mitchell, Stringtown, pro se.

Robert H. Henry, Atty. Gen., and Steven Spears Kerr, Asst. Atty. Gen., Oklahoma City, for appellees.

HODGES, Justice.

Carl Demetrius Mitchell, an inmate at the Mack H. Alford Correctional Center (MHACC) in Stringtown, Oklahoma, incarcerated for the charge of larceny of merchandise after former conviction of a felony (appellant), brought this civil rights action pro se in the District Court of Atoka County pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 12 O.S.Supp.1985 §§ 2001-2027 and 12 O.S.1981 §§ 1451-1462 seeking habeas corpus and/or mandamus relief for expungement of his misconduct reports, restoration of all lost earned credits and an unconditional reinstatement to original security status. Mitchell contends his transfer to MHACC from the house arrest program was intended as punishment for alleged prisoner misconduct; therefore, he is entitled to judicial On November 2, 1987, Mitchell filed a petition in the District Court of Atoka County asserting as invalid the disciplinary action taken against him by prison authorities for an alleged law violation concerning a charge of larceny of merchandise while he was living in Tulsa County on house arrest status. Mitchell was arrested on January 31, 1987, for such charge; however, the case was dismissed at preliminary hearing for lack of prosecution when the complaining witness did not appear.

review of the administrative decision to transfer him. He asserts the trial court erroneously sustained the prison authorities' (appellees') motion to set aside the default judgment. He further argues the trial court erroneously dismissed his case denying him due process and equal protection of the law.

The Department of Corrections (DOC) transferred Mitchell to MHACC due to the larceny charge. A disciplinary hearing was held against Mitchell for the alleged violation of a city, state or federal law. Based upon evidence including a witness's identification in a photographic line-up, the disciplinary committee found Mitchell guilty of the offense and revoked 280 days of his earned time credits. The Director of DOC denied Mitchell's appeal. Mitchell's misconduct conviction resulted in a change in security status and reclassification.

I. TRANSFER TO ANOTHER STATE PRISON FACILITY

Mitchell claims because the district court dismissed the larceny charge against him he did not violate any city, state or federal law which would support a prisoner misconduct conviction. Consequently, he argues, his reclassification and resultant transfer were illegal.

In Prock v. District Court of Pittsburg County, 630 P.2d 772, 779 (Okla.1981), this Court stated in its conclusion:

"While state statutes do not authorize or require a judicial review of internal prison disciplinary actions, both the federal and the state Due Process Clauses command that prisoners with claims to interests or expectations of a constitutionally-protected nature be afforded access to courts." (footnote omitted).

In Prock, we recognized neither the Oklahoma Constitution nor the United States Constitution guarantees any particular custodial condition to an incarcerated prisoner. However, a "state may by statutory law or regulations limit its official latitude to change the conditions of confinement and limit the circumstances under which breach-of-discipline sanctions may be imposed." We found there the Oklahoma prison authorities by written regulations have imposed limits on the sweep of their discretionary action in changing a prisoner's custody status by conditioning intra-prison transfers.

The present case is distinguishable from the facts in Prock in that here we are not dealing with a prisoner transferred to solitary confinement. Rather, Mitchell was transferred to general inmate population in another state prison facility. Mitchell does not cite any specific statute or regulation that creates a liberty interest which limits the prison authorities' discretion to transfer him to general inmate population in MHACC, nor has our independent research revealed such limitation.

Furthermore, in Morris v. Meachum, 718 P.2d 1354 (Okla.1986), we recently held a prisoner does not have a substantial personal right in the situs of his confinement, relying on Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 103 S.Ct. 1741, 75 L.Ed.2d 813 (1983). The United States Supreme Court quoted with approval language from Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976), in its Olim opinion stating:

" 'The initial decision to assign the convict to a particular institution is not subject to audit under the Due Process Clause, although the degree of confinement in one prison may be quite different from that in another. The conviction has sufficiently extinguished the defendant's liberty interest to empower the State to confine him in any of of its prisons ... Confinement in any of the State's institutions is within the normal limits or range of custody which the conviction has authorized the State to impose.' " (quoted in Morris v. Meachum, 718 P.2d at 1356).

In Morris, we observed that change in security status and resultant classification to a more supervised prison environment are the types of discretionary actions which have traditionally been the business of prison administrators rather than the courts.

Our view is additionally supported by the position of the Oklahoma Legislature as expressed in § 301(1)(f) of the Oklahoma Administrative Procedure Act, 75 O.S.1981 §§ 301-326, which specifically exempts from the provisions of that Act "[t]he supervisory or administrative agency of any penal institution, in respect to the institutional supervision, custody, control, care or treatment of inmates, prisoners or patients therein...."

Therefore, in the instant matter we find the trial court correctly dismissed Mitchell's case with regard to his transfer inasmuch as a prisoner has no liberty interest in the situs of his confinement.

II. LOSS OF EARNED CREDITS

We held in Prock, supra, there is no infringement of due-process liberty interest when a prisoner is denied the privilege of receiving good-time credits while in administrative segregation because neither Oklahoma statutory law nor state regulation created a liberty interest in such circumstances. However, the factual situation in the instant case is different in that Mitchell argues he has a state created liberty interest in earned credits lost due to his disciplinary action rather than merely an opportunity to earn credits. We find his argument persuasive.

Credit for good conduct is a matter of statutory right under 57 O.S.Supp.1984 § 138, which provides in pertinent part:

"A. Except as provided in subsection B of this section and in Section 224 of Title 57 of the Oklahoma Statutes, every inmate of a state correctional institution who satisfactorily engages in work or attends school, approved or provided by the Department shall have one (1) day deducted from the term of imprisonment for each day that he engaged in the...

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  • Conway v. Cumming
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • July 9, 1993
    ...455, 456 (1984) (loss of eligibility to participate in work-release program not a violation of any cognizable right); Mitchell v. Meachum, 770 P.2d 887, 890 (Okla.1988) (no liberty interest in situs of issue then is whether plaintiff's furlough status more closely resembles that of a parole......
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    ...appear in the record. The trial court failed to comply with the mandates of Johnson v. Scott, 702 P.2d 56 (Okl.1985) and Mitchell v. Meachum, 770 P.2d 887 (Okl.1988), it was at most harmless error in light of the holding in this case that alleged perjury does not give rise to an action in C......
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    ...N.Y.S.2d 505 (1987); Wilson v. People, 747 P.2d 638 (Colo.1987); Asherman v. Meachum, 213 Conn. 38, 566 A.2d 663 (1989); Mitchell v. Meachum, 770 P.2d 887 (Okla.1988); White v. Fauver, 219 N.J.Super. 170, 530 A.2d 37 (1987).8 We have added the bracketed language, which does not appear in th......
  • Asherman v. Meachum, 13611
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    • November 28, 1989
    ...108 N.J. 239, 247, 528 A.2d 563 (1987); People ex rel. Feliciano v. Waters, 99 App.Div.2d 850, 472 N.Y.S.2d 455 (1984); Mitchell v. Meachum, 770 P.2d 887, 889 (Okl.1988). These cases lend persuasive support to the trial court's ruling in this case. We conclude, accordingly, that the petitio......
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