Mitchell v. Mobile County

• Decision Date: 08 May 1975
• Citation: 294 Ala. 130,313 So.2d 172
• Parties: Price L. MITCHELL et al. v. MOBILE COUNTY, etc., et al. SC 832.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 172

313 So.2d 172

294 Ala. 130

Price L. MITCHELL et al. v. MOBILE COUNTY, etc., et al.

SC 832.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

May 8, 1975.

[294 Ala. 131] Mylan R. Engel, Mobile, for appellants.

Armbrecht, Jackson & DeMouy, W. Boyd Reeves and A. Danner Frazer, Jr., Mobile, for appellee, Ray D. Bridges.

William J. Baxley, Atty. Gen., and Frederick S. Middleton, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., for all appellees.

EMBRY, Justice.

This is an appeal from a final judgment adverse to plaintiffs' claim that Act No. 1177 of the 1973 Regular Session of the Alabama Legislature is unconstitutional. ¹ Plaintiffs, appellants here, are members of the Mobile County Personnel Board and the Director of that Board. Defendants, appellees here, are: Mobile County; Ray D. Bridges, Sheriff of Mobile County (his successor in office, Tom Purvis, has been properly substituted on appeal); all other counties and sheriffs thereof who come under the influence of Act No. 1177.

The trial court, after severing the first two sentences of the Act held the remaining portions constitutional, capable of execution, and construed 'compensation' to mean 'minimum basic salary.' We affirm.

The full text of the Act is found in the final decree attached as Appendix.

Plaintiffs attacked this Act by complaint seeking declaratory judgment that the Act violated Ala.Const., Art. 4, §§ 45, 106, 110 and 111. Section 45 provides that an act shall be divided into sections and contain but one subject, clearly expressed in its title. Section 106 provides that local laws shall be advertised prior to passage. Section 107 prohibits repeal of local laws except after advertising. Section 110 defines general and local laws. Section 111 prohibits passage of a local law introduced as a general law. The complaint also alleged that the word 'compensation' in the Act was vague. Defendants filed answers; defendant Bridges, an answer, cross-claim and counterclaim praying for enforcement of the Act. The matter was submitted to the trial court on pleadings, stipulation, exhibits, and brief testimony on a subject not related to this appeal. On February 28, 1974, the court rendered judgment declaring '* * * vague, confusing and ambiguous and are invalid, but that the remainder of said Act is competent to stand alone and In view of the severability clause in Section 4, is therefore valid and not repugnant to the Alabama Constitution of 1901, as amended.

Inter alia, the first two sentences of the Act:

'That the Act applies as of October 1, 1973, to all Counties of the State of Alabama having populations of not more than 600,000 according to the most recent Federal decennial census.

* * *

'That the word 'compensation' in said Act means the minimum basic salary to be paid to each such deputy sheriffs and chief deputy sheriffs in the counties covered by Act 1177, excluding overtime pay, riot training pay, uniform allowances, insurance, retirement benefits, sick leave, and similar allowances and benefits * * *' (Emphasis added.)

Appellants assert that the trial court erred in four aspects. We shall deal with each in turn.

I

Appellants contend that the Act as passed by the Legislature was a local bill and, as such, violated Ala.Const., Art. 4, § 106, for failure to comply with the advertising requirements of that section. Act No. 1177 was not advertised prior to its introduction. In support of the contention that Act No. 1177 was a local bill as passed, appellants argue that naming Madison County in the Act clearly indicates it is local and intended to apply to one county. Further it is contended the Act is a local one because:

'* * * As the bill is now written, all Counties in the State not having a Civil Service System would be included in the Act. However, if any of these Counties by subsequent legislation should come under a Civil Service System in their respective Counties, then this would have the effect of exempting them from this Act. Furthermore, should any of the Counties' population at some future date exceed the sum of 300,000 in population and not be under a Merit System, then this Act would no longer apply to that County. This obviously presents a double classification which is prohibited by the Alabama Constitution.' (Appellants' brief at p. 20)

This argument that the operative effect of the Act is local in nature is answered by our recent decision in Hamilton v. Autauga County, 289 Ala. 419, 268 So.2d 30.

In Hamilton:

'Both parties agree(d) that the Act, when passed, contained exceptions which were clearly local laws and which, not having been advertised as required by Section 106 of the Constitution of 1901, were unconstitutional. The questions raised on this appeal are: * * * Whether the trial court erred in holding that, after removal of these unconstitutional exceptions, the remaining provisions of the Act were constitutional and should be given effect.' 289 Ala. at 425, 268 So.2d at 35.

In the case before us the trial court struck the first two sentences of Act No. 1177. The reasons for so doing are not questioned in this appeal. In this posture the present case is on all fours with Hamilton.

The lesson of Hamilton, and cases cited therein, is that if the remaining portions of an Act are complete within themselves, sensible and capable of execution the Act will stand where invalid portions were deleted in accordance with a severability clause.

The portions of Act No. 1177 which appellants claim make it a local Act were contained in these parts deleted by the judgment of the trial court. Hence, it The remaining portions of the Act apply equally to all counties with a population of less than 600,000. We cannot say such a population classification is unreasonable, or that it does not bear any rational relationship to the minimum salary established. Likewise, the remaining portions are complete, sensible, and capable of execution. Hamilton, supra.

matters not whether the Act as passed was a local one. That which Is important is whether the remaining portions are sufficient to stand alone.

II

Appellants' second contention is that Act No. 1177 was introduced in the Legislature as a general bill, amended to become, and passed as, a local bill thus violating Ala.Const., § 111.

In support of this contention appellants rely on the opinion of the minority in Opinion of the Justices, 284 Ala. 626, 227 So.2d 396. There Justices Merrill and Harwood opined that a severability clause could not save an act which violated § 111, for to permit such would be contrary to legislative intent. The majority were of the opinion that a severability clause permitted excise of portions of an act to save it from invalidity under § 111. The reasoning of the majority of the justices was followed in Hamilton. There it was noted that the act, there in question, was passed by the Legislature sixteen days after the justices rendered their opinion concerning the relationship between a severability clause and Ala.Const., § 111.

'Since the conjecture is indulged that the legislature would not have enacted Act 1170 without these exceptions, may not the converse also be indulged--that the legislature would not have accepted the amendments had it not relied on Opinion of the Justices, supra, that the severability clause would save the act if the amendments were held unconstitutional?' Hamilton, supra.

It has often been stated that the purpose of the advertising requirement of Ala.Const., § 106, is to prevent deception of those immediately affected by local legislation and allow such persons to oppose the proposed enactment if they desire. Wilkins v. Woolf, 281 Ala. 693, 208 So.2d 74; Marion County v. Middleton, 246 Ala. 464, 21 So.2d 312; Burns v. State, 246 Ala. 135, 19 So.2d 450; Gray v. Johnson, 235 Ala. 405, 179 So. 221. Ala.Const., § 111 provides:

'No bill introduced as a general law in either house of the legislature shall be so amended on its passage as to become a special, private or local law.'

It is clear that the purpose of this section is prevention of deception which could result from a local bill being passed but not advertised because it was introduced as a general bill. When an act is stripped of its local amendments, the reasons underlying both § 106 and § 111 no longer have validity. Since the remaining portions affect all within its ambit alike, there is not reason to guard against deception nor protect persons peculiarly affected.

All the foregoing is, and must, be, predicated on the existence of a severability clause in the Act under consideration. The presence of such a clause is persuasive authority that the Legislature intends valid portions of legislative enactments to survive. Hamilton supra, and cases cited therein.

III

The third contention is made that use of the severability scalpel by the trial court enlarged the operation of the Act beyond that which the Legislature intended.

'* * * It is obvious from a careful reading of the Act, even though it is most vague and ambiguous in many areas, that the Legislature intended that the Act apply only in Counties that did There is no merit in this contention.

not have a Merit System with the exception of Mobile and Madison Counties. By deleting the first two sentences of Section I * * * (the Act was enlarged) to apply to all Counties * * * having a population of not more than 600,000. * * * We submit this was not the intent of the Legislature in passing this Act * * *' (Appellants' brief at p. 13)

'While it was unquestionably the intention of the legislature to exempt certain counties from the general provisions of this Act, the plain and unambiguous language of the Act itself (to which our consideration is restricted) clearly indicates that the legislature also intended the Act to be severable. Therefore, we think we may logically conclude that the legislature intended that, in the event those provisions (exempting certain counties) might be stricken from the Act because they were unconstitutional, the remaining...