Mitchell v. Moore

Decision Date12 April 1999
Citation729 A.2d 1200,1999 PA Super 77
PartiesThomas MITCHELL, Appellee, v. William MOORE, III, Appellant.
CourtPennsylvania Superior Court

Delores M. Troiani, Paoli, for appellant.

John L. Lachall, West Chester, for appellee.

Before MCEWEN, President Judge, and POPOVICH, J., and CIRILLO, President Judge Emeritus. William F. Joseph, Philadelphia, for appellant.

Brendan P. McGlynn, Philadelphia, for appellees.

Before JOHNSON, SCHILLER and BROSKY, JJ.

CIRILLO, President Judge Emeritus:

¶ 1 William Moore, III (Moore), appeals from the order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County denying his post-trial motions and entering judgment on a jury verdict of $130,000.00 awarded to Appellee, Thomas Mitchell (Mitchell). We affirm in part and reverse in part.

¶ 2 Thomas Mitchell and William Moore first met in 1980; the two men quickly developed a romantic relationship. Moore resided in Elverson, Pennsylvania and Mitchell in South Carolina. In the spring of 1981, Mitchell accepted Moore's invitation to spend his "off season"1 at Moore's Chester County farm. By 1985, Mitchell had permanently moved to Elverson, where he resided at Moore's farm without paying rent, worked a full-time job with a company located in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, and assisted Moore in maintaining his house and farm. Among other things, Mitchell took care of the farm animals, which included aiding in the breeding of sheep and birds. In 1990, Mitchell enrolled at Penn State University for graduate studies. As a result of his academic schedule, he was unable to run the sheep and bird businesses or maintain the farm. Soon thereafter, the parties' relationship soured; Mitchell moved out of Moore's residence in June of 1994.

¶ 3 In 1995, Mitchell brought an action against Moore sounding in fraud, quantum meruit, and implied contract. Specifically, Mitchell sought compensation, in the form of restitution, for the services he rendered to Moore throughout the thirteen years the two men lived together on the farm. In his complaint, Mitchell alleged that Moore had: promised him compensation for his services rendered to maintain and operate his farm; agreed to compensate him for his help in running an antique cooperative (co-op) that Mitchell had purchased; promised him future compensation and the devise of property in a will and codicil; and failed to compensate him for monetary contributions he had made towards Moore's purchase of real estate on Amelia Island, Florida.

¶ 4 In response to Mitchell's action, Moore filed preliminary objections seeking a demurrer. The court granted the objections in part and denied the objections in part, striking Mitchell's claim of fraud for lack of specificity, see Pa.R.C.P. 1019(b), but granting Mitchell leave to file an amended complaint. Mitchell filed an amended complaint, now including only counts for quantum meruit /unjust enrichment 2 and implied contract. Moore filed a counterclaim seeking $139,300.00 representing reasonable rent for the 139 months Mitchell lived on his farm rent-free and as compensation for various utility and telephone bills, taxes, car payments, and other miscellaneous expenses paid by Moore on Mitchell's behalf. ¶ 5 After a jury trial, a verdict was rendered in favor of Mitchell on the basis of unjust enrichment and against Moore on the counterclaim. Moore filed post-trial motions seeking, among other remedies, a judgment in his favor; these motions were denied by the trial court. Moore filed a timely appeal, raising the following issues for our consideration:

(1) Whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence in that:

(a) appellee-plaintiff failed to produce evidence of an express contract;

(b) appellee failed to prove an implied contract;

(c) the nature of the relationship rebutted the presumption of a promise to pay and therefore, appellee failed to prove unjust enrichment; and

(d) appellee failed to prove that appellant wrongfully secured or passively received benefits that would be unconscionable for him to retain?

(2) Whether the trial court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury concerning evidence of the will and its codicil?

(3) Whether the trial court committed error requiring the grant of a new trial by permitting the jury to consider claims prior to 1991 that were barred by the statute of limitations?

(4) Whether the trial court committed error in failing to grant appellant's motion for directed verdict based upon public policy (palimony)?

(5) Whether appellant is entitled to remittitur in that the verdict is not supported by the evidence?

(6) Whether appellant is entitled to a new trial on his counterclaim as the verdict was against the weight of the evidence?

¶ 6 In reviewing a denial of judgment notwithstanding the verdict, an appellate court must decide whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict; our scope of review is very narrow: all evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom must be considered in the light most favorable to the verdict winner. Johnson v. Hyundai Motor America, 698 A.2d 631 (Pa.Super.1997). Judgment notwithstanding the verdict can be entered only if the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law or if evidence is such that no two reasonable minds could disagree that the outcome should have been rendered in favor of the movant. Jara v. Rexworks, Inc., 718 A.2d 788 (Pa.Super.1998) (citations omitted). We will reverse a trial court's grant or denial of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict only when we find an abuse of discretion or an error of law that controlled the outcome of the case. Id., citing Jones v. Constantino, 429 Pa.Super. 73, 631 A.2d 1289 (1993).

¶ 7 Mitchell's claim for restitution for services rendered lies not upon an express contract or written agreement, but, rather, upon the equitable theory of unjust enrichment. Further, we may not make a finding of unjust enrichment, as has the trial court, where a written or express contract between parties exists. See First Wisconsin Trust Co. v. Strausser, 439 Pa.Super. 192, 653 A.2d 688 (1995). We, therefore, confine our review to whether the court properly found Mitchell entitled to compensation under the legal theory of unjust enrichment.

¶ 8 "Unjust enrichment" is essentially an equitable doctrine. Styer v. Hugo, 422 Pa.Super. 262, 619 A.2d 347 (1993), aff'd, 535 Pa. 610, 637 A.2d 276 (1994). Where unjust enrichment is found, the law implies a contract, which requires the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the value of the benefit conferred. Schenck v. K.E. David, Ltd., 446 Pa.Super. 94, 666 A.2d 327 (1995). The elements necessary to prove unjust enrichment are:

(1) benefits conferred on defendant by plaintiff; (2) appreciation of such benefits by defendant; and (3) acceptance and retention of such benefits under such circumstances that it would be inequitable for defendant to retain the benefit without payment of value. (citations omitted). The application of the doctrine depends on the particular factual circumstances of the case at issue. In determining if the doctrine applies, our focus is not on the intention of the parties, but rather on whether the defendant has been unjustly enriched.

Id., 666 A.2d at 328. Accord Torchia v. Torchia, 346 Pa.Super. 229, 499 A.2d 581, 582 (1985) ("[t]o sustain a claim of unjust enrichment, a claimant must show that the party against whom recovery is sought either `wrongfully secured or passively received a benefit that it would be unconscionable for her to retain.'") (citation omitted).

¶ 9 In its opinion, the trial court clearly determines that a benefit was conferred upon Moore as a result of the extensive labor and services Mitchell provided him on his farm and in his home. The critical question, with regard to whether as a result of this benefit Moore was unjustly enriched, was answered in the positive by the court as follows:

Assuming the jury established that a benefit had been conferred by Plaintiff [Mitchell] and received by Defendant [Moore], they only had to determine that Defendant's acceptance of these benefits and failure to compensate Plaintiff resulted in an unconscionable bargain. The jury was aware that Defendant [sic] moved hundreds of miles away from his job, house, friends and family to a different region of the country where he took on a new job and did work on Defendant's [Moore's] farm. It is not unreasonable to suggest that the jury believed Plaintiff [Mitchell] in that he made that life-altering change based on something besides his desire to develop his relationship with Defendant [Moore]. Given this potential scenario, it is likely that the jury could have found that the lack of compensation Plaintiff [Mitchell] received amounted to an unconscionable bargain and therefore, Defendant's [Moore's] unjust enrichment.

¶ 10 "It has been said, an intention to pay for work done will be assumed, except in the case of parent and child. Where, however, it is apparent that the parties, though not so related by blood, in reality bore like connection to each other, the implication does not arise." Brown v. McCurdy, 278 Pa. 19, 22, 122 A. 169, 170 (1923). While it has been held that the presumption of gratuitous services does not automatically arise in a daughter-in-law/mother-in-law context, where a claimant has become "part of the family" the contrary is true. Id.

¶ 11 Both parties concur that when Mitchell moved into Moore's home on a full-time basis, Moore paid many of Mitchell's bills, including car payments, VISA and SEARS card charges, and phone bills. Moreover, Moore claims that Mitchell became part of his own family; Mitchell, himself, admits to having celebrated all the major holidays with Moore's immediate family and received gifts from them on special occasions.

¶ 12 In Brown, supra, the law and facts centered around the issue of whether a presumption of payment, based upon an express contract...

To continue reading

Request your trial
202 cases
  • Commonwealth v. Monsanto Co.
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
    • December 30, 2021
    ...doctrine requires the offending party to pay the plaintiff the value of the benefit he has conferred on the defendant. Mitchell v. Moore , 729 A.2d 1200 (Pa. Super. 1999) .... A party alleging that a defendant has been unjustly enriched must establish the following: (1) plaintiff conferred ......
  • M.D. v. Claudio
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • May 14, 2010
    ...meruit, is ‘a form of restitution.’ ” Powers v. Lycoming Engines, 328 Fed.Appx. 121, 126 (3d Cir.2009) (quoting Mitchell v. Moore, 729 A.2d 1200, 1202 n. 2 (Pa.Super.Ct.1999)). Under Pennsylvania law, the elements of unjust enrichment are as follows: (1) a benefit conferred on the defendant......
  • In re Gen. Motors LLC
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York
    • June 30, 2017
    ...the benefit." Glob. Ground Support, LLC v. Glazer Enters., Inc. , 581 F.Supp.2d 669, 675 (E.D. Pa. 2008) ; see also Mitchell v. Moore , 729 A.2d 1200, 1203–04 (Pa. 1999). As with many of the states discussed above, Pennsylvania holds that "where the subject matter of the claim is governed b......
  • Raymo v. FCA US LLC
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan
    • July 30, 2020
    ...is an expenditure by one person that adds to the property of another, coupled with a resulting injustice."); Mitchell v. Moore , 729 A.2d 1200, 1203–04 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) ("The elements necessary to prove unjust enrichment are: (1) benefits conferred on defendant by plaintiff; (2) apprec......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2 books & journal articles
  • § 1.02 Disputes Between Cohabitants
    • United States
    • Full Court Press Divorce, Separation and the Distribution of Property Title CHAPTER 1 Disputes Between Unmarried People
    • Invalid date
    ...917 (1987). See also, Nini v. Sullivan, 23 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1127 (Colo. Dist. 1996). See also, Mitchell v. Moore, 1999 Pa. Super. 77, 729 A.2d 1200 (1999).[72] For examples of cases sanctioning this theory of recovery, see: Alaska: Sugg v. Morris, 392 P.2d 313 (Alaska 1964). Arizona: Stev......
  • TAXATION OF UNMARRIED PARTNERS.
    • United States
    • Washington University Law Review Vol. 99 No. 6, August 2022
    • August 1, 2022
    ...of the household to another are provided gratuitously. See Trimmer v. Van Bomel, 434 N.Y.S.2d 82 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980); Mitchell v. Moore, 729 A.2d 1200 (Penn. Sup. Ct. 1999); Establishment of "Family" Relationship to Raise a Presumption That Services Were Rendered Gratuitously, as Between P......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT