MITCHELL v. OKOLONA Sch. Dist.
| Decision Date | 29 March 2011 |
| Docket Number | CAUSE NO. 1:10-CV-135-D-D |
| Parties | MARION MITCHELL PLAINTIFF v. OKOLONA SCHOOL DISTRICT, DR. TERESA PRICE, SARA BEAN, WILLIAM RANDLE, HOWARD GUNN, LINDA LOUDERMILL, IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITIES DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi |
Presently before the Court is Defendants', Dr. Teresa Price, Sara Bean, William Randle, Howard Gunn and Linda Loudermill, motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity doctrine as to all § 1983 and Title VII individual-capacity claims alleged by Plaintiff. Plaintiff failed to respond to the motion. After reviewing the motion, pleadings, rules, and authorities, the Court makes the following findings:
A. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff, Marion Mitchell (hereinafter "Plaintiff), an African-American female, was hired by the Okolona School District to serve as Superintendant of Okolona School District on or around July 1, 2008. During her tenure as Superintendant, Plaintiff recommended and hired Caucasian employees for employment positions over less qualified African-American. Plaintiff did not include in her Complaint the date she was terminated or the stated reason the School Board gave for terminating her. In Defendants' motion, they also failed to give a termination date or the stated reason as to why Plaintiff was terminated but Defendants do admit that Plaintiff's contract terminated before the end of its term.
On May 5, 2010, Plaintiff filed the Complaint in the present action in which Plaintiff alleges that Okolona School District and Defendants discriminated against her based on her race, sex, and in violation of her rights secured by the First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, Title 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff claims that Defendants subjected her to race and sex discrimination in its discipline practices and retaliated against her when she hired a more qualified white female business manager over a less qualified African-American female, which she claims was her way of speaking out against discrimination in the workplace. Plaintiff also claims that Defendants treated her less favourably than male superintendents because she was not afforded the same terms and conditions of employment that were afforded to male superintendents. Plaintiff claims Defendants violated her procedural and substantive due process rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. All of Plaintiff's claims are supported by one fact allegation, that her contract was terminated due to the fact she refused to engage in discriminatory hiring practices.
Defendants did not file an Answer to the Complaint but instead the individually named defendants filed the present motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. In the present motion, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's allegation is legally impossible considering under Mississippi law she had no authority to hire employees and therefore she could not have been fired for refusing to engage in discriminatory hiring practices. Defendants also argue that Plaintiff cannot rebut the presumption that qualified immunity applies.
As further discussed herein, the Court finds that the individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and the Plaintiff's claims against the individual Defendants shall be dismissed.B. Motion to Dismiss Standard
To overcome a Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); accord Ashcroft v. Iqbal, — U.S. — -, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868, 883-85 (May 18, 2009). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct, at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). However, if the assertions made within a complaint, even if true, '"could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief, this basic deficiency should be exposed at the point of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court.'" Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558, 127 S.Ct. 1955) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
C. Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity shields public officials from personal liability for civil damages as long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights or their conduct is objectively reasonable. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); Gagne v. City of Galveston, 805 F.2d 558, 559 (5th Cir. 1986).
A claim of qualified immunity requires the court to engage in a two-step analysis. The court must first determine whether the defendant has violated an actual constitutional right. McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 323 (5th Cir. 2002). "The first inquiry in any section 1983 suit is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a right 'secured by the Constitution and laws.'" Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 139, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2692, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). If the answer is "no," the analysis ends.Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d 404, 410-11 (5th Cir. 2007). If the answer is "yes," then the court must consider whether the defendant's actions were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the conduct in question. Id. at 411. The standard gives ample room for mistaken judgments by protecting all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law. Mendenhall v. Riser, 213 F.3d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
The Fifth Circuit has held that claims brought under §1983 against public officials have a heightened pleading requirement and that a §1983 claim requires a plaintiff to allege Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 195 (5th Cir. 1996).
D. Discussion
Section 1983 provides that any person who, under color of state law, deprives another of "any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ..." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Rather than creating substantive rights, § 1983 simply provides a remedy for the rights that it designates. Thus, an underlying constitutional or statutory violation is a predicate to liability under § 1983. As discussed below, Plaintiff has failed to prove a constitutional or statutory violation to create liability under § 1983.
The Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment protects a public employee's right, in certain circumstances, to speak as a citizen on matters of public concern. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1957, 164 L. Ed. 2d 689 (2007); Pickering v.Board of Educ, 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S. Ct. 1731, 1734-35, 20 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1968); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147, 103 S. Ct. 1684; Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384, 107 S. Ct. 2891, 97 L. Ed. 2d 315 (1987); United States v. Treasury Employees, 513 U.S. 454, 466, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 130 L. Ed. 2d 964 (1995); Williams v. Dallas Ind. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d 689, 691-92 (5th Cir. 2007).
Pursuant to the Supreme Court's ruling in Garcetti, following Pickering, a public employee's speech is protected only when (1) the employee is speaking as a citizen; (2) on a matter of public concern; and (3) the government employer does not have adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the general public as a result of the statement he or she made. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418 (emphasis added).
Plaintiff claims Defendants violated her 1st Amendment rights by retaliating against her when she spoke out against discrimination in the workplace by hiring a Caucasian female business manager instead of a less qualified African-American female. Plaintiff is therefore claiming that her act of hiring was symbolic speech amounting to First Amendment protected speech.
Defendants argue Plaintiff has no legal authority to hire School district employees citing Miss. Code Ann. §37-7-30l(p) and Yarbrough v. Camphor, 645 So.2d 867, 871 (Miss. 1994). However, Miss. Code Ann. §37-9-3 provides that the superintendent or the administrative superintendent must recommend to the school board all non- instructional employees. §37-7-301 provides that school boards have authority to employ non-instructional employees upon the recommendation of the superintendent. See Miss. Code Anno. §37-7-301 Op.Atty.Gen. No. 2001-0116, Boyles, March 2, 2001. Therefore, the issue of whether Plaintiff actually hired theemployee is not an issue due to the fact the school board has no authority to hire an employee whom the Superintendant did not recommend to hire.
Instead, the Court first must determine whether Plaintiff spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern. Plaintiff by her own admission was retaliated against for hiring a Caucasian female, which she did in her official capacity. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff was clearly acting in her official capacity as the Superintendant and not as a citizen when she engaged in the symbolic speech of hiring or recommending for hire a Caucasian female over an African-American female. Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the first inquiry and accordingly has no First Amendment cause of action. The Court will not address the defence of qualified immunity due to the fact Plaintiff has failed to show...
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