Mitchell v. People's Sav. Bank

• Decision Date: 30 April 1898
• Citation: 40 A. 502,20 R.I. 500
• Parties: MITCHELL v. PEOPLE'S SAV. BANK.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

40 A. 502

20 R.I. 500

MITCHELL

v. PEOPLE'S SAV. BANK.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

April 30, 1898.

Action by Daniel Mitchell, conservator of the person and estate of Paulina Mitchell, against the People's Savings Bank of Providence. Demurrer to declaration overruled. Demurrer to plea sustained.

Clarence A. Aldrich, for plaintiff.

James, Win. E. & Theodore P. Tillinghast, for defendant.

BOSWORTH, J. This case is brought by Daniel Mitchell, a resident of the state of Connecticut, conservator of the person and estate of Paulina Mitchell, also a resident of Connecticut, against the People's Savings Bank of Providence, in this state, to recover the amount of a deposit made by the said Paulina Mitchell previous to the appointment of the plaintiff as her conservator. The declaration sets forth that a deposit was made by Paulina Mitchell with the defendant corporation December 27, 1853; that at the time of said deposit said Paulina Mitchell was, and ever since has been, a resident of Killingly, in the state of Connecticut; that on the 16th day of June, 1894, the plaintiff was duly and lawfully appointed conservator of the person and estate of said Paulina Mitchell, accepted said appointment, and gave bond as such conservator; that the office and duties of a conservator under the laws of the state of Connecticut are the same as the office and duties of a guardian under the laws of this state; that on the 20th day of July, 1897, the plaintiff, in his capacity as conservator, applied to the municipal court (which is the court of probate) of the city of Providence for leave to demand, sue for, and remove to the place of residence of himself and ward, all moneys in the hands of the defendant corporation; that he produced the proof required by section 41 of chapter 196 of the General Laws of this state; that the municipal court, upon consideration, then and there found that a removal of said property would not conflict with the terms of limitation attending the right by which said Paulina Mitchell owns the same; and that said municipal court thereupon ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the plaintiff, in his said capacity, might demand, sue for, and remove to the place of residence of himself and ward, all moneys in the hands of the defendant corporation standing in the name of said Paulina Mitchell. To this declaration the defendant corporation demurs, assigning as causes of demurrer (1) that section 41 of chapter 196 of the General Laws is unconstitutional; and (2) that the municipal court had no jurisdiction to make the adjudication and to take the action set out in the declaration. The defendant corporation also files a plea setting forth that said municipal court, before making the adjudication respecting the removal of the property, did not give notice of any kind to any person whomsoever of the application of the plaintiff, nor appoint any guardian ad litem to represent said Paulina Mitchell. To this plea the plaintiff demurs, assigning as a cause of demurrer that the laws of Rhode Island do not require the giving of any notice, nor the appointment of a guardian ad litem, or of any other persons, to represent said Paulina Mitchell. The case was heard upon the defendant's demurrer to the plaintiff's declaration, and the plaintiff's demurrer to the defendant's plea.

It is urged by the defendant that section 41 of chapter 196 of the General Laws violates section 2 of article 10 and section 10 of article 1 of the constitution of the state, and section 1 of article 14 of the amendments to the constitution of the United States. Section 41 of chapter 196 of the General Laws is as follows: "In all cases where any guardian and his ward may both be nonresidents of this state and such ward may be entitled to property of any description in this state, such guardian, on producing satisfactory proof to the probate court of the proper town and county, by certificates duly authenticated according to the act of congress in such cases, that he has given bond and security in the state in which he and his ward reside in double the amount of the value of the property, as guardian, and it is found that a removal of the property will not conflict with the terms of limitation attending the right by which the ward owns the same, then any guardian may demand or sue for and remove any such property to the place of residence of himself and ward." Section 2 of article 10 of the constitution of Rhode Island provides that "chancery powers may be conferred upon the supreme court, but on no other court to any greater extent than is now provided by law." Section 10 of article 1 of the state constitution provides "that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property unless by a judgment of his peers or the law of the land." Section 1 of article 14 of the amendments to the constitution of the United States provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law." The authority granted by section 41 of chapter 196 of the General Laws was conferred upon courts of probate February 9, 1865. The claim of the defendant is that this section is unconstitutional: (1) Because it confers chancery powers upon courts of probate to a greater extent than was provided by law at the time of the adoption of the constitution in 1842; (2) because it operates to deprive said Paulina Mitchell of her property without due process of law.

At the time of the adoption of the constitution there was no court in Rhode Island known as the supreme court. Chancery powers, to a limited extent, had been conferred upon the supreme judicial court, but this court had no general chancery jurisdiction. Courts of probate at this time had exercised jurisdiction since 1742 over persons of unsound mind, with powers to appoint guardians, settle accounts, etc. Subsequently to 1742, and previous to the adoption of the constitution, the jurisdiction of courts of probate was extended, and power was conferred upon such courts to appoint guardians over infants, and persons who, for want of discretion in managing their estates, were liable to bring themselves to want; so that, at the time of the adoption of the constitution, jurisdiction generally, in matters relating to the appointment of guardians, and affecting the relations of guardians and wards, was vested in courts of probate. The jurisdiction exercised by the English courts of chancery over guardians and wards did not arise because the appointment of guardians, and the management and settlement of the estates of wards, presented questions that necessarily called for an exercise of the power of equitable interpretation, or the application of equitable remedies, but because it was necessary that those persons unable properly to care for themselves should be cared for by the sovereign authority; and therefore, in the absence of jurisdiction specially conferred upon any...