Mitchell v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corrs.

• Decision Date: 22 March 2022
• Docket Number: 8:19-cv-457-MSS-TGW
• Parties: RILEY MITCHELL, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

RILEY MITCHELL, Petitioner,
v.
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.

No. 8:19-cv-457-MSS-TGW

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division

March 22, 2022

ORDER

MARY S. SORIVEN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Mitchell petitions for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and challenges his state court convictions for burglary of an unoccupied dwelling and petit theft, for which he is serving thirty years in prison. After reviewing the petition (Doc. 1), the response and appendix (Docs. 9 and 10), and the reply (Doc. 17), the Court DENIES the petition.

FACTS

The evidence at Mitchell's trial showed that a maintenance supervisor for a property management company discovered a broken window in the rear of a house owned by the company. (Doc. 10-2 at 326, 336) A screen for the window was lying on the ground. (Doc. 10-2 at 336) A five or six-foot high chain linked fence enclosed the backyard of the house (Doc. 10-2 at 331-33), but a section of the fence always remained open for entering and exiting. (Doc. 10-2 at 332, 350) Inside the house the supervisor observed a collapsed ceiling in the master bedroom, a hole in the ceiling of a bathroom that led to the attic where the air handler was kept, and pieces of insulation for copper piping all over the floor in the garage. (Doc. 10-2 at 327-28, 338) Approximately seventy feet of copper tubing which connected the

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air handler in the attic to the air condenser outside the house was missing. (Doc. 10-2 at 328, 341-42) Outside the house the air conditioner condenser, which was not enclosed by the fence, was also missing. (Doc. 10-2 at 328, 333-34, 350-51) The supervisor had visited the house four days earlier and had observed no damage. (Doc. 10-2 at 329)

A crime scene technician observed a red substance on the bottom of the window frame and a fleshy substance on the broken area of the window. (Doc. 10-2 at 366, 368) The technician observed the fleshy substance on the window inside the house and the red substance on the window outside the house. (Doc. 10-2 at 372-73, 377) The technician collected samples of both substances. (Doc. 10-2 at 367-68) DNA from the samples matched Mitchell's DNA. (Doc. 10-2 at 394-96, 400)^[1] The maintenance supervisor denied knowing or employing Mitchell or giving Mitchell permission to break the window or remove the air conditioning unit from the house. (Doc. 10-2 at 345-46)

A month and a half after the burglary, a detective met with Mitchell and told him that he was under arrest for the burglary. (Doc. 10-2 at 406) The detective did not mention the air conditioner, copper wiring, and copper tubing missing from the house. (Doc. 10-2 at 406) The detective attempted to advise Mitchell of his constitutional rights, but Mitchell repeatedly interrupted the detective. (Doc. 10-2 at 406, 421) Mitchell did not admit to burglarizing the house owned by the property management company but generally admitted to stealing scrap metal from houses. (Doc. 10-2 at 418-19) He spontaneously denied taking something without permission but told the detective that he was a scrapper and had a family to support. (Doc. 10-2 at 408, 422) He admitted that he knew that he wrongly went inside abandoned houses,

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collected scrap metal, and sold the metal with his brother's help. (Doc. 10-2 at 409, 422) The detective observed scrapes and scars on Mitchell's arms. (Doc. 10-2 at 410-12)

The jury found Mitchell guilty of burglary of an unoccupied dwelling and grand theft. (Doc. 10-2 at 131-32) The trial court sentenced Mitchell as a habitual felony offender to thirty years in prison for the burglary conviction and a concurrent five years for the grand theft conviction. (Doc. 10-2 at 173-81) The state appellate court affirmed the burglary conviction without comment, reversed the grand theft conviction because the prosecution failed to prove the value of the items stolen, and remanded the case for entry of a judgment and sentence for petit theft, a lesser offense. (Doc. 10-2 at 522-23) The Court takes judicial notice of state court records which show that the trial court resentenced Mitchell to time served for the petit theft. Judgment and Amended Sentence, State v. Mitchell, No. 10-CF-19078-A (Fla. 13th Jud. Cir. Jan. 10, 2018). The thirty-year sentence for burglary was not affected. The post-conviction court denied Mitchell's motion for post-conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing (Docs. 10-3 at 141-50 and 10-7 at 2-25), and the state appellate court affirmed. (Doc. 10-9 at 158) Mitchell's federal petition follows.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

AEDPA

Because Mitchell files his federal petition after the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, AEDPA governs his claims. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997). AEDPA amended 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) to require:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim -

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(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

A decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law “if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the U.S. Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the U.S. Supreme Court] has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). A decision involves an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law “if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the U.S. Supreme Court's] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. Clearly established federal law refers to the holding of an opinion by the U.S. Supreme Court at the time of the relevant state court decision. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412.

“[AEDPA] modified a federal habeas court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent federal habeas ‘retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). A federal petitioner must show that the state court's ruling was “so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility of fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011).

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Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Mitchell asserts ineffective assistance of counsel - a difficult claim to sustain. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) explains:

First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.

“There is no reason for a court . . . to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. “[C]ounsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. “[A] court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.

“An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. To demonstrate prejudice, the defendant must show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. A reasonable probability is a “probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

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Strickland cautions that “strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91. A defendant cannot meet his burden by showing that the avenue chosen by counsel was unsuccessful. White v. Singletary, 972 F.2d 1218, 1220-21 (11th Cir. 1992). Because the standards under Strickland and AEDPA are both highly deferential, “when the two apply in tandem, review is ‘doubly' so.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 105. “Given the double deference due, it is a ‘rare case in which an ineffective assistance of counsel claim that was denied on the merits in state court is found to merit relief in a federal habeas proceeding.'” Nance v. Warden, Ga. Diag. Prison, 922 F.3d 1298, 1303 (11th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted).

The state appellate court affirmed in a decision without a written opinion the post-conviction court's order denying Mitchell relief. (Doc. 10-9 at 158) A federal court “‘look[s] through' the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale [and] presume[s] that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.” Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S.Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018).

Because the post-conviction court recognized that Strickland governed the claims (Docs. 10-3 at 143 and 10-7 at 4)...