Mitchell v. Spillers

• Decision Date: 15 April 1948
• Docket Number: 16173.
• Citation: 47 S.E.2d 564,203 Ga. 565
• Parties: MITCHELL et al. v. SPILLERS
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

47 S.E.2d 564

203 Ga. 565

MITCHELL et al. v. SPILLERS

No. 16173.

Supreme Court of Georgia

April 15, 1948

Syllabus by the Court.

1. In the construction of deeds the paramount, essential, and controlling rule is to ascertain the intention of the parties, and if that intention is plain and contravenes no rule of law, it should be given effect regardless of mere literal repugnancies in different clauses of the conveyance. The intention may be ascertained from the language of the deed as a whole and the surrounding facts, such as the continued possession of the grantor after execution and delivery of the deed.

2. Where a deed contained granting and habendum clauses in the usual form where an absolute title was conveyed, but immediately following the granting clause it was recited that 'It is understood that party of the first part shall have the rents, issues and profits from the said land for and during her natural life,' and it was stipulated between the parties in a claim case that the grantor had remained in possession of the lands since the date of the deed, a finding was authorized that by the conveyance a life estate was reserved to the grantor.

3. Where, after obtaining a judgment against the grantor in the aforementioned deed, the plaintiff caused an execution to be issued and a levy to be made on a portion of the lands conveyed by the deed, the entry of the sheriff reciting that the levy was made on the life estate of the grantor therein and the grantees filed a claim to the said lands, contending that the reservation clause in the deed was repugnant to the granting clause and must yield thereto and was impotent, and that if valid only a usufruct at most was reserved, the judge to whom the issue was submitted did not err in ordering the execution to proceed.

On November 6, 1944, Mrs. Lizzie Mitchell executed and delivered to Mrs. Mary O'Neal, Mrs. Vallie Baggarley, Mrs. Ruby Harris, James Mitchell and H. C. Mitchell a deed to described realty in Crawford County, Georgia. This deed contained granting and habendum clauses in the usual form where a fee simple title is conveyed, but immediately after the granting clause the following provision was incorporated: 'It is understood that party of the first part shall have the rents issues and profits from said land for and during her natural life.'

On October 24, 1946, Mrs. Mary Lee Spillers, as administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Henrietta Mitchell, recovered in the Superior Court of Crawford County against Mrs. Lizzie Mitchell, grantor in the aforementioned deed, a judgment for $876 and costs. Thereafter an execution issued, and on July 7, 1947, a levy was made by the sheriff on 303 1/2 acres of the land conveyed by the above-mentioned deed the entry of the sheriff reciting that the levy was made on the 'life estate of Mrs. Lizzie Mitchell in' the said land.

On July 8, 1947, the grantees in the above mentioned deed filed a claim to the land levied on. The case came on for a hearing, and it was agreed by all parties that the presiding judge should hear and determine the cause upon all questions of law and the following stipulated contentions and facts in addition to those above stated: 'The plaintiff contends that the deed from defendant to claimants reserved a life interest in defendant and which was subject to levy and sale to satisfy said fi. fa. * * * Plaintiff concedes that, if the defendant has no life estate in the lands, the claim should be sustained. Claimants contend that the defendant has no life estate in said lands and no interest that can be levied on and sold to satisfy any judgment against defendant, and claimants concede that, if the defendant has a life estate in the lands, this is subject to levy and sale and a finding to the effect that defendant has a life estate in said lands, then the judgment and decision of the court should be a finding that the life estate is subject to levy and sale, and the life estate only found subject to plaintiff's judgment, and the judgment of the court finding that said life estate was and is subject to levy and sale. The question of whether or not claim was filed for purpose of delay only is submitted to the court for decision. * * * It is further stipulated that in instant case the plaintiff only seeks to subject to said execution the life interest of and in lands involved in the instant case. * * * The questions and issues to be determined by the court [are]: Did the defendant reserve a life estate in said lands described in deed to claimants that is subject to levy and sale? Defendant in fi. fa. has been living on the land since date of deed. Was the claim filed and interposed for purposes of delay only? If the claim was filed for purpose of delay only, then plaintiff is [entitled?] to judgment for damages, the amount of such damages being limited to 10 per cent. It is agreed that the court pass on the issues of law and fact * * * and hear and determine said issues in vacation at any time in the discretion of the court.'

The court...