Mitchell v. State
| Decision Date | 05 April 1911 |
| Citation | 80 A. 1020,115 Md. 360 |
| Parties | MITCHELL v. STATE. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Worcester County; Robley D. Jones, Judge.
Charles Mitchell was convicted of violating the local option law, and he appeals. Affirmed.
Argued before BOYD, C.J., and BRISCOE, PEARCE, BURKE, PATTISON, and URNER, JJ.
George M. Upshur, for appellant.
William F. Johnson, State's Atty., and Isaac Lobe Straus, Atty Gen., for the State.
The traverser was indicted on the 2d day of November, 1910, in the circuit court for Worcester county, for the violation of Acts 1908, c. 27, commonly known as the "local option law" of that county. He was tried, convicted, and sentenced to pay a fine of $150, and to be confined in the Maryland House of Correction for the period of six months. He has taken this appeal.
At the trial of the case the traverser demurred to the indictment upon the ground that it failed to allege the offense in the language of the statute (that is, to charge that the sale of the intoxicating liquor was made at a place of business of the traverser); secondly, the act is unconstitutional and void because in violation of article 3, § 29, Const. Md which provides that every law enacted by the General Assembly shall embrace but one subject, and that shall be described in its title. The objections to the indictment and to the validity of Acts 1908, c. 27, raised on the record in this case, cannot be sustained, and we think the ruling of the court below in overruling the demurrer was entirely correct.
The language of the second section of the act of 1908, under which the indictment was framed, is clear and definite in its legislative meaning and intent, and can admit of but one construction. It provides "that if the returns of the election provided for in section one of this act shall show that a majority of the votes cast at said election were against the sale of intoxicating liquors in Worcester county that it shall be unlawful for any person or persons, firm corporation or association of persons, under any pretense whatever, directly or indirectly, to barter, sell, give away or otherwise dispose of it at a place of business, or keep at any place whatsoever for the purpose of bartering or selling any spirituous, fermented or intoxicating liquors, alcoholic bitters or compounds within the limits of Worcester county; and it shall also be unlawful for any person or persons, firm, corporation or association of persons under any pretense whatever, within the limits of the county aforesaid, to take orders for any spirituous, fermented or intoxicating liquors, alcoholic bitters, or compounds, or for any person or persons, firm, corporation or association of persons, to operate as distributing or collecting agents for any spirituous, fermented or intoxicating liquors, alcoholic bitters or compounds."
The indictment charged that Charles Mitchell, the appellant here, of the county and state named in the indictment, on the 9th day of July, in the year 1910, at said county and state, unlawfully did sell certain spirituous, fermented, or intoxicating liquors, to wit, one gill of spirituous, fermented, or intoxicating liquors, to a certain Henry Davis, contrary to the form of the act of assembly in such case made and provided and against the peace, government, and dignity of the state. This indictment it seems to us clearly and sufficiently charged an offense within the statute because the statute by its very terms prohibits the sale of spirituous, fermented, and intoxicating liquors within the limits of Worcester county, and made it unlawful to keep at any place whatsoever for the purpose of barter or sale any spirituous or intoxicating liquors within the limits of that county. The use of the words in the statute, "to give away or otherwise dispose of it at a place of business," was not intended to allow the sale of intoxicating liquors in the county at other places than "a place of business," but they were inserted for the purpose of enlarging the prohibition, and making it unlawful to give or otherwise dispose of it under any other circumstances and conditions at a place of business than those previously named in the statute. It was not therefore necessary to allege that the sale was made "at a place of business" conducted by the traverser, because it was unlawful under the provisions of the statute to sell directly or indirectly spirituous or intoxicating liquors at any place whatsoever within the limits of Worcester county. This is clear both from the title and the provisions of section 2 of the act itself.
The cardinal rule in the construction of a statute is to ascertain the intention of the Legislature as it is expressed in the words of the statute, and for this purpose the whole act must be considered together. In State v. Archer, 73 Md. 57, 20 A. 172, this court said "this rule lies at the bottom of all statutory construction." The law, it is true, in its tenderness for life and liberty, requires that penal statutes shall be strictly construed, by which is meant that courts will not extend the punishment to cases not plainly within the language used. At the same time such statutes are to be fairly and reasonably construed, and courts will not by a narrow and strained construction exclude from their operation cases plainly within their scope and meaning. This intention is to be ascertained, primarily, of course, from the language of the statute itself, and, if the language used is plain and unambiguous, the Legislature must be understood as meaning what they have expressly declared. U.S. v. Lacher, 134 U.S. 624, 10 S.Ct. 625, 33 L.Ed. 1080; Foby v. Fletcher, 28 L. J. Exch. 100.
Statutes must also be construed with special reference to the subject-matter legislated upon, and with reference to the manifest mischief the act was intended to remedy. Alexander v. Worthington, 5 Md. 472; Roland Park Co. v. State, 80 Md. 451, 31 A. 298; Maxwell v. State, 40 Md. 273; Johnson & Wife v. Heald, 33 Md. 352. The construction we have thus given the act here in dispute, not only we think accords with the well-settled rules of statutory interpretation established by the courts, but carries out the legislative purpose and intent of the act itself.
It is contended, however, that section 2 of the act is invalid and unconstitutional because in violation of article 3, § 29, Const., for the want of a valid title. The title of the act it will be seen is an act to enable the qualified voters of Worcester county to determine at a special election to be held Saturday, March 21, 1908, whether or not spirituous, fermented, or intoxicating liquors, alcoholic bitters or compounds shall be sold in said county, and providing certain fines and penalties for the violation of the provisions of the same.
Now it is objected, because section 2 in the body of the act makes it also unlawful in addition to the sale thereof "to give away," "otherwise dispose of," "to take orders for," and "to operate as distributing or collecting agents" any spirituous, fermented, or intoxicating liquors, within the limits of the county, and, as the last-named violations are not embraced in the title, the statute should be declared invalid. The answer to this contention is that the indictment and conviction in this case is for the sale of liquor, and we are not concerned with the violation of the statute in other respects. The objection, however, is obviously not tenable upon authority. In Cearfoss v. State, 42 Md. 403, this court held that the fact that giving was made an offense in the body of the act, whilst the title prohibited the sale, did not render the act unconstitutional under section 29 of article 3 of the Constitution. Slymer v. State, 62 Md. 237; Co. Com'rs v. Hellen, 72 Md. 606, 20 A. 130; Franklin v. State, 12 Md. 236; Parkinson v. State, 14 Md. 202, 74 Am. Dec. 522.
The only remaining question arises upon an alleged bill of exception taken and signed by the court below on the 10th day of December, 1910, nearly one month after the 11th day of November, 1910, the date of the trial and the conviction of the traverser. The sentence was imposed on the 16th day of November, and an order for an appeal to this court was entered in the case on the 19th day of November, 1910. The bill of exception is in these words: ...
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