Mitchell v. State ex rel. Henslee

• Decision Date: 08 May 1961
• Docket Number: No. 5-2328,5-2328
• Citation: 233 Ark. 578,346 S.W.2d 201
• Parties: Lonnie MITCHELL, Appellant, v. STATE ex rel. Lee HENSLEE, Superintendent of Ark. State Penitentiary, Appellee.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 201

346 S.W.2d 201

233 Ark. 578

Lonnie MITCHELL, Appellant, v. STATE ex rel. Lee HENSLEE, Superintendent of Ark. State Penitentiary, Appellee.

No. 5-2328.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

May 8, 1961.

Rehearing Denied June 5, 1961.

Thad D. Williams and Christopher C. Mercer, Little Rock, for appellant.

J. Frank Holt, Atty. Gen., by Thorp Thomas, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.

JOHNSON, Justice.

On the 11th day of April 1959, appellant, Lonnie B. Mitchell, a Negro 23 years of age, was convicted of raping a crippled white woman 77 years of age, and sentenced to death. On appeal to this Court, the judgment, which was based upon a jury verdict, was unanimously affirmed on September 21, 1959; Mitchell v. State, 230 Ark. 894, 327 S.W.2d 384. In that opinion we said: 'The overwhelming and uncontradicted evidence proves appellant guilty beyond any shadow of a doubt. In fact, there is no contention that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain the verdict.' Following this decision, appellant, on January 14, 1960, filed in the Union Circuit Court, where he was originally tried, a motion to vacate the judgment. The motion was overruled and upon appeal the decision of the trial court was affirmed on June 6, 1960. Mitchell v. State, Ark., 337 S.W.2d 663. Thereafter, on September 23, 1960, appellant filed the present petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Jefferson Circuit Court. In his petition appellant alleged that his conviction was void in that the death penalty for rape in Arkansas was not imposed upon any person other than Negro men convicted of rape upon white women ¹ and that such unequal punishment violates his constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution and laws of the United States. He also alleged that the trial court did not appoint him competent counsel, along with the usual allegations of systematic exclusion and/or limitation of Negroes on the jury panels. ² He further claimed that his confession was coerced and that he is presently insane and was at the time of the commission of the offense.

A hearing was held on the petition for a writ of habeas corpus on September 28, 1960. No evidence was introduced and the trial court dismissed the writ and denied an appeal. Upon proper prayer this Court on November 28, 1960, granted an appeal.

For reversal of the holding of the trial court, appellant relies on two points. His first contention is that: 'Appellant is entitled to a judicial inquiry into the truth and substance on the cause of his detention.' In support of his contention appellant argues that the effect of the trial court's decision denies him the opportunity to prove the allegations contained in his petition.

The law relative to the scope of the inquiry when a writ of habeas corpus is petitioned is well settled in this State. It is concisely set forth in Rowland v. Rogers, 199 Ark. 1041, 137 S.W.2d 246, 247, as follows:

'The rule is that where a petitioner for a writ of habeas corpus is in custody under process regular on its face, nothing will be inquired into except the jurisdiction of the court whence the process came. Ex parte Williams, 99 Ark. 475, 138 S.W. 985.'

See also Ex parte O'Neal, 191 Ark. 696, 87 S.W.2d 401; State v. Martineau, 149 Ark. 237, 232 S.W. 609; Ex parte Foote, 70 Ark. 12, 65 S.W. 706.

As to the allegations contained in the instant petition, they are the same as were advanced in Mitchell v. State, Ark., 337 S.W.2d 663, 664. There we said:

'It is alleged in the motion that appellant is a Negro and that it is the custom and practice in Arkansas to sentence Negro men to death for raping white women, but that white men are not sentenced to death for rape; that Negroes were systematically excluded from the jury which tried him; that he is an ignorant youth (he was 23 years of age at the time); that he did not have access to effective assistance of counsel; that a purported confession made by appellant was coerced and not voluntary; that at the * * trial he was insane and not mentally present at the trial; that he was insane at the time of the commission of the rape; that he is presently insane; and that he was denied an examination by a private psychiatrist prior to his trial. Nothing is alleged in the motion that was not or could not have been raised on appeal in the first instance except the allegation of present insanity.'

The record reveals that no petition for a writ of certiorari was filed with the United States Supreme Court in the above quoted case and as we there said, nothing is alleged that was not or could not have been raised on appeal except the allegation of present insanity. Thus the languge in Goodman v. Storey, 221 Art. 308, 254 S.W.2d 63, 64, is applicable here:

'In Brandon, Ex Parte, 49 Ark. 143, 4 S.W. 452, the court said: '* * * an application for habeas corpus cannot be made to perform the function of an appeal, or writ of error, in correcting errors and irregularities at the trial. To authorize the judge of the superior court to interfere and discharge a convicted prisoner in this summary fashion, the sentence must be a nullity, or the court which imposed it must have been without jurisdiction.''

Therefore, since the record reveals that the trial court...