Mitchell v. State
| Decision Date | 25 November 1998 |
| Docket Number | 23908,No. 23901,23901 |
| Citation | 971 P.2d 727,132 Idaho 274 |
| Parties | Rob Lee MITCHELL, Petitioner-Respondent-Cross-Appellant, v. STATE of Idaho, Respondent-Appellant-Cross Respondent. State of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Rob Lee Mitchell, Defendant-Appellant. Lewiston, September 1998 Term |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Aherin, Rice & Anegon, Lewiston, for respondent-cross-appellant. Anthony C. Anegon argued.
The district court granted Rob Lee Mitchell (Mitchell) post-conviction relief from ineffective assistance of appellate counsel by allowing Mitchell a new direct appeal of his underlying convictions for attempted first-degree murder and robbery. The state appeals the decision. The district court denied Mitchell post-conviction relief on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Mitchell cross-appeals this decision. As a consequence of the district court's grant of post-conviction relief based on ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, Mitchell was allowed to file a direct appeal from the criminal convictions of first-degree attempted murder and robbery. In the direct appeal he claims insufficiency of evidence to support the jury's verdict, fundamental error, and excessive sentences.
The facts leading to Mitchell's conviction for attempted first-degree murder and robbery are summarized in State v. Mitchell, 124 Idaho 374, 375, 859 P.2d 972, 973 (Ct.App.1993):
During the morning of May 16, 1991, a man entered the Lewiston Floral Shop. He told the proprietor, Anne Ringold, that he was interested in a present and Mother's Day card for his mother. He looked at cards and expressed interest in a terrarium containing a small house plant, but he left without buying either a card or the terrarium. That afternoon, the man returned, this time with a gun. He forced Ms. Ringold, at gunpoint, to give him the money in the cash register. He then ordered her into a back room where he stabbed her repeatedly. Before fleeing he also took the terrarium that he had admired earlier.
Several days later Mitchell was arrested for these crimes and charged with attempted murder in the first degree, I.C. §§ 18-4001, 18-4002, 18-4003 and 18-306, and robbery, I.C. § 18-6501. Mitchell pled not guilty, and a jury trial ensued.
At trial Ms. Ringold identified Mitchell as her assailant. The police recovered a terrarium that Mitchell had given to his mother as a Mother's Day present, and Ms. Ringold identified it as the item that had been stolen from her shop. A Mother's Day card that Mitchell had given to his mother with the terrarium was also shown to be the same brand and design as cards carried by the Lewiston Floral Shop. The state's evidence also included expert testimony that several fingerprints and handprints found at the crime scene, including a print in blood, matched Mitchell's prints. The jury found Mitchell guilty on both charges.
Mitchell was sentenced to a term of confinement of fifteen years for attempted murder and a unified sentence of thirty-five years, with fifteen years minimum confinement, for the robbery. The court ordered that the sentences be served consecutively.
Mitchell appealed the district court decision following trial and raised various ineffective assistance of counsel claims and the claim of excessive sentences. Id. at 375-77, 859 P.2d at 973-75. The Court of Appeals declined to consider the ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal, preserving those issues for post-conviction relief proceedings. Id. at 376, 859 P.2d at 974. The Court of Appeals found that the district court did not abuse its discretion with respect to the sentences imposed. Id. at 377-78, 859 P.2d at 975-76.
Subsequent to the Court of Appeals decision, Mitchell filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, and the district court appointed counsel to represent him in those proceedings. The state answered and moved for summary disposition. Mitchell's counsel filed an amended UPCPA petition raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, at sentencing and on appeal. The state answered the amended petition with general denials of all the ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The district court denied the state's motion for summary disposition. Following a hearing the district court denied relief to Mitchell on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, but determined that Mitchell's appellate counsel had been ineffective. Consequently, the district court ruled that Mitchell was entitled to a new direct appeal.
The state appeals the district court's order granting relief on Mitchell's claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Mitchell cross-appeals from the district court's order denying relief on the claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
" 'An application for post-conviction relief is a special proceeding, civil in nature.' " State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983) (quoting Clark v. State, 92 Idaho 827, 830, 452 P.2d 54, 57 When reviewing a decision denying a petition for post-conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing, an appellate court will not disturb the lower court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. The role of the reviewing court is to determine whether there was substantial evidence to support the trial court's findings. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel presents mixed questions of law and fact. On appeal, when faced with mixed questions of fact and law, [the appellate court] will defer to the factual findings made by lower courts if those determinations are based upon substantial evidence, but ... will exercise free review of the application of the relevant law to those facts.
(1969)). The applicant has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, the allegations on which the application for relief is based. I.C.R. 57(c); Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990).
Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 921-22, 828 P.2d 1323, 1326-27 (Ct.App.1992) (citations omitted). However, if there are no specific findings of fact, the appellate court should only disregard the absence of findings of fact if the record is clear and presents an obvious answer to the question on appeal. Pope v. Intermountain Gas Co., 103 Idaho 217, 225, 646 P.2d 988, 996 (1982).
MITCHELL HAS NOT SHOWN A REASONABLE PROBABILITY THAT THE RESULT OF THE APPEAL FROM HIS CONVICTION WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT BUT FOR COUNSEL'S ERRORS.
In reviewing claims for ineffective assistance of counsel the Court utilizes the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760-61, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176-77 (1988); State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 791, 948 P.2d 127, 146 (1997). An applicant for post-conviction relief must demonstrate that (1) counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. A defendant is constitutionally entitled to the effective assistance of counsel on a direct appeal as of right. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 394, 105 S.Ct. 830, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985). Therefore, the test to evaluate ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal is the same. See Aragon, 114 Idaho at 764-65, 760 P.2d at 1180-81.
The district court found appellate counsel's brief to be deficient within the meaning of Strickland, and the state does not challenge this finding. The only issue regarding the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is whether Mitchell was prejudiced by appellate counsel's deficient performance or, as Mitchell claims, the prejudice prong need not be shown because the appellate brief was so deficient that prejudice can be presumed.
The district court documented serious deficiencies in the appellate brief which support the finding of deficient performance under Strickland 's first prong. However, the district court did not set forth findings of fact to support the conclusion that Mitchell was prejudiced by appellate counsel's conduct. Mitchell argues that the district court had competent and substantial evidence to conclude that he was prejudiced based upon the appellate briefs and the criminal record which were placed into evidence at the post-conviction hearing. The argument suggests that a conclusion reached by the district court that there was prejudice is sufficient if the district court had the record of the prior proceedings before it. However, "[t]he absence of findings of fact cannot be cured by recitals in the conclusions of law." C.I.T. Corp. v. Elliott, 66 Idaho 384, 398, 159 P.2d 891, 897 (1945).
Unless the record is clear and yields an obvious answer to the question of whether Mitchell suffered prejudice, the absence of findings cannot be disregarded. Pope, 103 Idaho at 225, 646 P.2d at 996. Mitchell, however, argues that the second prong of the Strickland test need not always be proved. This argument is premised on the position that there are circumstances in which prejudice is presumed. See Lozada v. Deeds, 498 Counsel in Jenkins only filed a five-page appellate brief raising a single three-paragraph argument. Nevertheless, the court's decision to presume prejudice was based on the fact that after filing the brief, counsel had been removed and no replacement counsel had been assigned. Jenkins, 821 F.2d at 161; Hollenback v. United States, 987 F.2d 1272, 1276 (7th Cir.1993) ( Jenkins ). It was the actual absence of counsel on appeal, not counsel's poor performance, that justified applying a presumption of prejudice.
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