Mitchell v. State

• Decision Date: 26 February 2021
• Docket Number: SC 20287
• Citation: 338 Conn. 66,257 A.3d 259
• Parties: James A. MITCHELL v. STATE of Connecticut et al.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

338 Conn. 66

257 A.3d 259

James A. MITCHELL

v.STATE of Connecticut et al.

SC 20287

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 6, 2020

Officially released February 26, 2021^**

Dante R. Gallucci, assigned counsel, for the appellant (petitioner).

Denise B. Smoker, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Donna Mambrino, senior assistant state's attorney, and Gail P. Hardy, former state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Robinson, C.J., and Palmer, McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins, Kahn and Ecker, Js.^*

ECKER, J.

The petitioner, James A. Mitchell, appealed from the trial court's denial of his request for leave to file a late petition for certification to appeal from the court's judgment denying his petition for a new criminal trial on the ground that the petitioner's claims were "meritless and too late." The Appellate Court rejected the petitioner's claim that the trial court improperly considered the merits of the petition, rather than the reasons for the delay or any other factors relevant to permitting a late filing, and dismissed the appeal. See Mitchell v. State , 188 Conn. App. 245, 247, 204 A.3d 807 (2019). We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to engage in the proper analysis to determine whether to excuse the late petition for certification. We further conclude, however, that the trial court acted within its discretion when it determined that the petition did not raise issues warranting certification and, therefore, affirm the Appellate Court's judgment dismissing the petitioner's appeal on this alternative basis.

I

The record reveals the following procedural history culminating in the present appeal. Following a jury trial, the petitioner was convicted of attempt to commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-8, 53a-49 (a) and 53a-54a (a), conspiracy to commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 (a) and 53a-54a (a), kidnapping in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-8 and 53a-92 (a) (2) (A), conspiracy to commit kidnapping in the first degree in violation of §§ 53a-48 and 53a-92 (a) (2) (A), sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-8 and 53a-70 (a) (1), conspiracy to commit sexual assault in the first degree in violation of §§ 53a-48 and 53a-70 (a) (1), assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-8 and 53a-59 (a) (5), conspiracy to commit assault in the first degree in violation of §§ 53a-48 (a) and 53a-59 (a) (5), and criminal possession of a firearm in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2003) § 53a-217 (a) (1).¹ See State v. Mitchell , 110 Conn. App. 305, 307–308, 955 A.2d 84, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 946, 959 A.2d 1012 (2008). The trial court, Mullarkey , J. , imposed a total effective sentence of fifty-seven years imprisonment. Id., at 310, 955 A.2d 84. The Appellate Court affirmed the petitioner's conviction on direct appeal. Id., at 308, 329, 955 A.2d 84.

The petitioner subsequently sought postconviction relief by way of a petition for a new trial and a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner was represented by the same attorney in both proceedings. Trial proceeded first on the later filed habeas petition. The habeas court, Cobb , J., denied the petition and thereafter granted the petitioner's petition for certification to appeal pursuant to General Statutes § 52-470 (g). The Appellate Court affirmed the habeas court's judgment. Mitchell v. Commissioner of Correction , 156 Conn. App. 402, 404, 421, 114 A.3d 168, cert. denied, 317 Conn. 904, 114 A.3d 1220 (2015).

Trial then commenced on the petition for a new trial, before the same judge who had presided over the petitioner's criminal trial.² On August 22, 2016, the trial court, Hon. Edward J. Mullarkey , judge trial referee, rendered judgment denying the petition. On September 12, 2016, the petitioner filed a request for an extension of time to file his appeal, which the trial court granted on September 13. The petitioner then filed his appeal within the extended deadline.

When the petitioner filed the appeal from the trial court's denial of his petition for a new trial, he did so without first obtaining certification to do so in accordance with General Statutes § 54-95 (a),³ which provides that certification to appeal shall be obtained "within ten days after the judgment is rendered ...." See Santiago v. State , 261 Conn. 533, 543–44, 804 A.2d 801 (2002). That appeal had been pending for almost one year when, on September 5, 2017, the Appellate Court notified the petitioner that the requisite certification to appeal was lacking. On September 8, 2017, prior to the hearing in the Appellate Court to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed, the petitioner filed in the trial court a request for leave to file a petition for certification to appeal, to which the petition for certification was appended. To explain his failure to seek certification within the statutory time limitation, the petitioner alleged in that request that, "[a]lthough analogous to a petition for certification to appeal in a habeas corpus case, the petitioner was not provided with a written notice of appeal procedures via [Judicial Branch] form JD-CR-84, as is the custom in habeas corpus cases ...." The respondent, the state of Connecticut,⁴ filed an opposition to the request. Its opposition cited the one year delay in seeking certification and the frivolousness of the grounds raised in the petition for a new trial. Before argument was heard on the request, the Appellate Court dismissed the petitioner's appeal for failure to obtain certification in compliance with § 54-95 (a).

Argument proceeded in the trial court on the petitioner's request for leave to file the petition for certification to appeal. The court orally denied the request at the conclusion of the hearing and subsequently issued a written decision. The decision noted the ten day statutory time limit prescribed for seeking certification to appeal but did not address any particular facts regarding the petitioner's excuse for failing to meet that requirement or the significance of the procedural nonconformity. Instead, it summarized reasons why the court previously had determined that the principal evidence on which the new trial petition relied would not have changed the outcome had such evidence been available at the criminal trial. It then concluded that the petitioner's claims were "meritless and too late."

The petitioner appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming "that the [trial] court abused its discretion in denying his request because the court, in considering the length of the delay in filing the request, did not consider the reasons for the delay or any other factors relevant to permitting a late filing but, rather, addressed the merits of the petitioner's appeal." Mitchell v. State , supra, 188 Conn. App. at 247, 204 A.3d 807. The Appellate Court dismissed the appeal. Id. It reasoned that, "although the petitioner is correct that [the trial court] referenced the merits of the petitioner's claims on appeal, it also made clear that its decision was based in large part on the petitioner's delay ...." Id., at 250, 204 A.3d 807. The Appellate Court acknowledged that the petitioner's request for leave had attributed the delay to not having been provided with a written notice of appeal procedures but concluded that this fact could not excuse the delay because no such notice was required and, even if it were, the failure to afford that notice would not operate as a waiver of the certification requirement. Id. The Appellate Court also acknowledged that the trial court never expressly addressed the notice issue but opined that, "by considering the length of the petitioner's delay, the court afforded due regard to the reasons for the delay, and, thus, the court's denial of the petitioner's request for leave to file a late petition for certification to appeal was not an abuse of discretion." Id.

We granted the petitioner's petition for certification to appeal to this court to decide whether the Appellate Court correctly concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioner's late petition for certification to appeal. See Mitchell v. State , 331 Conn. 920, 205 A.3d 567 (2019). The threshold question raised by the certified issue is whether the trial court improperly ignored considerations relevant to assessing whether to excuse a late request for certification to appeal. Because we answer that question in the affirmative, we also consider whether the trial court's decision could be sustained on the basis of its determination that the petition for a new trial raised no claims warranting appellate review. We conclude that this latter determination was not an abuse of discretion.

II

The petitioner contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his request for leave to file the petition for certification because that decision was not made in accordance with this court's direction in Santiago v. State , supra, 261 Conn. at 543, 804 A.2d 801. He argues that, in assessing the length of the delay, the trial court improperly failed to discount the period during which he was pursuing the appeal from the denial of his petition. This argument was raised at the hearing before the trial court and in the petitioner's Appellate Court brief, but it was not addressed by the Appellate Court. The petitioner also renews the argument that was rejected by the Appellate Court, namely, that the trial court improperly considered the merits of the petition for certification rather than the reasons for delay and other factors relevant to the timeliness of his request for certification. We agree, in part, with the petitioner's second argument.

A petition for a new trial, like a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, provides a "critical procedural mechanism for remedying an injustice." Seebeck v. State , 246 Conn. 514, 531, 717 A.2d...