Mitchell v. Superior Court for Los Angeles County
Decision Date | 13 September 1962 |
Citation | 24 Cal.Rptr. 671,207 Cal.App.2d 643 |
Parties | John Franklin MITCHELL, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California for the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent, PEOPLE of the State of California, Real Party in Interest. Civ. 26644. |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Ellery E. Cuff, Public Defender of Los Angeles County, Roy R. Maines, James L. McCormick, Deputy Public Defendants, for petitioner.
No appearance for respondent.
William B. McKesson, Dist. Atty. of Los Angeles County, Harry Wood, Robert J. Lord, Deputy Dist. Attys., for real party in interest.
By his petition for a writ of prohibition petitioner seeks to prevent his being tried a second time, after the jury was dismissed at his first trial ostensibly for inability to reach a verdict. His claim is double jeopardy.
Petitioner was tried by a jury on June 18, 1962, upon a charge of incest, violation of § 288, Penal Code, etc., before Samuel Laidig, Judge Pro tempore of the superior court and was represented by the Public Defender. Both sides having rested the jury was instructed on June 19, 1962 and retired to deliberate at 11:45 a. m. They lunched from 12:10 p. m. until 1:25 p. m. At 4:45 p. m. the jury returned to the court room. A judge other than Laidig (pro tem.) was then on the bench and the following took place: It does not appear from the record that either counsel had anything to say for or against the discharge of the jury or that defendant or his counsel in any way manifested consent thereto.
Penal Code, § 1140: 'Except as provided by law, the jury cannot be discharged after the cause is submitted to them until they have agreed upon their verdict and rendered it in open court, unless by consent of both parties, entered upon the minutes, or unless, at the expiration of such time as the court may deem proper, it satisfactorily appears that there is no reasonable probability that the jury can agree.'
The dispute focuses upon the question whether there was an abuse of discretion in the determination of whether the jury could not reach a verdict, and the even more basic question of whether there was any exercise of discretion. It should first be pointed out that it does not appear to be necesary that defendant or his counsel object to an improper discharge of the jury before the claim of double jeopardy may be asserted. Section 1140 requires that consent be 'entered upon the minutes.' In People v. Valenti, 49 Cal.2d 199, 316 P.2d 633, the jury was discharged and the information was dismissed. 'Defense counsel said nothing either in protest against or in acceptance * * *.' (49 Cal.2d page 202, 316 P.2d page 634.) It was held that jeopardy had attached and that defendant could not be retried. Cases on both sides of this question are collected in 63 A.L.R.2d 782.
In Paulson v. Superior Court, 58 A.C. 1, 22 Cal.Rptr. 649, 372 P.2d 641, after approximately five hourse of deliberation the jury entered the courtroom and upon inquiry from the court replied that they had not reached a verdict. Questions were asked of the court and were answered. The court then asked the jury how it stood and the foreman replied. The court then made the following statement: (P. 4, 22 Cal.Rptr. p. 651, 372 P.2d p. 643.) It was stipulated that at a time when the court was not in session the foreman of the jury reported to the bailiff that the jury was hopelessly deadlocked and the bailiff reported this to the judge. At pages 5 and 6, of 58 A.C. at page 651 of 22 Cal.Rptr. at page 643 of 372 P.2d, the court stated: 'Prohibition is a proper remedy to prevent retrial when a defendant has been once in jeopardy (Cardenas v. Superior Court, 56 Cal.2d 273, 14 Cal.Rptr. 657, 363 P.2d 889; Gomez v. Superior Court, 50 Cal.2d 640, 652, 328 P.2d 976; Jackson v. Superior Court, 10 Cal.2d 350, 352, 74 P.2d 243, 244, 113 A.L.R. 1422.)
"[J]eopardy attaches to a defendant when he is placed on trial before a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid indictment or information before a jury duly impaneled and charged with his deliverance.' (Jackson v. Superior Court, supra.) If a jury is discharged without returning a verdict, the defendant cannot again be put in jeopardy unless he consented to the discharge or legal necessity required it. (Cardenas v. Superior Court, supra; ...
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People v. Burgener
...hearing to determine what had actually taken place. Particularly apt here is the language of the court in Mitchell v. Superior Court (1962) 207 Cal.App.2d 643, 650, 24 Cal.Rptr. 671: 'A jury should not be discharged in the absence of legal necessity, and it appears that in this case no atte......
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Stanley v. Superior Court of L.A. Cnty.
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