Mitchell v. Taylor
Decision Date | 20 July 1895 |
Citation | 27 Or. 377,41 P. 119 |
Parties | MITCHELL v. TAYLOR. |
Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
Appeal from circuit court, Wasco county; W.L. Bradshaw, Judge.
Action by T.G. Mitchell against O.D. Taylor to compel defendant under his contract to assume the purchase of stock. From a judgment of nonsuit, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.
The facts necessary for an understanding of this case are substantially as follows: On March 24, 1892, the defendant being the president of the Columbia River Fruit Company, and acting in its behalf, induced one D.B. Cornell to enter into a contract with the company, containing, among other things the following stipulations: As an inducement to enter into this contract with the company the defendant made, executed, and delivered to Cornell the following agreement: Cornell paid the first installment of $1,000 to the company at the time of entering into the agreement with it. The complaint, after reciting these facts, further alleges that, on the 1st day of March, 1893, Cornell sold, assigned, and transferred to plaintiff all his right, title, and interest in and to said stock and said agreement, and the plaintiff is now the owner and holder thereof; that thereafter, and on March 24, 1893, plaintiff notified defendant of his desire to have defendant repurchase said stock, as by said agreement required, but that defendant refused to comply therewith; and that thereafter, on March 24, 1894, plaintiff duly sold and transferred in writing to the defendant said stock and the agreement of said Cornell to purchase the same, and delivered the same to defendant, and demanded the payment of $1,000, being the sum paid by plaintiff on the agreement with the company, together with 8 per cent. per annum from March 24, 1892; but that defendant refused to comply with his said request to repurchase the stock or to pay the $1,000, with interest, or any part thereof; and that plaintiff has fully performed on his part; that plaintiff holds said stock and agreement for defendant at his disposal, and now brings the same into court with a proper transfer to defendant. The prayer is for $1,000 and interest at 8 per cent. per annum from March 24, 1892.
The answer puts in issue the material allegations of the complaint, except that it is admitted that the agreement between Cornell and defendant was entered into as alleged. Thereafter, on November 10, 1894, plaintiff filed a supplemental complaint, wherein it is alleged "that heretofore, and on or about the _____ day of July, 1894, and since the commencement of this action, the said agreement mentioned in plaintiff's complaint, and entered into by and between the Columbia River Fruit Company and D.B. Cornell, and wherein said Cornell agreed to purchase, and said company to sell, certain stock of said company, as alleged in the complaint, being in the hands of the county clerk of this county, as brought into court in this cause, as set forth and shown in the complaint herein, the said defendant accepted and received the same, with the transfers thereof to him, and has ever since and still does keep and retain the same, but neglects and refuses to pay the plaintiff the said sum of $1,000, as agreed, and which the said defendant promised and agreed to pay in his said written agreement mentioned in the complaint, or any part thereof." The answer to the supplemental complaint admits the taking of these documents from the clerk's office by defendant, but alleges that they were handed to him by the clerk of the court or his deputy, and that he took and received them without knowledge of what they were; that, after keeping them some time, he discovered that they purported to be the agreement between Cornell and the company and a transfer of the same from Mitchell to himself, and that thereupon he immediately returned them to the clerk; that he never accepted them, but only received them in ignorance of what they were. This new matter is denied by the reply. Under these pleadings, the cause was tried before a jury. At the trial, plaintiff offered, and the court admitted, in evidence the two agreements aforesaid; an assignment thereof by Cornell to plaintiff; a power of attorney from plaintiff to H.A. Hogue, authorizing him to demand, receive, and collect the amount owing on the contracts mentioned in the foregoing assignment, and to make such transfer, assignment, or satisfaction thereof as may be necessary; "and an assignment by plaintiff to defendant of all his right, title, and interest" in and to a certain contract for purchase by D.B. Cornell, of Saginaw, East Side, Michigan, of 10 shares of stock in the Columbia River Fruit Company of The Dalles, Or., which said contract was executed March 24, 1892, "and assigned to plaintiff by Cornell March 1, 1894." There was indorsed on this assignment, in pencil: "Left for O.D. Taylor by W.H. Wilson, May 21, 1894."
A.J Rorick, a witness for plaintiff, testified, in substance, that, at the request of H.A. Hogue, and acting on behalf of the plaintiff, he went to the room of defendant at the Hotel Perkins in Portland, on the 24th of March, 1894, and found defendant there, and with him ex-Attorney General Geo. H. Williams, and, in giving his version of the interview, said: Judge Williams said they were not ready to pay the $1,000. And, in answer to a question, the witness continued: A.G. Johnson testified, in substance, that he had been deputy clerk since the 1st of July, 1894; that, some time after he became deputy, Taylor came into the office and inquired for some papers in another matter in which he was interested; and that, while hunting for the papers, Taylor stepped out of the office. Continuing his testimony, and referring to the Cornell papers, the witness further said: ...
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