Mitchell v. Town of Hayneville
| Decision Date | 18 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:20cv252-MHT (WO) |
| Parties | KELVIN MITCHELL, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF HAYNEVILLE, ALABAMA, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
Plaintiff Kelvin Mitchell is the chief of police for the Town of Hayneville, Alabama, a position he has held more-or-less consistently since 2004. This suit concerns the more-or-less.
Mitchell alleges that he backed the wrong horse in a town council election and that the council summarily fired him in retaliation when it finally was able to convene a post-election quorum two years later. He was out of the job for about two and a half months; he then returned to administrative leave with pay and later resumed work as the police chief. He now names as defendants the Town of Hayneville, three current council members in their individual capacities only, and a former council member in both her official and individual capacities. He asserts six claims: violations of (1) the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 201; (2) the continued-coverage notice provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1166; (3 & 4) his Fourteenth Amendment rights, as enforced through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to procedural due process and to be free of retaliation for political activity protected by the First Amendment; and (5 & 6) state-law guarantees of his contract rights and protection from wrongful termination. All six of Mitchell's claims are brought against the Town of Hayneville, and he brings his due-process and First Amendment claims against the four individual defendants as well.
The court has jurisdiction to hear his FLSA, ERISA, due-process, and First Amendment claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e) (ERISA), and 28 U.S.C. 1343 (civilrights), and his state-law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction).
The case is now before the court on defendants' motion to dismiss Mitchell's ERISA, due-process, and state-law claims. They also include in their motion the First Amendment claim to the extent it is brought against former council member Cynthia McDonald in her official capacity. For the reasons that follow, the court will grant in part and deny in part defendants' motion. Mitchell's ERISA claim will be dismissed, as he concedes it should be, because that statute's notice requirements do not apply to government entities; however, he will be permitted to amend his complaint to state a similar claim under the applicable Public Health Services Act (PHSA) instead, 42 U.S.C. § 300bb-6. His due-process claims against the defendant councilmembers in their individual capacities are barred by qualified immunity, but his claim against the town may proceed. His claims against McDonald in her official capacity will be dismissed. His state-law claims are properly pleaded and may proceed.(Also, because they are not challenged in the motion to dismiss, Mitchell's FLSA claim and his First Amendment claim will proceed, except to the extent that he brings the First Amendment claim against McDonald in her official capacity.)
In considering a defendant's motion to dismiss, the court accepts the plaintiff's allegations as true, see Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), and construes the complaint in the plaintiff's favor, see Duke v. Cleland, 5 F.3d 1399, 1402 (11th Cir. 1993). The court may draw "reasonable inferences" from the facts alleged in the complaint. Chesser v. Sparks, 248 F.3d 11117, 1121 (11th Cir. 2001).
To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id.
The details of the contested election that preceded Mitchell's firing are set forth at length in his complaint, but only a few are relevant to his claims. In August 2016, the Town of Hayneville, Alabama, held its quadrennial municipal election. Mitchell supported an unsuccessful candidate for town council. This election became the subject of great controversy and voluminous litigation, ultimately producing a decision from the Supreme Court of Alabama. See Ex parte Scrushy, 262 So. 3d 638 (Ala. 2018). On April 18, 2018, shortly after the election disputes were resolved in the courts, the council met and voted to remove Mitchell from his once and future position as police chief.
Mitchell was at the April meeting, but the facts alleged in the complaint indicate that he did not have prior notice of reasons why the council might seek to remove him from his post nor any opportunity to present his side of the story at that time. In early July, the council met again and voted to reinstate Mitchell to his position, but to place him on administrative leave with pay. While he was out of the job between April and July, Mitchell continued to receive a paycheck because he was being paid out his accrued leave time. His health-care coverage ended on July 1; based on the fact that he was returned to administrative leave with pay on July 2, the court infers that his coverage resumed that day.
In November 2018, Mitchell received a letter with notice of the reasons why the council was considering terminating him, and he was given the opportunity to request a hearing on the charges. He did so, and the hearing was held on December 3, 2018, with Mitchell and his attorney present. After hearing Mitchell's evidence, the council met again on December 10 to decide whetherto terminate him, but the vote split 2-2. Mitchell resumed his duties as police chief the following week and has remained in the job since then.
A threshold matter in resolving the claims that are the subject of the present motion is determining exactly what remedies Mitchell seeks.1 This turns out to be a complicated and hotly disputed question with consequences for nearly all counts of his complaint. He can't be suing for his job because he continues to be the town's police chief, but he could be suing for his job security because he claims he was never formally reappointed to the position, which carries certain tenure protections under Alabama law. He can't sue for back pay because he continued to receive a paycheck through his return to thejob in July 2018, but he could sue for the accrued leave time he expended to get that continued salary.
He also can't sue for compensatory damages for the loss of his income or health insurance because, again, he continued to receive a paycheck throughout the relevant time period and his health-care coverage ended only a day before it resumed again. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254 (1978) ( ). If his procedural-due-process claim against the individual-capacity defendants were not barred by qualified immunity, he could sue for nominal damages, see id. at 266-67, or for punitive damages if he showed that the council members who terminated him had "evil motive or intent," or demonstrated "reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others," Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983). But as explained below, qualified immunity does bar this claim, so he cannot pursue damages on that count.
Punitive damages also are not available against the town itself. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981). Ultimately, the court concludes that equitable remedies--such as injunctive or declaratory relief--are for the most part all that may be available to Mitchell on the claims that are the subject of the present motion to dismiss.
Mitchell brings suit against Hayneville under the provisions of ERISA enumerating employees' rights to continuing health-care coverage for a period of time after certain "qualifying event[s]," including termination.2 29 U.S.C. § 1161. In particular, healleges that the town failed to notify him of his right to continued coverage in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1166. As he now acknowledges, this claim cannot proceed under ERISA. See Response to Motion to Dismiss (doc. no. 28) at 9. The provisions he alleges were violated do not apply to "governmental plan[s]," 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1), which include plans maintained by state subdivisions, 29 U.S.C § 1002(32).
Although his ERISA claim is barred, Mitchell asks for the opportunity to amend his complaint to state a clam instead under the the Public Health Services Act (PHSA), which does apply to government health plans and which contains substantively identical notice provisions to ERISA. See 42 U.S.C. § 300bb-6; see also Bigelow v. United Healthcare of Miss., Inc., 220 F.3d 339, 344-45 (5th Cir. 2000) (). Other courts in similar circumstances have simply construed ERISA claims as claims under the PHSA because of the parallels between the statutes. See Bigelow, 220 F.3d at 344. But there is an additionalproblem with Mitchell's complaint: He purports to seek only damages and fees on this claim, see Amended Complaint (doc. no. 8) at 20, but the PHSA authorizes only equitable relief as a remedy against state actors who violate its provisions, see 42 U.S.C. § 300bb-7. The Eleventh Circuit has held that the PHSA does not authorize even attorneys' fees incidental to equitable relief. See Brett v. Jefferson Cty., 123 F.3d 1429, 1435 (11th Cir. 1997).
It is unclear from the facts alleged in the present complaint what equitable relief...
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