Mitchell v. Town of Whitestown

• Decision Date: 16 August 2022
• Docket Number: 1:21-cv-01935-JPH-MG
• Parties: TREY T. MITCHELL, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF WHITESTOWN, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

TREY T. MITCHELL, Plaintiff,
v.
TOWN OF WHITESTOWN, et al., Defendants.

No. 1:21-cv-01935-JPH-MG

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division

August 16, 2022

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

James Patrick Hanlon, United States District Judge.

Trey Mitchell alleges that Whitestown police officers used excessive force when they arrested him. Mr. Mitchell brings state and federal claims against the officers and the Town of Whitestown. Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Dkt. [15]. For the reasons that follow, that motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I.

Facts and Background

Because Defendants have moved for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court accepts and recites "the well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true." McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011).

On December 17, 2019, Trey Mitchell was dining at a Buffalo Wild Wings with some friends. Dkt. 13 ¶¶ 12-13. Believing that one of Mr. Mitchell's friends was overdosing, a Buffalo Wild Wings employee called the Whitestown Metropolitan Police Department. Id. Officer Kirsten Gibbons responded and approached Mr. Mitchell and the friend who was suspected of overdosing. Id.

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¶14. Officer Gibbons "became increasingly rude" and "made disparaging comments" about Mr. Mitchell. Id. ¶¶ 15-16.

Officers Dalton Tibbs, Blayne Root, and John Jurkash arrived to assist Officer Gibbons. Id. ¶¶ 17-18. While Mr. Mitchell was helping them place his friend on a medical gurney, Officer Tibbs pushed Mr. Mitchell without provocation. Id. ¶ 21. Officer Tibbs then "became physical with Mr. Mitchell," so Mr. Mitchell "placed himself in a defensive position" and the other officers "became involved in the altercation." Id. ¶¶ 22-26. Mr. Mitchell was eventually forced to the ground and then "submitted to being placed under arrest and did not resist thereafter." Id. ¶¶ 26-27. Despite his compliance, Officer Root tased Mr. Mitchell in the leg. Id. ¶ 27. Then, Mr. Mitchell was placed in handcuffs in a facedown position while Officer Gibbons knelt on his back. Id. ¶ 28. Mr. Mitchell told Officer Gibbons that he was in pain because he had previously broken his back and asked her to reposition her knee, but Officer Gibbons refused. Id. ¶¶ 28-29.

Mr. Mitchell later pled guilty to three felony counts of resisting law enforcement in connection with this incident. See Indiana vs. Mitchell, Boone Superior Court, Cause No. 06D01-1912-F5-002604; dkt. 15-2 (charging information); dkt. 15-3 (judgment of conviction).^[1]

On June 26, 2020, Mr. Mitchell submitted a Notice of Tort Claim to each defendant. Id. ¶ 37. He later filed this lawsuit against the officers and

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the Town of Whitestown. Dkt. 1; dkt. 13 (amended complaint). Against the officers, Mr. Mitchell alleges claims for excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment (Count I), battery (Count IV), and negligent or willful and wanton conduct (Count VII). Dkt. 13 at 5, 7-8. Against Whitestown, he alleges Monell claims for enacting an unconstitutional policy or custom (Count II) and for failure to train (Count III). Id. at 6-7.^[2] Mr. Mitchell also seeks to hold Whitestown vicariously liable for the state law torts of the officers. Id. at 7-8.

Defendants have moved under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss all claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Dkt. 15.

II.

Applicable Law

A defendant may move under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss claims for "failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A facially plausible claim is one that allows "the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id.

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When ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court will "accept the well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true," but will not defer to "legal conclusions and conclusory allegations merely reciting the elements of the claim." Id.

Indiana substantive law governs Mr. Mitchell's state law claims in Counts IV and VII. See Webber v. Butner, 923 F.3d 479, 480-81 (7th Cir. 2019). Therefore, the Court "must apply Indiana law by doing [its] best to predict how the Indiana Supreme Court would decide" issues related to those claims. Id. at 482.

III.

Analysis

A. Federal Claims

1. Monell Claims

Mr. Mitchell "concedes that dismissal is appropriate for his Monell claims in Counts II and III." Dkt. 23 at 1. Whitestown's motion to dismiss those counts is therefore GRANTED.

2. Fourth Amendment Excessive Force

Defendants argue that Mr. Mitchell's excessive force claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). Dkt. 16 at 5-15. Mr. Mitchell responds that because he alleges that the officers used unreasonable force against him after he submitted to arrest, his excessive force claim is not Heck-barred. Dkt. 23 at 2-3.

Heck v. Humphrey "bars a plaintiff from maintaining a § 1983 action in situations where 'a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply

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the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.'" McCann v. Neilson, 466 F.3d 619, 621 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994)). But if a plaintiff's lawsuit can succeed and "will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed." VanGilder v. Baker, 435 F.3d 689, 691-92 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 487).

"[A] plaintiff who has been convicted of resisting arrest or assaulting a police officer during the course of an arrest is not per se Heck-barred from maintaining a § 1983 action for excessive force stemming from the same confrontation." McCann, 466 F.3d at 621. But a "plaintiff can only proceed to the extent that the facts underlying the excessive force claim are not inconsistent with the essential facts supporting the conviction." Helman v. Duhaime, 742 F.3d 760, 762 (7th Cir. 2014). For example, when an excessive force claim is based "on claims that the police used excessive force in effecting custody or after doing so," it can proceed. Id. (citing Evans v. Poskon, 603 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 2010)); see also McCann, 466 F.3d at 623; VanGilder, 435 F.3d at 691-92.

Here, Mr. Mitchell concedes that the force...