Mitchell v. US Dept. of Housing & Urban Develop.

• Decision Date: 23 August 1983
• Docket Number: No. C-83-3153 RPA.,C-83-3153 RPA.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
• Parties: Nancy MITCHELL, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT; Housing Authority for the County of Marin; Janet Miller-Schoder, in her official capacity as Executive Director of the Housing Authority of the County of Marin; Philip Chang Associates & Sons, a limited partnership, Defendants.

569 F. Supp. 701

Nancy MITCHELL, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT; Housing Authority for the County of Marin; Janet Miller-Schoder, in her official capacity as Executive Director of the Housing Authority of the County of Marin; Philip Chang Associates & Sons, a limited partnership, Defendants.

No. C-83-3153 RPA.

United States District Court, N.D. California.

August 23, 1983.

David B. Harrison, Legal Aid Society of Marin County, San Rafael, Cal., for plaintiffs.

Alfred Daubenfeld, Michael Burton, San Rafael, Cal., for defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

AGUILAR, District Judge.

Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and on behalf of a class of all others similarly situated for declaratory and injunctive relief against: her landlord; the Housing Authority for the County of Marin; and the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development. On behalf of the class plaintiff seeks a declaration from the Court requiring good cause for nonrenewal of leases entered into under the Housing Assistance Payments Program of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and corresponding injunctive relief. On behalf of herself plaintiff seeks an order from this Court requiring the defendants to renew her lease.

This action is now before the Court on plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction to restrain her landlord from evicting her and the Housing Authority from refusing to assist her in paying the rent for her apartment in Novato, California until proceedings in this lawsuit have concluded.

I. THE CONTRACTUAL SCHEME BEHIND THE HOUSING ASSISTANCE PAYMENT PROGRAM

A. The Rental Limitation Agreement

Plaintiff's landlord is defendant Philip Chang Associates & Sons (hereinafter referred to as "Chang"). In 1973, the preceding owner of the property wanted the property rezoned so that he could build the apartment complex. Chang's predecessor and the County of Marin entered into an agreement, amended in 1978, which provided that in consideration for the rezoning, Chang's predecessor agreed:

to rent or lease ten two-bedroom apartment units to residents with low, moderate or middle incomes, who qualify for participation in the Section Eight Housing Assistance Payment Program of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) or in any other housing assistance program created and/or approved by COUNTY.

This agreement also provided:

It is agreed and understood by the parties that the above mentioned units will be apportioned among the various buildings of the project ....

The agreement specifically binds successors and assigns until 1996, and it is specifically stated that the agreement shall run with and bind the land.

B. The Annual Contributions Contract (ACC)

The Marin Public Housing Authority and the United States of America enter into an annual contributions contract (hereinafter referred to as ACC), pursuant to which the United States provides financial assistance to the Housing Authority for the purpose of making housing assistance payments.

C. The Housing Assistance Payments Contract

The Marin Public Housing Authority and landlord Chang have entered into a Housing Assistance Payments Contract. By this contract the Housing Authority obligates itself to pay a designated portion of the assisted family's rent. In the present case, the Housing Authority contracted to pay Chang $266 of the $350 total monthly rent. Under the heading Term of Contract it is provided:

The term of this Contract shall be one years the term of the Lease beginning on 2-1-82; Provided, however, that if the Family continues in occupancy, after the expiration of the term, on the same terms and conditions as the original Lease, the Contract shall continue in effect for the duration of such tenancy, but the total duration of the Contract shall in no case extend beyond the term of the ACC.

D. The Tenant/Landlord Lease

Tenant Mitchell entered into a lease with landlord Chang. The term of this lease is stated as twelve months, beginning on February 1, 1982 and ending on January 31, 1983. Under the heading LEASE RENEWAL it is provided:

Should the Tenant hold over the dwelling after this lease has terminated, the same terms and conditions of this agreement shall continue to be binding on the parties as a month to month agreement.

Under the heading TERMINATION OF LEASE it is provided:

This Lease shall terminate upon the date of any termination of the Housing Assistance Payments Contract, including any termination due to termination of eligibility of the Tenant.

II. FACTS

On February 2, 1982, plaintiff entered into a one year lease with defendant Chang for an apartment in Novato, California. The apartment was for plaintiff and her two children. Also on February 2, 1983, defendant Marin Public Housing Authority entered into a Housing Assistance Payments Contract with defendant Chang. On November 5, 1982, Chang notified plaintiff that it did not intend to renew her lease, due to expire on January 31, 1983. Plaintiff did not vacate the premises, and on February 24, 1983, Chang filed a complaint for unlawful detainer in the Marin County Municipal Court. On May 26, 1983 the Municipal Court entered judgment restoring the premises to Chang. Plaintiff has appealed, but has been unable to obtain a stay of her eviction.

Plaintiff then filed this class action complaint in this Court and received a temporary restraining order from the Court prohibiting Chang from evicting plaintiff, and requiring the Housing Authority to continue to pay its share of plaintiff's rent payments, until the hearing on plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction was held.

In support of her motion for preliminary injunction, plaintiff contends that defendants failed to renew her lease without showing good cause for non-renewal, and without permitting her the opportunity to be heard on the issue of good cause. Plaintiff contends that she is likely to succeed on the merits of this action because good cause must be established to fail to renew a Housing Assistance Payments Program lease, and that she will suffer irreparable harm if an injunction is not granted because of the scarcity of low income housing in Marin County.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Mootness

Before discussing the propriety of the preliminary injunction, defendants' contention that this action is moot must be addressed. Defendants contend that plaintiff did in fact have the opportunity to litigate the question of good cause in the municipal court, and therefore, this action is moot. As there was good cause for the non-renewal of plaintiff's lease, and as plaintiff had the opportunity to show the absence of good cause, there is no live case or controversy upon which the Court can rule.

The cause for non-renewal of plaintiff's lease was mentioned in Chang's motion for summary judgment in the state court unlawful detainer proceedings. It cannot be said, on the basis of the record now before the Court, that there was full and fair opportunity in the state proceedings for plaintiff to litigate the question of good cause for non-renewal. Additionally, though the Court cannot condone certain of the activity plaintiff has admitted to as a tenant, the bulk of the incidents which defendants contend constitute good cause for non-renewal are the subject of conflicting facts and testimony, which the Court will not resolve at this stage in the proceedings. Therefore, the action is not moot at this time.¹

B. Preliminary Injunction Principles

In order for the Court to issue a preliminary injunction, there must be a clear showing that: there is a probability of success by plaintiffs on the merits and possible injury to plaintiff; or there are sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make the questions fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships that tip decidedly toward plaintiff. Aguirre v. Chula Vista Sanitary Service, 542 F.2d 799, 781 (9th Cir.1976). These two alternative tests have been described as "extremes of a single continuum." Benda v. Grand Lodge of International Association, 584 F.2d 308, 315 (9th Cir.1978); cert. denied, 441 U.S. 937, 99 S.Ct. 2065, 60 L.Ed.2d 667 (1979). Thus, where there is a compelling likelihood of success on the merits, the injury to the party seeking relief need be only "possible," but where the likelihood of success is less clear (but still a fair ground for litigation), greater potential harm to the party seeking relief is required as compared to any harm possibly coming to the defendant. In deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction, the Court must also consider the public interest. Even where the likelihood of success on the merits is great, the Court may not grant a preliminary injunction where to do so would be harmful to the public interest. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440, 64 S.Ct. 660, 674, 88 L.Ed. 834 (1943).

C. Harm and Hardship

Plaintiff asserts that she will be irreparably harmed if the preliminary injunction is not issued because she will be evicted from her home and will likely be unable to find other affordable housing. The scarcity of public housing constitutes irreparable harm sufficient to preliminarily enjoin eviction. Tenants for Justice v. Hills, 413 F.Supp. 389, 393 (E.D.Pa.1975); and see Owens v. Housing Authority of City of Stamford, 394 F.Supp. 1267, 1271 (D.Conn. 1975). This conclusion is more compelling in a county such as Marin, which does not have a significant amount of low income housing.

Defendant Chang asserts that the balance of hardship favors defendants. Chang asserts that the Housing Authority for Marin has provided plaintiff with many referrals for new housing since Chang has attempted to evict plaintiff, but that plaintiff has refused to follow up on any of the referrals. Additionally, Chang contends that the balance of hardships tips its favor because plaintiff has demonstrated no...