Mitchell v. Washington
| Decision Date | 14 March 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 13–36217.,13–36217. |
| Citation | 818 F.3d 436 |
| Parties | George O. MITCHELL, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. State of WASHINGTON; Kelly Cunningham, SCC Superintendent; Dr. Thomas Bell, Defendants–Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Erwin Chemerinsky, Peter Afrasiabi, Kathryn Marie Davis, Appellate Litigation Clinic, University of California, Irvine School of Law; Tommy Du (argued), Catriona Lavery (argued), Law Students, Irvine, CA, for Plaintiff–Appellant.
Robert W. Ferguson, Attorney General of Washington, Grace C.S. O'Connor (argued) and Christopher Lanese, Assistant Attorneys General, Olympia, WA, for Defendants–Appellees.
Before: DOROTHY W. NELSON, A. WALLACE TASHIMA, and RICHARD R. CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge TASHIMA
OPINION
TASHIMA
, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff–Appellant George Mitchell brought this action against Defendants–Appellees ("Defendants") for injunctive relief and damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
, alleging constitutionally inadequate medical care and a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, and Mitchell timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
George Mitchell, a fifty-nine year old African–American male, has been civilly committed as a sexually violent predator to the Special Commitment Center ("SCC") by the State of Washington since June 27, 2003. See In re Det. of Mitchell, 160 Wash.App. 669, 249 P.3d 662 (2011)
.
On approximately December 14, 2000, prior to his arrival at the SCC, Mitchell was diagnosed with Hepatitis C
. From approximately 2003 to 2005, Mitchell met with one of SCC's consulting physicians, Dr. W. Michael Priebe, of the Tacoma Disease Center. As a consulting specialist, Dr. Priebe was limited to recommending certain courses of treatment, and did not have the authority to order treatment. In mid–2005, Dr. Priebe discussed treatment options with Mitchell. One of the treatment options discussed was the administration of interferon and ribavirin. Because interferon and ribavirin are weight-based medications (meaning dosage depends on the patient's weight), Mitchell agreed to postpone this type of treatment until he could lose weight.
In May of 2009, Mitchell met with Dr. Thomas Bell, then the Medical Supervisor of SCC, to discuss his liver biopsy results and review treatment options. During that meeting, based on a belief that his condition was deteriorating, Mitchell requested interferon and ribavirin
treatment. Dr. Bell informed Mitchell that the interferon and ribavirin treatment for his genotype had been largely unsuccessful on African–American males. In addition, after reviewing Mitchell's liver biopsy results, Dr. Bell told Mitchell that his Hepatitis C had not progressed to a level that would justify the harsh side effects of the requested treatment. Based on these factors, Dr. Bell did not recommend Mitchell for interferon and ribavirin treatment. In November of 2012, Mitchell was placed on interferon and ribavirin. The treatment was ultimately unsuccessful.
Mitchell commenced this action on August 23, 2012, against Defendants Dr. Bell, Kelly Cunningham, Superintendent of SCC, and the State of Washington.1 Mitchell sued Dr. Bell and Cunningham in their individual and official capacities. Mitchell alleged that Dr. Bell's refusal to refer him for interferon and ribavirin treatment violated the Fourteenth Amendment for two reasons:2 (1) the denial of interferon and ribavirin treatment violated his right to reasonable medical care; and (2) the consideration of race in the denial of treatment violated the Equal Protection Clause.
On referral of this case for a report and recommendation ("R & R"), the Magistrate Judge recommended that Defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted. The Magistrate Judge first ruled that all claims against the State of Washington were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Second, she ruled that because Mitchell testified in his deposition that is he suing Cunningham and Dr. Bell in their official capacities, all claims for damages against them are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The Magistrate Judge then excluded a declaration proffered by Mitchell because it was unsigned and because the declarant lacked sufficient qualifications and personal knowledge. She next ruled that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because Mitchell failed to assert a constitutional violation. Specifically, the Magistrate Judge ruled that Mitchell presented no evidence that Dr. Bell's treatment of Mitchell did not meet the appropriate standard of care for a medical provider, and that Mitchell's equal protection claim failed because he had not shown that Defendants acted with the intent or purpose to discriminate.
The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge's R & R and entered judgment against Mitchell.
This Court reviews a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Vasquez v. Cty. of L.A., 349 F.3d 634, 639 (9th Cir.2003)
. The Court must "determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law."
Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir.2000)
(en banc) (citing Balint v. Carson City, 180 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir.1999) (en banc)).
The Eleventh Amendment bars claims for damages against a state official acting in his or her official capacity. Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 472 (9th Cir.1992)
(per curiam). It does not, however, bar claims for damages against state officials in their personal capacities. Id. Moreover, when a plaintiff sues a defendant for damages, there is a presumption that he is seeking damages against the defendant in his personal capacity. Romano v. Bible, 169 F.3d 1182, 1186 (9th Cir.1999).
Mitchell's First Amended Complaint clearly states that he is suing Cunningham and Dr. Bell in both their official and personal capacities for damages and injunctive relief. The district court, however, relying on Mitchell's deposition testimony that he is suing Cunningham and Dr. Bell only in their official capacities, held that all claims for damages against Cunningham and Dr. Bell should be dismissed. But the record clearly demonstrates that Mitchell, who was acting pro se, did not understand the legal significance between bringing claims against Dr. Bell and Cunningham in their official versus personal capacities. Further, in questioning Mitchell, Defendants' attorney failed adequately to explain the significance of the difference, even after Mitchell signified that he did not understand the legal jargon and would need assistance. As a result, we conclude that Mitchell is not bound by his deposition testimony and Mitchell's damages claims against Defendants in their individual capacities are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.3 To hold otherwise would "threaten[ ] to ensnare parties who may have simply been confused during their deposition testimony and may encourage gamesmanship by opposing attorneys." Van Asdale v. Int'l Game Tech., 577 F.3d 989, 998 (9th Cir.2009)
.
Although not briefed by the parties, before reaching the merits of Mitchell's claims, we must consider whether Mitchell's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief are moot. See Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 398 F.3d 1125, 1128–29 (9th Cir.2005)
(). Article III of the Constitution requires that "federal courts confine themselves to deciding actual cases and controversies." Id. at 1128. Id. at 1128–29 (quoting Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361, 363, 107 S.Ct. 734, 93 L.Ed.2d 732 (1987) (citation omitted)).
When a plaintiff no longer wishes to engage in the activity for which he initially sought declaratory or injunctive relief, the requisite case or controversy is absent. Id. at 1129
. Several months after Mitchell commenced this action, SCC began treating Mitchell with interferon and ribavirin. The treatment was ineffective. Given the failure of the requested treatment, Mitchell no longer has any need for the treatment and there is no reasonable expectation that Mitchell will request the same failed treatment again. As a result, we conclude that Mitchell's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief are moot.
and Qualified Immunity
Mitchell's remaining claims are claims for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against individual Defendants, Dr. Bell and Cunningham, in their personal capacities. Government officials enjoy qualified immunity from civil damages unless their conduct violates "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Thus, in determining whether qualified immunity applies to Defendants, we must determine whether: (1) the facts adduced constitute the violation of a constitutional right; and (2) the constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009).
Mitchell asserts two constitutional violations. First, he contends that Dr. Bell and Cunningham denied him constitutionally adequate medical care in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Second, he contends that Dr. Bell and Cunningham violated his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment by making a medical treatment decision based on race.
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