Mitchell v. Woodworth, 24052.

• Decision Date: 06 July 1971
• Docket Number: No. 24052.,24052.
• Parties: Willie Mae MITCHELL, etc., Appellant, v. Elmer D. WOODWORTH, also known as E. D. Woodworth, Deputy Commissioner District of Columbia, Compensation Bureau of Employees' Compensation, United States Department of Labor, et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

449 F.2d 1097 (1971)

Willie Mae MITCHELL, etc., Appellant, v. Elmer D. WOODWORTH, also known as E. D. Woodworth, Deputy Commissioner District of Columbia, Compensation Bureau of Employees' Compensation, United States Department of Labor, et al.

No. 24052.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued November 4, 1970.

Decided July 6, 1971.

Mr. H. Clay Espey, Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. Charles B. De Shazo, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellant.

Mr. George M. Lilly, Atty., U. S. Dept. of Labor, with whom Messrs. Thomas A. Flannery, U. S. Atty., John A. Terry, Asst. U. S. Atty., and Alfred H. Myers, Atty., U. S. Dept. of Labor, were on the brief, for appellee Woodworth.

Mr. M. S. Mazzuchi, Washington, D. C., for appellees Steiner Construction Co., Inc. and Aetna Casualty & Surety Company.

Before BAZELON, Chief Judge, and WRIGHT and MacKINNON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Appellant Willie Mae Mitchell is the widow of Herman Mitchell, a laborer who died of a cerebral vascular accident shortly after collapsing at work. She appeals from the District Court's affirmance of the Labor Department's denial of her claim for workman's compensation. See 33 U.S.C. § 921(b) (1964); 36 D.C. Code § 501 (Supp. IV 1971). We reverse.

The Deputy Commissioner who presided over the administrative hearing made the following findings of fact:

That on November 17, 1966, the employee Herman Mitchell who was 52 years of age and suffering from hypertension, reported to work for the employer * * * at approximately 7:00 a. m.; that he began work at 7:30 a. m and made no complaint to anyone that he was feeling ill; that on the said date the employee\'s work consisted of helping the brick masons; that the employee picked up masonry blocks weighing approximately twenty-five pounds in each hand and carried them a distance of about 25 feet to the brick masons; that at approximately 8:00 a. m., or shortly thereafter, he told * * * a co-worker that he was feeling ill and he sat down on the floor; that * * * the general superintendent called an ambulance and the employee was taken to Casualty Hospital about 9:00 a. m. or 9:30 a. m., where he died on November 17, 1966 at approximately 8:25 p. m.; that the death of the employee was caused by cerebral vascular accident, secondary to intraventricular and intracerebral hemorrhage.

The Deputy Commissioner concluded that "the death of the employee * * * did not arise out of or in the course of the employment." It is this conclusion that Mrs. Mitchell attacks.

We recently dealt with a very similar situation, in Wheatley v. Adler, 132 U.S. App.D.C. 177, 407 F.2d 307 (1968) (en banc). We took note there of the "express statutory presumption 33 U.S.C. § 920(a) (1964) that the `claim comes within the provisions of the Act.'" 132 U.S.App.D.C. at 182, 407 F.2d at 312. We then laid down the legal principle which controls this case:

The statutory presumption brings within the Act a death that results in the course of employment when a preexisting internal disorder takes a sudden turn for the worse, unless the record contains substantial evidence as to the cause of the collapse which shows that it was not aggravated or precipitated by a work-related factor.

Id. Accordingly, the only question we face is "whether there is substantial evidence in the record to dispel the presumption." Id.

Three doctors testified at the hearing, two for the employer and one for Mrs. Mitchell. Appellees...