Mitola v. Providence Pub. Bldgs. Auth.
| Decision Date | 09 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2019-420-Appeal,PC 15-1646 |
| Parties | V. George MITOLA et al. v. PROVIDENCE PUBLIC BUILDINGS AUTHORITY. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Michael L. Mineau, Esq., for Plaintiffs.
Thomas C. Angelone, Esq., Mal A. Salvadore, Esq., for Defendant.
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.
On March 9, 2012, the defendant, Providence Public Buildings Authority (defendant or the authority), acquired the development rights of approximately sixty-seven acres of land in North Scituate, Rhode Island, owned by the plaintiffs, V. George Mitola and Carol A. Mitola (plaintiffs). The plaintiffs filed a petition for assessment of damages on April 22, 2015, and a petition to compel purchase in fee on December 7, 2015. After the petition to compel purchase in fee was denied by the trial justice, the issue of damages proceeded to a jury-waived trial. The plaintiffs now appeal from the final judgment awarding them $492,000 plus interest in the amount of $6,309.20. They ascribe reversible error to the Superior Court's (1) denial of their petition to compel purchase in fee; (2) denial of their motion to reconsider the court's decision and order denying the plaintiffs’ petition to compel purchase in fee; and (3) acceptance of the valuation of the property offered by the defendant's appraiser, and thereby the court's rejection of the comparable sales method of valuation as calculated by the plaintiffs’ appraiser.
For the reasons stated herein, we vacate the judgment and remand this case to the Superior Court with directions that the court enter an order compelling the taking in fee and for the valuation of a fee-simple interest in the sixty-seven acres of land.
V. George Mitola first testified at trial that, in May 2002, he purchased approximately sixty-seven acres of undeveloped land in North Scituate, Rhode Island, for the sum of $325,000. The land is identified as Lot 1 on Tax Assessor's Plat 38. Mr. Mitola stated that his intention—both when he purchased the property in 2002 and after the construction of the family home was completed in 2006—was to subdivide the property, whereby he would keep approximately four of the eight proposed lots for his family.
The events leading to the case at bar began in 2005. That year, defendant sought to acquire the development rights of the property owned by plaintiffs. The defendant retained an appraiser and notified plaintiffs of the appointment of an appraiser by a letter dated May 19, 2006. The defendant, pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 45-50-13(a)(6), retained the appraiser to determine the fair market value of the development rights to the property. The May 19, 2006 letter also requested that plaintiffs obtain an appraisal. An appraisal was completed by defendant; however, plaintiffs did not engage an appraiser. On August 21, 2006, defendant filed a complaint in Superior Court, in PC 06-4391, asking the court to compel plaintiffs to appoint an appraiser. The plaintiffs answered the petition and pled a counterclaim alleging constitutional violations, which the court considered on summary judgment and subsequently denied, finding that they had stated "no colorable basis for their claim that § 45-50-13 is unconstitutional."
Thereafter, defendant filed a petition in a separate action, PM 12-1293, requesting that the Superior Court determine the amount of money that would satisfy the claims of all interested persons for the development rights to the property. On March 9, 2012, the Superior Court determined that the sum of $775,000 was sufficient to satisfy the claims to the development rights; and, on that same day, defendant deposited that amount into the Registry of the Superior Court. The defendant later sought to reduce the amount in the registry from $775,000 to $485,000. The court granted defendant's petition and reduced the amount required to be held in the registry to $485,000. In the order reducing the amount, the court also provided that any person claiming an interest in the development rights had three months after receipt of personal service of the order to file a petition for the assessment of damages, in accordance with § 45-50-13(e).
Following the entry of the order, Mr. Mitola filed a motion to vacate and/or modify the order reducing the amount required to be held in the registry. He argued that he did not receive notice of the motion to reduce the deposit held in the registry; he also filed affidavits in support of his motion. The defendant then filed a motion for summary judgment on its petition. An assented-to order was entered on May 15, 2014, which gave plaintiffs forty-five days "in which to file a petition * * * for an assessment of damages[.]"
On April 22, 2015, plaintiffs filed the instant action in the Superior Court as a "Petition for Assessment of Damages[.]" The plaintiffs’ petition, among other things, (1) stated that plaintiffs did "not agree with the amount of the offer by [defendant] as just compensation for the taking of said development rights"; (2) sought declarations that the removal of sand and gravel and the installation of a solar farm were not development rights subject to defendant's condemnation; but, if they were a part of the development rights, the values of such were to be "added to the amount of the value of the [l]ot as an additional part of the amount which constitutes just compensation"; and (3) asserted that the taking of development rights instead of taking the property in "fee simple" was unconstitutional. On October 19, 2015, the trial justice entered a scheduling order setting a trial date of December 7, 2015.
On December 7, 2015, Mr. Mitola filed a petition in the present case to compel purchase in fee pursuant to § 45-50-13.1 The defendant filed an objection to the petition. A hearing was held on the petition to compel purchase in fee on January 19, 2016. At the hearing, Mr. Mitola, through counsel, argued that there was no time limit for him to elect to have defendant purchase the property in fee simple under § 45-50-13(a)(5). The defendant disagreed, first highlighting that "this is a question of first impression about whether or not they're estopped or laches will prevent them from making a request to have the authority take the fee." The defendant argued that the petition to compel purchase in fee was untimely because it was filed more than three years after defendant effectuated a taking of the development rights of the property by making a deposit into the Superior Court registry. The defendant further contended that it would be prejudiced by additional interest being assessed on amounts over the amount deposited into the Superior Court registry, namely interest on the value of the house located on the property.
The trial justice issued a written decision on March 1, 2016. Citing to § 45-50-13(a)(5), she held that plaintiffs’ obligation to notify the authority of their request for the property to be purchased in fee began when defendant "commenced condemnation proceedings by filing a [m]iscellaneous [p]etition on May 19, 2006."2 Further, she held that plaintiffs’ opportunity to require defendant to acquire the property in fee ended when defendant deposited funds in the registry of the court and title to the development rights passed to defendant on March 9, 2012. The trial justice also found that plaintiffs’ delay in filing the petition to compel purchase in fee prejudiced defendant and held that the equitable defense of laches applied. Because the value of the property was not the same at that time, in 2016, as it was when the condemnation was initiated in 2006, the trial justice further found that new appraisals would be needed. Additionally, the trial justice stated that defendant would be prejudiced by having to prepare for a new theory of damages on the eve of trial.
In an order entered on April 4, 2016, the trial justice denied Mr. Mitola's petition to compel purchase in fee. The plaintiffs thereafter filed a motion to reconsider on May 2, 2016, and defendant filed an objection to that motion on May 9, 2016. On May 12, 2016, a hearing was held before the trial justice on plaintiffs’ motion to reconsider, at which plaintiffs introduced a letter likely issued on November 10, 2012, to show that plaintiffs’ previous legal counsel had at that time proposed transferring the property in fee simple as a possible resolution.3 The trial justice denied plaintiffs’ motion to reconsider in a bench decision rendered that same day. In her decision, the trial justice noted that (1) there was no change in circumstances that would warrant granting the motion; (2) the letter should have been known by plaintiffs; and (3) plaintiffs failed to notify the Superior Court in 2012 of the election to have defendant purchase the property in fee simple.
On April 3, 2018, a bench trial on the assessment of damages in the present case began. The parties first noted that they agreed that "the highest and best use [of the property] is an eight-lot subdivision[.]" At trial, Mr. Mitola testified that (1) he purchased the property on May 29, 2002, for $325,000; (2) he wanted to subdivide and develop the property while keeping some of the lots for his daughters and family members; (3) road and other engineering work took place on the property from 2004 through 2006; (4) during the course of development, he was contacted by a representative of the Providence Water Supply Board, who stated that the Providence Water Supply Board could "either purchase [the property] or take [it] through eminent domain."
Next, Jeffrey Hanson, president of Millstone Engineering and project manager of the engineering work completed on the property in 2005 and 2006, testified. Hanson testified that "[a] portion of the subdivision was started under construction" at that time, and the cost of his engineering work on the property was $277,834.33.4 Hanson...
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