Mitz v. State, 29087
| Citation | 233 Ind. 537,121 N.E.2d 874 |
| Decision Date | 07 October 1954 |
| Docket Number | No. 29087,29087 |
| Parties | John MITZ, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Indiana |
Byron G. Jenkins, Harold P. Fiely, Jenkins & Fiely, Portland, Richard Salb, Indianapolis, of counsel, for appellant.
Edwin K. Steers, Atty. Gen., Robert L. Sheaffer, Owen S. Boling, Deputy Attys. Gen., for appellee.
This is an appeal from the judgment of the trial court denying appellant's petition for a writ of error coram nobis.
Appellant contends that the two pauper attorneys appointed by the court to represent him prior to his plea of guilty to auto banditry did not competently represent him because (1) they did not spend sufficient time in consultation with him; (2) they did not make sufficient independent investigation of the alleged crime; (3) they did not advise him of his constitutional rights in these particulars: (a) that the charge contained an includable lesser offense, (b) his right to appeal as a pauper, (c) his right to trial by jury, (d) to be heard by himself and counsel, (e) his right to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him and to have a copy thereof, (f) his right to meet witnesses face to face, (g) his right to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and (h) the law of reasonable doubt or burden of proof; (4) the court, itself, did not see that he was advised of his constitutional rights; and (5) evidence of guilt of other crimes was admitted in the hearing on his petition for a writ of error coram nobis.
The record discloses that on or about the 19th day of March, 1952, appellant was arrested and subsequently charged with the crime of robbery and auto banditry. On April 18, 1952, he was arraigned. At this arraignment the court appointed two pauper attorneys to represent appellant. They talked with him at that time for a few minutes, and one of them talked with him later at the jail. Appellant told the attorney that he was guilty, had given a statement, wanted to get on his way, and for the attorney to work out the 'best deal.' Little was said about the facts in the case. Appellant asked the attorney to write to his wife, which the attorney did. The actual periods of conversation between the pauper attorneys and appellant took about ten minutes.
On April 25, 1952, a plea of guilty was entered on the count of auto banditry, that being the lesser offense, and appellant was given a ten-year sentence.
The record at the time of entry of the plea of guilty disclosed that appellant stated that he desired to withdraw his plea of not guilty and plead guilty, that he wished to waive his right to a jury and have the case disposed of that morning, and that he knew the penalty for auto banditry.
The statement which appellant had given to the police prior to the appointment of the pauper attorneys, and which appellant does not contend was not given voluntarily and of his own free will, contains the following:
'
On the same date Dillinger entered a plea of guilty and was sentenced to ten years. It developed at the hearing that Small was already in the Reformatory.
The situation now seems to us quite clear. Appellant had committed the crime with which he was charged, he had furnished details concerning it, and wished to plead guilty. He knew he was entitled to a jury trial and knew the penalty for the crime.
We are unable to discover wherein detailed recitation to appellant of all rights of a defendant in a criminal case could help him, or wherein not detailing such rights could harm him.
Let us examine appellant's contentions one by one.
(1) Appellant says his attorneys did not spend sufficient time in consultation with him. True, a total of only ten minutes seems very little. But what more could they learn from him in a longer time? He says he is guilty, he has made a statement, look at it and you get the detailed facts. What more is there to learn?
(2) Appellant says his attorneys did not make a sufficient independent investigation. What were they to investigate? His statement to the police, certainly. Then what? He says he did it. Here are the details. No one ever claimed appellant lied about being guilty or was incompetent mentally. What, then, was a further independent investigation to discover which could be helpful to appellant?
(3) Appellant says his attorneys did not advise him of his constitutional rights in these particulars:
a. That the charge included a lesser offense. An includable lesser offense only becomes important where there is a question as to whether the facts clearly make the crime charged. Here they clearly do.
b. His right to appeal as a pauper. What good would this information be? Where the facts of appellant's guilt were clear according to appellant's statement, and he wished to plead guilty, what would there be to appeal from?
c. His right to a jury trial. He was informed as to this right and personally waived it.
d. To be heard by himself and counsel. He was.
e. His right to demand the nature and cause of the accusation, etc. With this information he was furnished.
f. His right to meet witnesses face to face. This right he had. The young lady who was held up in Dady's store testified and was subject to cross-examination. So did one of his accomplices. What other witnesses did appellant wish to meet face to face? There were none, and, besides, he was not being merely accused. He admitted his guilt. Wherein was he harmed?
g. His right to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses. What witnesses? Nothing in the record indicates there were any witnesses in the world that appellant wanted or who could have been useful to him.
h. The law of reasonable doubt or burden of proof. Wherein could such information be of any use to appellant? There was no reasonable doubt involved nor any question of burden of proof. The man admits he is guilty.
(4) Appellant says the court itself, did not inform him as to his constitutional rights. Again, what constitutional rights? Appellant does not point out, nor do we discover, any constitutional rights of which appellant could have availed himself that were not made clear to him.
(5) Appellant claims error in the admission of evidence of other crimes in the hearing on the petition for writ of error coram nobis. Inasmuch as the guilt or innocence of appellant was not in issue, the usual objection, that evidence of the commission of one crime is not competent to show the...
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