Mizell v. SunTrust Bank
| Decision Date | 18 March 2014 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 13-cv-1077 (KBJ) |
| Parties | ISADORE MIZELL, Plaintiff, v. SUNTRUST BANK, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Plaintiff Isadore Mizell ("Mizell"), who is proceeding pro se, filed the instant complaint in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia on June 18, 2013. Mizell alleges that Defendant SunTrust Bank ("Defendant" or "SunTrust") improperly closed the bank account for Mizell's travel agency business without first notifying him, (Complaint ("Compl."), ECF No. 1-1, ¶ 4), and maintains that Defendant is liable for defamation (Count I), and breach of contract (Count II). (Id. ¶ 14.) On July 15, 2013, Defendant removed the case to this Court. (Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1.) Three days later, on July 18, 2013, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Mizell's complaint on the grounds that Mizell's claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitation. (See Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss ("Def.'s Mot."), ECF No. 3, at 1-2.) Mizell subsequently filed a motion to remand the case to Superior Court on August 16, 2013. (Pl.'s Mot. to Remand ("Pl.'s Mot."), ECF No. 8, at 1.)
Both motions are currently before the Court. Because the Court concludes that Defendant appropriately removed the case to federal court, and that both of Mizell's claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitation, Plaintiff's motion to remandis DENIED and Defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED. An order consistent with this opinion will follow.
Mizell is a businessman who resides in the District of Columbia. (Compl. ¶ 2.) He is the owner of the Mizell Travel Agency ("Travel Agency"), which is also located in D.C. (Compl. ¶ 4.) The Travel Agency had maintained an account with SunTrust, or its predecessor banks, since September 14, 1981. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 10.) According to the complaint, SunTrust closed the Travel Agency account on June 1, 2009, because two checks written on the account were returned as a result of insufficient funds. (Id. ¶ 4.) The complaint alleges that SunTrust sent no notification of the account's closure either to Mizell personally or the Travel Agency. (Id. ¶ 5.) The complaint further states that, for three weeks after the closure of the account, SunTrust continued to accept deposits (totaling more than $40,000), while at the same time refusing to honor any checks written on the account. (Id. ¶ 6.) In addition, the complaint maintains that SunTrust told other Travel Agency creditors—including credit card issuer CitiCorp—that the Travel Agency's bank account was "frozen," which resulted in those other creditors canceling their credit accounts with the Travel Agency. (Id. ¶ 7.) Mizell alleges that, in total, four of the Travel Agency's credit cards, representing a total of $110,000 in lines of credit, were cancelled. (Id. ¶ 8.) Moreover, Mizell contends that, because of his "frozen" bank account, the Travel Agency lost the services of one of its major business partners, American Airlines, which "severely hamper[ed]" the Travel Agency's ability to do business. (Id. ¶ 11.) Finally, Mizell asserts that, when he requested that Defendant remit to him the money that was on deposit in the SunTrustbank account at the time that it was closed without notice, Defendant made him wait "another 10 days" before remitting the deposits, which further injured his ability to do business and damaged his reputation. (Id. ¶ 12.)
Almost exactly four years later, on June 18, 2013, Mizell filed the instant complaint in D.C. Superior Court. Based on the facts as alleged above, the complaint identifies two discrete claims. The first is a defamation claim, based upon the allegation that Defendant used the word "frozen" to describe the bank account to Mizell's various creditors, and thereby caused him significant injury. (Id. ¶ 14.) The second is a claim for breach of contract, based upon the allegation that under the contract between Mizell and SunTrust, the bank was required to notify Mizell prior to closing the Travel Agency account. (Id.) Mizell seeks $500,000 in damages stemming from these two claims. (Id. ¶ 15.)
On July 15, 2013, Defendant removed the case to this Court, basing the removal on diversity between the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (Notice of Removal at 2.) Three days later, on July 18, 2013, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that the applicable statutes of limitation bars both of Mizell's claims. (Def.'s Mot. at 1-2.) On August 6, 2013, this Court issued an order to show cause why the case should not be remanded to Superior Court, based upon the fact that Defendant's Notice of Removal had failed to establish adequately that the parties are indeed diverse, because the Notice stated only that Mizell was a "resident" of the District of Columbia. (Order to Show Cause, ECF No. 5, at 1.) Defendant responded to the Court's order to show cause on August 16, 2013, and Court issued an order discharging the order toshow cause on August 21, 2013. (See Def.'s Response to Order to Show Cause, ECF No. 6; Minute Order of August 21, 2013.)1 Defendant subsequently filed an amended Notice of Removal, which properly stated Mizell's citizenship, on August 28, 2013. (Amended Notice of Removal, ECF No. 11.) In the interim, however, Mizell filed his own motion to remand the case to Superior Court, essentially arguing that allowing the case to remain in federal court would unfairly prejudice him. (Pl.'s Mot. at 1.) Consequently, there are two motions currently before the Court: Mizell's motion to remand and Defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint, or in the alternative, motion for summary judgment.
"Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and, therefore, the law presumes that "a cause lies outside of [the court's] limited jurisdiction." Busby v. Capital One, N.A., 841 F. Supp. 2d 49, 52 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).) Nonetheless, "[a] defendant may properly remove a civil action from a state court when the federal district court has original subject matter jurisdiction." District of Columbia v. Grp. Hospitalization & Med. Servs., Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 51, 53 (D.D.C. 2008); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Among other bases, federal district courts have original subject matter jurisdiction "over a case when citizens of different states are involved and the amount in controversy exceeds$75,000.00 exclusive of interest and costs." Nwachukwu v. Karl, 223 F. Supp. 2d 60, 65 (D.D.C. 2002); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
When a plaintiff seeks to have a case that has been removed to federal court remanded back to state court, "[t]he party opposing a motion to remand bears the burden of establishing that subject matter jurisdiction exists in federal court." Int'l Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers v. Ins. Co. of the West, 366 F. Supp. 2d 33, 36 (D.D.C. 2005). Moreover, "[c]ourts must strictly construe removal statutes," and "must resolve any ambiguities concerning the propriety of removal in favor of remand." Busby, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 53.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a party may move to dismiss a complaint on the grounds that it "fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must comply with Rule 8, which requires "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). This requirement is meant to "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
"Although 'detailed factual allegations' are not necessary to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff must furnish 'more than labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.'" Busby v. Capital One, N.A., 932 F. Supp. 2d 114, 133 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In other words, the plaintiff must provide "more than anunadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "Mere conclusory statements" of misconduct are not enough to make out a cause of action against a defendant. Id. Rather, a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations that, if true, "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face[,]" Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, and "[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged[,]" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
In deciding whether to grant a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, "[t]he court must view the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and must accept as true all reasonable factual inferences drawn from well-pleaded factual allegations." Busby, 932 F. Supp. 2d at 134 (citation omitted). But even so, the court "need not accept inferences drawn by plaintiffs if such inferences are unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint[.]" Kowal v. MCI Commc'ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Nor is the court "bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation[.]" Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted).
Moreover, while the pleadings of pro se parties are to be "liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[,]" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), "[t]his benefit is not . . . a license to ignore the Federal Rules...
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