Mo. Coal. for the Env't v. State

• Citation: 593 S.W.3d 534
• Decision Date: 04 February 2020
• Docket Number: No. SC 97913,SC 97913
• Parties: MISSOURI COALITION FOR the ENVIRONMENT and Thomas J. Sager, Appellants, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Missouri

593 S.W.3d 534

MISSOURI COALITION FOR the ENVIRONMENT and Thomas J. Sager, Appellants,

v.STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

No. SC 97913

Supreme Court of Missouri, en banc.

Opinion issued February 4, 2020

Rehearing Denied February 20, 2020

The challengers were represented by Henry B. Robertson and Bruce A. Morrison of Great Rivers Environmental Law Center in St. Louis, (314) 231-4181.

The state was represented by Jason K. Lewis and Alyssa M. Mayer of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City, (573) 751-3321.

Laura Denvir Stith, Judge

Thomas Sager and the Missouri Coalition for the Environment (collectively, the coalition) appeal the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in the State’s favor on the coalition’s petition for declaratory and injunctive relief claiming Senate Bill No. 35 (SB 35), now codified at section 34.030, RSMo Supp. 2017,¹ violates the Missouri Constitution in numerous respects. The circuit court properly granted summary judgment.

The coalition claims that, by regulating land purchases by both the Missouri Department of Natural Resources (DNR) as well as other state agencies, SB 35 violated the single-subject and clear-title requirements in article III, section 23 of the Missouri Constitution. The single subject of the bill was state purchases of land, which this Court finds was clearly expressed in its title. The coalition also failed to show the bill’s original purpose changed prior to final passage in violation of the original-purpose requirement of article III, section 21; the purpose of requiring notice and hearing prior to purchases of land – thereby achieving greater transparency – remained the same. Additionally, there is no merit to the coalition’s argument that SB 35 implicitly amended other laws governing DNR and that the full text of those other laws, therefore, should have been set out in the final bill pursuant to article III, section 28. The duties and powers of state agencies, including DNR, often are set out in multiple statutes. The coalition can cite to no case holding that a bill imposing obligations on an agency implicitly amends other statutes regulating that agency and, therefore, must set out the full language of those other statutes.

Finally, summary judgment was proper on the coalition’s claim that SB 35 is an invalid special or local law in violation of article III, section 40(30) because it is treated differently from other agencies with the constitutional power to purchase land. Missouri’s constitution gives DNR and other constitutionally created agencies separate powers and duties, and Missouri statutes do not offend section 40(30) by treating them differently. Moreover, DNR is a statewide agency and its authority to purchase land after notice and comment pursuant to SB 35 applies to the state as a whole. SB 35 is not a special or local law. For these reasons, the judgment is affirmed.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Prior to 2017, section 34.030 gave the commissioner of administration authority to "negotiate all leases and purchase all lands, except for such departments as derive their power to acquire lands from the constitution of the state." § 34.030 . As originally introduced, SB 35 repealed this version of section 34.030, replaced it with identical language, and added certain notice and hearing requirements with which the commissioner must comply before purchasing such land. 2017 Mo. S.B. 35 (as introduced Jan. 4, 2017).

Prior to its enactment, the legislature amended SB 35 by narrowing its notice and hearing requirements to apply only to purchases of land greater than a certain size and by adding DNR to the list of state agencies required to follow the notice and hearing provisions set out in the bill:

2. When the commissioner of administration contracts to purchase lands on behalf of any department of state that will be owned and managed by such department or when the department of natural resources contracts to purchase lands that will be owned or managed by the department of natural resources, and such lands exceed sixty or more acres in a single transaction or such purchase price exceeds two hundred fifty thousand dollars in a single transaction , the respective department shall:

(1) Provide public notice on its departmental website and to each publically elected official that represents all or part of the county in which the land to be purchased is located at least sixty days prior to the department of natural resources purchasing such land or the commissioner of administration purchasing such land on behalf of a department;

(2) Provide public notice in one newspaper ... in every county in which the department of natural resources intends to purchase land or the commissioner of administration intends to purchase private land on behalf of a department ...; and

(3) Hold a public hearing in every county in which the department of natural resources intends to purchase land or the commissioner of administration intends to purchase land on behalf of a department. The department shall provide public notice of the public hearing on its departmental website and in writing to each publically elected official who represents all or part of the county in which the land to be purchased is located ...

§ 34.030.2, RSMo Supp. 2017 (amendments added to the bill in bold).

In May 2018, the coalition filed its suit for declaratory and injunctive relief alleging SB 35 violated several of the Missouri Constitution’s procedural requirements for the passage of legislation. The circuit court granted summary judgment in the State’s favor on all counts. The coalition appeals. This Court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the validity of state statutes or constitutional provisions. Mo. Const. art. V, § 3.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND BURDEN OF PROOF

When the issue on appeal is whether a factual question should have precluded summary judgment, this Court "will review the record in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered." ITT Commercial Finance Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993) . This Court "accord[s] the non-movant the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the record." Id. Here, the coalition challenges the passage of SB 35 on the basis that the manner of the bill’s passage did not comply with procedural requirements set out in Missouri’s constitution governing how bills are to be written and passed. Because the constitutional validity of a state statute is an issue of law, our review is de novo. Earth Island Inst. v. Union Elec. Co., 456 S.W.3d 27, 32 (Mo. banc 2015) . While the procedural requirements of article III are mandatory, not discretionary, "an act of the legislature approved by the governor carries with it a strong presumption of constitutionality." Hammerschmidt v. Boone Cnty., 877 S.W.2d 98, 102 (Mo. banc 1994) . "Therefore, this Court interprets procedural limitations liberally and will uphold the constitutionality of a statute against such an attack unless the act clearly and undoubtedly violates the constitutional limitation." Id.

III. SB 35 MET CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS

The coalition asserts SB 35 violates sections of the Missouri Constitution limiting the manner in which the legislature may pass legislation by requiring that bills have a single subject clearly expressed in the title of the bill as passed, that the section being amended be fully set forth with the amendments clearly marked, and that the bill’s original purpose not be changed. See Mo. Const. art. III, §§ 21, 23, 28. These limitations are designed to prevent surprise or deception of legislators and the public as to the purpose, subject, and effect of the proposed legislation. Calzone v. Interim Comm'r of the Dep't of Elementary & Secondary Educ., 584 S.W.3d 310, 315-17 (Mo. banc 2019) . They also are intended to prevent legislative logrolling – a process combining unrelated amendments that on their own could not pass but together may muster a majority. Hammerschmidt, 877 S.W.2d at 101.

Applying these provisions to SB 35, the coalition notes that, prior to its repeal and replacement in 2017, section 34.030 provided that the commissioner "shall negotiate all leases and purchase all land, except for such departments as derive their power to acquire lands from the constitution." The commissioner’s purchasing power, therefore, did not extend to the three Missouri state government agencies – DNR, the state highways and transportation commission, and the department of conservation – that "derive their power to acquire lands from the constitution."² The coalition argues the legislature violated article III, sections 21, 23, and 28 by expanding the scope of section 34.030 to include DNR’s land purchases because that expansion caused SB 35 to address more than a single subject, that subject was not clearly expressed in the bill’s title, and the purpose of the bill changed when DNR was added. This Court will address each of these constitutional provisions in turn.

A. SB 35 Did Not Violate Article III, Section 23 ’s Single-Subject Requirement

Section 23 of article III provides, in relevant part: "No bill shall contain more than one subject which shall be clearly expressed in its title...." SB 35’s final title was "An act to repeal section 34.030, RSMo, and to enact in lieu thereof one new section relating to state purchases of land." The coalition argues land purchases by the commissioner are a different subject from land purchases by DNR because the constitution gives DNR the constitutional authority to purchase land itself. Mo. Const. art. IV, § 47(a). Therefore, the coalition says, a bill that imposes notice and hearing requirements on other agencies cannot also impose such requirements on DNR without violating the single-subject requirement. The Court rejects this argument.

Missouri law long has recognized that the test for whether a bill addresses a single subject is not how the provisions relate...