Mo. & N. Ark. R.R. Co. v. Entergy Ark., Inc.
| Decision Date | 06 November 2012 |
| Docket Number | No.1:10-cv-8-DPM,1:10-cv-8-DPM |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas |
| Parties | MISSOURI & NORTHERN ARKANSAS RAILROAD COMPANY, INC. PLAINTIFF v. ENTERGY ARKANSAS, INC. DEFENDANT |
1. The parties tried this case during several days in December 2011. The jury returned a verdict finding three things: Leal was injured "on or about Switch" when he slipped and fell in the mud near Entergy's back gate; Leal sustained injury "from an[] act or omission" by Entergy; MNA was negligent, and that negligence was a proximate cause of Leal's injuries. Document No. 119. All the quoted phrases are from the parties' industrial track agreement, which creates and defines Entergy's indemnity obligations in various particular circumstances, including those presented by Leal's slip and fall. Document No. 37-1. The Court denied the parties' motions for judgment as a matter of law at the close of MNA's case. The parties renewed those motions at the close of all the proof; the Court took them under advisement so the record would include the jury's verdict after a full trial.
The Court appreciates the parties' prompt and succinct post-trial briefs. Those papers, like counsels' efforts throughout the case, were helpful and ably done. The Court regrets its delay in turning back to the motions for judgment. The governing procedural standard is not disputed. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a); Shaw Hofstra & Associates v. Ladco Development, Inc., 673 F.3d 819,825 (8th Cir. 2012).
2. The Court confirms its oral ruling after verdict denying the cross motions directed at the "on or about Switch" issue. The parties' contract is ambiguous on the reach of the term "about"; and the particulars of Leal's accident and railroad/industry practice, all matters of extrinsic evidence, were disputed. This issue was thus for the jury. Smith v. Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Co., 340 Ark. 335, 341,10 S.W.3d 846, 850 (2000). Its verdict stands.
3. The cross motions for judgment as a matter of law on whether Leal's injuries were traceable to any act or omission by Entergy are denied too. MNA's motion is moot because the jury decided the issue in the railroad's favor. Document No. 119. Entergy's motion is denied because the proof would have supported a reasonable juror's verdict either way. Entergy did not causeall the rainy weather or the mud, of course. But Entergy's gate was made so it could swing wild off the road, back into the uneven area near the fence, an area that was weedy and muddy that night. Considering the lack of evidence about any similar problems or incidents, and Entergy's stern direction to MNA to keep the gate locked, the jury could have found that Leal's fall in the dark was just an accident, an unforeseeable event in an imperfect world. The jury's contrary conclusion, though, is well supported by the nature of the gate, the road, and the area between the road and the fence, coupled with the many days of rain, which should have put Entergy on notice that this area would be a soggy, muddy mess, exposing users of the back gate to dangerous conditions.
. In their contract, the parties agreed that, in the circumstances established by the jury's answers to questions 1 and 2, Entergy would owe full indemnity unless negligence by MNA was a proximate cause of Leal's injury too. "[I]f any claim or liability shall arise from joint or concurring negligence of [Entergy and MNA], it shall be borne by them equally." Document No. 37-1, at 4. These issues were captured in the Court's instructions 14,15,16,17, and 18 and question 3 on the verdict form. With anexception noted in the margin, the parties agreed with these instructions and this question. This is a matter of the railroad's alleged negligence under Arkansas common law, not under the FELA. Burlington Northern, Inc. v. Hughes Brothers, Inc., 671 F.2d 279, 285 (8th Cir. 1982).* The jury answered question 3 "yes," which would divide liability for the Leal settlement 50/50.
MNA makes two main arguments for judgment as a matter of law on apportionment. First, the railroad says it owed Leal no duty of care as to Entergy's premises, and therefore cannot be negligent. E.g., Lewis v. AT&T Mobility, 2011 Ark. App. 756, at 4, 2011 WL 6062678, at *2 (duty in general). Second, MNA says it violated no standard of care —nothing the railroad did or did not do proximately caused Leal's slip and fall; the railroad had no reason to foresee any danger; and the muddy area was, in any event, open and obvious to Leal, which he acknowledged at trial.
Entergy responds with a punch list. There are, Entergy contends, at least eight facts that make MNA's negligence a jury question.
Document No. 123, at 7-8. The Court can't improve on Entergy's summary of its legal argument from these facts.
MNA actively and affirmatively adopted the back gate area as a place at which its personnel would access the switch. MNA certainly had knowledge of the wet and muddy conditions, yet—unlike the situation in Hughes Bros. —MNA did nothing at all to warn or advise its employees or [Entergy] that the conditions constituted a hazard, did nothing at all to implement its own safety rule to use the safest route, and did nothing at all to prohibit or prevent its employees from using the back gate area under the conditions present at the time of Mr. Leal's injury.
A preliminary point: acquiescence. The parties skirmish over this doctrine, and whether it is part of Arkansas law in an indemnity case stemming from a FELA settlement. This issue is vexed. Compare Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 434 F.2d 575, 580-81 (8th Cir. 1970) (), and Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Winburn Tile Manufacturing Co., 461 F.2d 984, 988-89 (8th Cir. 1972) (), with Nabholtz Construction Corp. v. Graham, 319 Ark. 396,403-04,892 S.W.2d 456,461 (1995) ().
The Court need not sort this law out. The facts, taken in the light most favorable to Entergy, don't come close to creating a question about acquiescence. There was no evidence MNA actually discovered the dangerous condition with the gate swinging back into the weedy, uneven, and muddy area, much less any evidence that the railroad acquiesced in the situation continuing for so long a time that the railroad became a joint participant in this condition. Hughes Bros., 671 F.2d at 285-86. Even if acquiescence is part of Arkansas common law in FELA-related indemnity disputes, the doctrine does not apply on this record.
MNA's no-duty argument echos points made on summary judgment, now with the benefit of the trial record. The issue takes the case into the old law about master and servant. The FELA and the Arkansas Workers Compensation Act must be set aside; what was the scope of MNA's common-law duty, as principal, to Leal, the railroad's agent, regarding working conditions at Entergy's back gate? In answering this question, the Court has considered general negligence principles, older Arkansas cases about masters and servants, and the Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 492-528, which distills the applicable common law. These legal rules are much like those about abusiness owner and his invitees, but with some variations. RESTATEMENT, introductory note to title C, "Non-delegable Duties of Master", p. 435. MNA's argument from the Arkansas law of premises liability is thus illuminating, though not controlling.
MNA had a non-delegable duty to provide Leal a reasonably safe place to work and warn him about unsafe conditions MNA should have realized that Leal might not discover even though he was exercising due care. E.g., Bryant Lumber Co. v. Stastney, 87 Ark. 321, 324-25,112 S.W. 740, 741 (1908); RESTATEMENT § 492. The scope of MNA's duty diminishes on premises beyond the railroad's control. Though the Court has not found an Arkansas case directly in point, the Restatement accurately captures the common law.
The [M]aster's duty as to working conditions does not extend to the condition of premises not in his control... except that he has a duty to disclose dangerous conditions of which he should know.
RESTATEMENT § 504. This duty of disclosure or warning is further refined depending on the circumstances. More on this point after exploring the facts, in the light most favorable to Entergy, about MNA's control of conditions at the back gate.
The Court is not persuaded by Entergy's argument that the railroad could control those conditions. Yes, MNA had total access for many years with its own lock as part of the dual-lock system. Yes, the access was routine and regular, not an occasional thing like a UPS delivery. But there was no evidence presented...
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