Mo. State Conference of the Nat'l Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People v. State

• Decision Date: 09 October 2020
• Docket Number: No. SC 98744,SC 98744
• Citation: 607 S.W.3d 728
• Parties: MISSOURI STATE CONFERENCE OF the NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, et al., Appellants, v. STATE of Missouri, et al., Respondents.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

607 S.W.3d 728

MISSOURI STATE CONFERENCE OF the NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, et al., Appellants,

v.STATE of Missouri, et al., Respondents.

No. SC 98744

Supreme Court of Missouri, en banc.

Opinion issued October 9, 2020

Leif Dautch, Office of the Attorney General, 455 Golden Gate Avenue - Suite 11000, San Francisco, CA 94102-7004, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

First District Appellate Project, 475 Fourteenth Street, Suite 650, Oakland, CA 94612, Steven Schorr, PO Box 1931, Discovery Bay, CA 94505-7931, for Defendant and Appellant.

PER CURIAM

The Missouri State Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the League of Women Voters of Missouri, Meredith Langlitz, and Javier A. Del Villar ("Appellants") appeal the circuit court's judgment in favor of the State of Missouri and other respondents (the "State") for both declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. This case involves concerns about registered Missouri voters’ ability to vote amidst the ongoing public health crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. While the legislature greatly expanded voting options in Missouri for 2020 elections due to the pandemic, it put in place certain limitations on the newly created mail-in voting system. One of those limitations—that absentee and mail-in ballot envelopes be notarized for certain voters—is the subject of this appeal. Due to the transmissibility of COVID-19 through person-to-person contact, Appellants seek injunctive and declaratory relief that allows all Missouri voters to vote by mail without having their signatures on their ballot envelopes acknowledged¹ by a notary or other official authorized by law to administer oaths. The circuit court denied their request for relief, and Appellants appeal from that judgment. Because Appellants’ request for relief is not supported or warranted by Missouri law, the circuit court's judgment is affirmed.²

Background

Appellants originated the underlying action in April 2020 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The State filed a motion to dismiss, arguing Appellants failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. The circuit court sustained the State's motion, and Appellants appealed the dismissal. While the appeal was pending before this Court, the General Assembly passed and the governor signed Senate Bill No. 631.

SB 631 immediately expanded eligibility for absentee voting without notarization under section 115.277 for the remaining 2020 elections.³ For voters who do not qualify for an absentee ballot, it also created no-excuse mail-in voting with the requirement that those voters obtain acknowledgment of their signature by a notary. With respect to absentee voting, SB 631 retained all the existing eligibility categories to vote absentee⁴ set out in section 115.277 and added new sections 115.277.1(7) and 115.277.6 pertaining only to elections held in 2020.

Section 115.277.1(7) authorizes any voter who has "contracted or is in an at-risk category for contracting" COVID-19 to vote by absentee ballot without having their signatures on their ballot envelopes acknowledged by a notary or other official authorized by law to administer oaths. § 115.283.8; § 115.291.1. The legislature defined at-risk voters in the new section 115.277.6 as:

For purposes of this section, the voters who are in an at-risk category for contracting or transmitting severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 are voters who: (1) Are sixty-five years of age or older; (2) Live in a long-term care facility licensed under chapter 198; (3) Have chronic lung disease or moderate to severe asthma ; (4) Have serious heart conditions; (5) Are immunocompromised; (6) Have diabetes ; (7) Have chronic kidney disease and are undergoing dialysis; or (8) Have liver disease.

§ 115.277.6

SB 631 also created a new section 115.302.1 authorizing all registered Missouri voters, regardless of their eligibility to vote absentee pursuant to section 115.277, to cast a mail-in ballot in any remaining elections held in 2020 provided the ballot is acknowledged by a notary as provided in sections 115.302.11 and 115.291.1. These new voting provisions authorize all registered voters to vote by mail provided their signatures on the ballot envelopes are acknowledged by a notary or other person authorized to administer oaths.⁵ The new absentee provision further authorized a subset of voters deemed at-risk by the statute to vote absentee by mail without such acknowledgement in the remaining 2020 elections.

In Appellants’ appeal of the circuit court's dismissal, this Court remanded the case for further proceedings. Mo. State Conf. of NAACP v. State , 601 S.W.3d 241, 243 (Mo. banc 2020). Appellants then filed an amended petition and engaged in discovery seeking evidentiary support for their claims. After a trial on the merits, the circuit court entered judgment for the State on September 24, 2020. The circuit court found Count I, which presented a question of statutory interpretation, failed as a matter of law because Appellants who are not ill or disabled are not "confine[d] due to illness of disability" under the plain and ordinary meaning of section 115.277.1(2). As to Count II, which asserted the notarization requirement poses unconstitutional health risks, the circuit court found the claim was unsupported by the law and evidence. Appellants appeal directly to this Court under this Court's exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the validity of a state statute pursuant to article V, section 3 of the Missouri Constitution.

I. Interpretation of Section 115.277.1(2)

Appellants’ first point on appeal challenges the circuit court's ruling that the plain and ordinary meaning of section 115.277.1(2) does not allow Missouri voters who expect to confine themselves to avoid spreading or contracting the COVID-19 virus to vote absentee without notarization. In Count I of their amended petition, Appellants allege section 115.277.1(2) "permits registered voters who expect to confine themselves on Election Day due to COVID-19 to vote absentee in Missouri without a notary seal."

The judgment in a court-tried case will be sustained "unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, unless it is against the weight of the evidence, unless it erroneously declares the law, or unless it erroneously applies the law." Murphy v. Carron , 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976). "Statutory interpretation is an issue of law that this Court reviews de novo. " State v. Richey , 569 S.W.3d 420, 423 (Mo. banc 2019).

Section 115.277.1(2) allows voters to vote absentee if they are incapacitated or confining due to illness or disability or are caregivers for a person who is incapacitated or confining due to illness or disability. Specifically, section 115.277.1(2) provides:

Except as provided in subsections 2, 3, 4, and 5 of this section, any registered voter of this state may vote by absentee ballot for all candidates and issues for which such voter would be eligible to vote at the polling place if such voter expects to be prevented from going to the polls to vote on election day due to: ... (2) Incapacity or confinement due to illness or physical disability, including a person who is primarily responsible for the physical care of a person who is incapacitated or confined due to illness or disability....

§ 115.277.1(2) (emphasis added). Appellants argue this provision includes, in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, voters who expect to confine themselves to home to avoid spreading or contracting COVID-19. Although none of the Appellants claim they expect to be ill on or have contracted COVID-19 by the date of the election, they argue they are, nevertheless, expecting to confine themselves "due to illness" as that phrase is used in section 115.277.1(2) and are, therefore, entitled to submit their absentee ballot by mail without notarization.⁶

The goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the General Assembly's intent "as reflected in the plain language of the statute at issue." State v. Jones , 479 S.W.3d 100, 106 (Mo. banc 2016) (quoting Ivie v. Smith , 439 S.W.3d 189, 202 (Mo. banc 2014) ). "The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used [and] to give effect to that intent if possible[.]" Wolff Shoe Co. v. Dir. of Revenue , 762 S.W.2d 29, 31 (Mo. banc 1988). This Court does so by "consider[ing] the words used in their plain and ordinary meaning." Dickemann v. Costco Wholesale Corp. , 550 S.W.3d 65, 68 (Mo. banc 2018).

Here, section 115.277.1(2) provides voters who "expect[ ] to be prevented from going to the polls to vote on election day due to ... [i]ncapacity or confinement due to illness or physical disability" may request and cast an absentee ballot without notarizing their ballot envelope. Appellants argue this authorizes Missouri voters to vote absentee without notarization during the COVID-19 pandemic if they expect to confine themselves on election day to avoid spreading or contracting the virus. Essentially, Appellants contend voters who do not expect to be ill or disabled on the date of the election are, nonetheless, eligible to vote absentee because they have confined themselves to avoid "contracting or spreading" COVID-19. The plain and ordinary meaning of the language in the statute, however, does not support this application. In plain and ordinary speech, "confinement due to illness" does not refer to voluntarily remaining in one's own home to avoid "contracting or spreading" a pathogen. Webster's dictionary defines "illness" as "an unhealthy condition of body or mind," or meaning someone who is actually experiencing a diagnosis or symptoms and not the threat of such impact. Illness , Webster's New Int'l Dictionary 1127 (3d ed. 2002). Appellants’ interpretation of this phrase requires reading the words "risk of" or "to avoid" illness into the statute. This Court's obligation is to examine the...