Moakler v. Furkids, Inc.
| Decision Date | 04 December 2017 |
| Docket Number | 1:16-cv-4451-WSD |
| Parties | LAURA MOAKLER, Plaintiff, v. FURKIDS, INC. and SAMANTHA DEE SHELTON, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia |
This matter is before the Court on Defendants Furkids, Inc.'s and Samantha Dee Shelton's (collectively "Defendants") Motion to Dismiss [5] for lack of subject matter jurisdiction ("Motion").
Plaintiff Laura Moakler ("Moakler") worked as a Kennel/Vet Technician for Furkids, a domestic, charitable, nonprofit provider of pet care, from August 20, 2014, to August 1, 2016. (Id. ¶ 12). Samantha Shelton is its founder.
On June 2, 2016, Defendants were sent correspondence notifying them that Moakler had obtained counsel to represent her regarding FLSA overtime claims. (Id. ¶ 28). Ten days later, Defendants wrote up Moakler for working past 5:00 p.m. on Wednesday, June 8, 2016. (Id. ¶ 30). Defendants notified Moakler that overtime would only be paid if it were approved and that she "would be terminated should she work overtime again." (Id. ¶¶ 31, 33). On August 1, 2016, Defendants terminated Moakler. (Id. ¶ 34). On December 1, 2016, Moakler filed this action, claiming that Furkids violated the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) ("FLSA Antiretaliation Provision"), by terminating Plaintiff in retaliation for Plaintiff raising FLSA overtime claims.1 (Compl. ¶¶ 27-38).
On March 10, 2017, Defendants moved to dismiss Moakler's Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). ([5]). Defendants argue that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction because "the FLSA does not apply to this case" since "Moakler's work for Furkids had nothing to do with interstate commerce." ([5 at 3-4]). Defendant purports to mount a "factual attack" on subject matter jurisdiction. ([5] at2 n.1). In support, Defendant offers the Declaration of Samantha Shelton. ([5-1]). Shelton states that she founded Furkids, Inc., which is "a 501(c)(3) nonprofit charitable organization that operates one of the largest cage-free, no-kill shelter in the Southeast for rescued cats." ([5-1] ¶ 2). Shelton asserts that Moakler worked only at the Furkids' cat shelter located in metro Atlanta, Georgia, and that rescued animals housed by Furkids are found within Georgia and are brought to Furkids by Georgia residents. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 6). Shelton further states that "Furkids' cat and dog shelters do not offer any services for fees to the general public, and donot [sic] engage in any ordinary commercial activities." (Id. ¶ 7). Shelton acknowledges that "Furkids operates a thrift store to raise money to care for its animal residents" but states that "Moakler did not work at the thrift store," the "thrift store is a completely separate operation from the cat shelter where Moakler worked," and Furkids is funded primarily through charitable donations. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 9).
Shelton states that "Moakler's position as a kennel technician included giving food and water to the cats, changing litter, cleaning the facility, supervising the cats' interactions with each other and with guests, and otherwise ensuring the clean, safe, and humane care of Furkids' cat residents." ([5-1] ¶ 12). Shelton maintains that "Moakler has never provided commercial services on behalf of Furkids, or otherwise engaged in commerce." ([5-1] ¶ 11).
On March 24, 2017, Moakler filed her Response. ([6]). Moakler maintains that "the central issue for the court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is whether Ms. Moakler can maintain an action under the FLSA's retaliatory discharge provision, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3), even if Defendants' failure to pay overtime does not in fact constitute a violation of the overtime provision of the Act because the employment relationship is not covered by the FLSA." ([6] at 2). Moakler argues that she can "prevail on an FLSA retaliation claim even if she cannot establish individual or enterprise coverage." (Id. at 3, citing Wirtz v. Ross Packaging Comp., 367 F.2d 549, 550-51 (5th Cir. 1966)).
Moakler asserts that "Defendants' Motion is not properly based on subject matter jurisdiction, and therefore, Defendants' extrinsic factual exhibits should not be considered." (Id. at 3). Nevertheless, Moakler requests that the Court take judicial notice of information posted on Defendants' website should the Court consider extrinsic evidence. (Id. at 3). Moakler contends that this information demonstrates that "Defendants operate adoption centers for five PetSmart locations and two PETCO locations, sell retail merchandise on-line and at the shelters, and operate three large thrift stores." (Id. at 3-4, citing [6-1]). Moakler cites Defendants' website as demonstrating that Defendants offer fee for services, like spay and neuter surgeries, to the public. (Id. at 4, citing [6-1]).
Relying on audited financial statements published on Defendants' website, Moakler maintains that all of Defendants' economic activity "takes place under the umbrella of one business entity - Furkids, Inc., and are accounted for as one business in Defendant's set of financial statements." (Id. at 4, citing [6-2]). "It appears for Defendant Furkids, Inc.'s 2014 audited financial statements that Furkids generated $601,210 in revenue from a combination of services provided in addition to sales from thrift stores." (Id. at 4, citing [6-2] at 6). "That same revenue amounted to $486,302 in 2015." (Id. at 4, citing [6-3] at 6).
Moakler also cites Defendants' website to state that "Defendants' rescued animals, donors, and adoptive owners come from various states nationwide." (Id. at 5, citing [6-4]). Moakler notes that "Defendants produced a video to advertise the cat shelter that went 'viral' around the world and generated an 'influx of donations from around the country, as well as adoption applications and inquiries from people interested in volunteering for the shelter.'" (Id. at 5, citing [6-4] at 2).
On April 7, 2017, Defendants filed a Reply. ([7]). Defendants argue that Wirtz is distinguishable because it did not involve "the total lack of connection to interstate commerce that is presented by Plaintiff's work at a local animal shelter caring for cats." (Id. at 6). Defendants maintain that applying the antiretaliation provision to Moakler "would undermine the constitutional requirement of interstate commerce and would extend the reach of that provision far beyond the reach of Congress' Commerce Clause power. . ." (Id. at 7 (emphasis in original)).
"Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). They possess only that power authorized by the Constitution and conferred by Congress. Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986). "If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
A motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) may be either a "facial" or "factual" attack. Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323 F.3d 920, 924 n.5 (11th Cir. 2003). A facial attack challenges subject-matter jurisdiction based on the allegations in a complaint, and the district court takes the allegations as true in deciding whether to grant the motion. Id.
Factual attacks challenge subject-matter jurisdiction in fact. Id. When resolving a factual attack, the court may consider extrinsic evidence, such as testimony and affidavits. Id. In a factual attack, the presumption of truthfulness afforded a plaintiff under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) does not apply. Scarfo v. Ginsberg, 175 F.3d 957, 960-61 (11th Cir. 1999). Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 1981)). The plaintiff has the burden to prove that jurisdiction exists. Elend v. Basham, 471 F.3d 1199, 1206 (11th Cir. 2006).
However, a "district court should only rely on Rule 12(b)(1) '[i]f the facts necessary to sustain jurisdiction do not implicate the merits of plaintiff's cause of action." Morrison, 323 F.3d at 925 (quoting Garcia v. Copenhaver, Bell & Assocs., 104 F.3d 1256, 1261 (11th Cir. 1997). "If a jurisdictional challenge does implicate the merits of the underlying claim then "[T]he proper course of action for the district court . . . is to find that jurisdiction exists and deal with the objection as a direct attack on the merits of the plaintiff's case." Id.
The FLSA is "designed to protect workers from the twin evils of excessive work hours and substandard wages." Howard v. City of Springfield, 274 F.3d 1141, 1148 (7th Cir. 2001). The statute requires payment of minimum wages and compensation for overtime and gives employees deprived of these payments the right to receive them. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 216(b). There are two possible types of FLSA coverage. Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d 1292, 1298-99 (11th Cir. 2011). First, an employee may claim "individual coverage" if the employee regularly and directly participates in the actual movement of persons or things in interstate commerce. Id. Second, an employee may claim "enterprise coverage" if his employer (1) is in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce and (2) has gross volume sales or business of at least $5000,000 annually. Id.
The FLSA also contains an antiretaliation provision. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). Section 215(a)(3) states "it shall be unlawful for any person . . . (3) to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to...
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