Moasser v. Becker, (AC 22819)

• Decision Date: 29 July 2003
• Docket Number: (AC 22819)
• Citation: 78 Conn. App. 305,828 A.2d 116
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: FARHAD MOASSER v. JAMES A. BECKER ET AL.

78 Conn. App. 305

828 A.2d 116

FARHAD MOASSER v. JAMES A. BECKER ET AL.

(AC 22819)

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued February 21, 2003.

Officially released July 29, 2003.

Schaller, Flynn and Dupont, Js. Brenden P. Leydon, with whom, on the brief, were Mark F. Katz and Susan F. D'Elia, for the appellant (defendant Judith Becker).

Philip M. French, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Opinion

SCHALLER, J.

In this action to foreclose three judgment liens, the defendant Judith Becker¹ appeals from the trial court's judgment of foreclosure by sale. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly (1) denied her motions to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, (2) precluded her from relitigating an issue that had been litigated before she became a party to the action and (3) accepted an attorney trial referee's finding that the defendant had violated the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA), General Statutes § 52-552a et seq.² We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiff, Farhad Moasser, commenced an action against the defendant's former husband, James A. Becker, in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, alleging fraud. The plaintiff ultimately obtained judgments against James Becker in 1988 and 1989. At that time, James Becker was married to the defendant, and they were joint tenants of a residence (property) located in Stamford. The plaintiff obtained three judgment liens on James Becker's interest in the property, all of which were recorded in the Stamford land records. In 1992, the plaintiff commenced the present action in the Superior Court, seeking to foreclose the three judgment liens. Additional facts are set forth as necessary for the resolution of the defendant's claims.

I

We first consider the defendant's claim that the court improperly denied her motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, the defendant argues that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's foreclosure action because the plaintiff failed to register the underlying federal District Court judgment as a state court judgment pursuant to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (UEFJA), General Statutes § 52-604 et seq. We are not persuaded.

The following procedural history is relevant to the defendant's claim. The plaintiff brought this action to foreclose the three judgment liens he obtained as a result of his previous action against James Becker in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. The present case was tried before attorney trial referee Alfred H. Hoddinott, Jr., in December, 2000, and January, 2001.³ At trial, the plaintiff introduced certified copies of the certificates of the three judgment liens. The plaintiff did not present any evidence showing that the underlying District Court judgments had been made judgments of the Connecticut Superior Court pursuant to the provisions of the UEFJA. On January 16, 2001, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that the plaintiff did not have an enforceable Connecticut Superior Court judgment. The plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the motion to dismiss in which he advanced several distinct grounds for denial of the motion to dismiss. The court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss without a memorandum of decision on March 26, 2001. The defendant did not request an articulation of the court's reasoning in denying the motion.⁴

In her trial brief submitted to Hoddinott on February 6, 2001, the defendant again challenged the court's subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that the plaintiff did not have an enforceable Superior Court judgment. In his June 11, 2001 report, Hoddinott noted that the issue was controlled by the court's March 26, 2001 denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss. Hoddinott further stated that he saw no reason to revisit that ruling. On August 15, 2001, the defendant filed objections to acceptance of Hoddinott's report, in which she objected to Hoddinott's failure to revisit the issue of the court's subject matter jurisdiction. The court rendered judgment in accordance with the referee's report on January 14, 2002.

On February 1, 2002, the defendant filed another motion to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to establish at trial that he had an enforceable Connecticut Superior Court judgment. The court denied the motion to dismiss on May 16, 2002, indicating in a handwritten notation that "[t]he claim of lack of an enforceable judgment was previously rejected in the memorandum of decision of January 14, 2002."

We begin our analysis by setting forth the applicable standard of review. "A determination regarding a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law. When . . . the trial court draws conclusions of law, our review is plenary and we must decide whether its conclusions are legally and logically correct and find support in the facts that appear in the record." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 485, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003).

Before proceeding to address the merits of the defendant's claim, we must determine whether the record is adequate for us to review the court's rulings. Although the court did not articulate its reasoning for denying the defendant's motions to dismiss, it is undisputed that the plaintiff did not register his judgment pursuant to the UEFJA. The plaintiff's failure to register the judgment pursuant to the UEFJA was the sole basis for the defendant's motions to dismiss. Consequently, the defendant's motions to dismiss presented a single pure question of law, namely, whether a judgment of an in-state federal court must be registered pursuant to the UEFJA as a jurisdictional prerequisite to commencing an action in state court to foreclose the federal judgment lien. Under such circumstances, the lack of an articulation by the trial court of its precise reasoning for denying the motions to dismiss is not fatal to the defendant's claim. Cf. Niehaus v. Cowles Business Media, Inc., 263 Conn. 178, 184-85, 819 A.2d 765 (2003).

We now turn to the merits of the defendant's claim. The defendant argues that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's foreclosure action because the plaintiff failed to register the judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut as a state court judgment pursuant to the UEFJA. Whether the UEFJA requires a judgment creditor to register in the Superior Court an in-state federal judgment lien presents a question of statutory construction. "The process of statutory interpretation involves a reasoned search for the intention of the legislature.. . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. In seeking to determine that meaning, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hatt v. Burlington Coat Factory, 263 Conn. 279, 290, 819 A.2d 260 (2003).

We begin with the language of the UEFJA. General Statutes § 52-605 (a) provides: "A judgment creditor shall file, with a certified copy of a foreign judgment, in the court in which enforcement of such judgment is sought, a certification that the judgment was not obtained by default in appearance or by confession of judgment, that it is unsatisfied in whole or in part, the amount remaining unpaid and that the enforcement of such judgment has not been stayed and setting forth the name and last-known address of the judgment debtor." General Statutes § 52-605 (b) provides: "Such foreign judgment shall be treated in the same manner as a judgment of a court of this state. A judgment so filed has the same effect and is subject to the same procedures, defenses and proceedings for reopening, vacating or staying as a judgment of a court of this state and may be enforced or satisfied in like manner." "Foreign judgment" is defined in General Statutes § 52-604 as "any judgment, decree or order of a court of the United States or of any other court which is entitled to full faith and credit in this state, except one obtained by default in appearance or by confession of judgment." It is not clear from reading those provisions whether the legislature intended to require the registration of an in-state federal judgment as a jurisdictional prerequisite to the filing of an action to foreclose a lien arising from the judgment. Case law, however, provides some useful guidance as to the meaning of the statutory language. Our courts have concluded, despite the language of § 52-605 (a) providing that a foreign judgment creditor "shall file" a foreign judgment in the court in which enforcement is sought, that the provisions of the UEFJA are not exclusive, and a judgment creditor still may seek recognition of a foreign judgment by way of a common-law action on the judgment. See Tri-State Tank Corp. v. Higganum Heating, Inc., 45 Conn. App. 798, 802, 699 A.2d 201 (1997); Seaboard Surety Co. v. Waterbury, 38 Conn. Sup. 468, 470, 451 A.2d 291 (1982). Those authorities are not directly on point because they are based on the specific statement in General Statutes § 52-607 that "[t]he right of a judgment creditor to proceed by an action on the judgment ... remains unimpaired." They are instructive, however, because they suggest that even in the case of a judgment clearly falling within the statutory definition of "foreign judgment,"⁵ the provisions of the UEFJA do not establish a mandatory...