Moates v. Facebook Inc.

• Decision Date: 22 January 2021
• Docket Number: Civil Action No.: 4:20-cv-896-ALM-KPJ
• Parties: MICHAEL MOATES, Plaintiff, v. FACEBOOK INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas

MICHAEL MOATES, Plaintiff, v. FACEBOOK INC., Defendant.

Civil Action No.: 4:20-cv-896-ALM-KPJ

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS SHERMAN DIVISION

January 22, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Michael Moates' ("Plaintiff") Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (the "Motion") (Dkt. 6), wherein Plaintiff seeks both a temporary restraining order ("TRO") and a preliminary injunction against Defendant Facebook Inc. ("Facebook"). On December 11, 2020, Facebook filed a response (Dkt. 10), to which Plaintiff filed a reply (Dkt. 14). On January 13, 2021, the Court held a hearing (the "Hearing"), during which the parties presented oral argument. See Dkt. 24. Having considered the pleadings, applicable authorities, and arguments, the Court finds the Motion (Dkt. 6) is hereby DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On November 19, 2020, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed an Original Complaint (Dkt. 1) against Facebook. Six days later, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (Dkt. 5) and the present Motion (Dkt. 6), requesting a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. The First Amended Complaint was subsequently superseded by a Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. 20), which contains additional allegations and two hundred seventy-eight (278) pages of exhibits. See Dkt. 20, Exs. 1-22. Plaintiff also introduced new factual representations during the Hearing. See Dkt. 24. To provide the most complete picture of the allegations at hand, the Court draws from the Second Amended Complaint and Plaintiff's statements made during the Hearing. See Dkts. 20, 24.¹

Plaintiff represents he maintains a number of pursuits: conducting multiple businesses, working with a non-profit charity foundation, fundraising, pursuing a Doctor of Education (EdD) degree, and moderating Facebook Pages and Groups. See Dkt. 24. To earn income, Plaintiff states he works in "side journalism," through which he, as an independent contractor, writes articles for various clients, such as the Washington Examiner. See id. Plaintiff alleges he maintains accounts on various platforms: Facebook, Facebook Messenger, Instagram, WhatsApp, Oculus, and CrowdTangle, some of which he uses to communicate with his client base.² See id.; Dkt. 20 at 9. Plaintiff further asserts he relies on the "Facebook Login" feature to register accounts and access third-party websites.³ See Dkt. 20 at 11.

As an additional source of income, Plaintiff represents he operates online Facebook Pages and Groups, through which he facilitates "likes, followers, and engagement." See Dkt. 20 at 9; see also Dkt. 10-14 (screenshot of a public Facebook Group named "Donald J. Trump Administration News").

Sometime in 2020, Plaintiff "invested" $10,546.00 in advertising "to build a following" of Facebook users who would like, follow, and engage with content hosted by the social media platform: "When someone spends money to build an audience[,] they invest, and that money is returned through different types of engagements. In this case, the Plaintiff used the Facebook ad system for their Engagement ad." Id.; see also Dkt. 20-10 (copy of receipt, which reflects Facebook charged Plaintiff for advertising targeted towards groups labeled "Misc. Freedom," "Conservative Engagement," and "DJT, GOP, Moderate").

On October 7, 2020, an email notified Plaintiff that an entity affiliated with him, "DC Chronicle News," did not comply with Facebook's Community Standards:

It's against our standards to mislead people or Facebook by things like:

• Misrepresenting your Page's identity or purpose.

• Using multiple Facebook accounts or sharing accounts between multiple people.

• Creating new accounts or taking other actions to avoid restrictions on posting, commenting or sharing too much.

• Making it difficult to know your content's origin or making your content seem more popular than it is.

Dkt. 20 at 10; Dkt. 20-3 (punctuation added). Thirteen days later, Plaintiff's Facebook and Instagram accounts were disabled. See Dkt. 20 at 10-11; Dkt. 20-5. Because Plaintiff's ability to log into Facebook Messenger, Oculus, CrowdTangle, and other platforms depends on an active Facebook account, Plaintiff also lost access to these websites and applications. See Dkt. 20 at 11.

Plaintiff then contacted multiple Facebook representatives, from whom he eventually learned the alleged reason for his deactivation:

We will remove any Facebook Pages, Groups and Instagram accounts representing QAnon, even if they contain no violent content. This is an update from the initial policy in August that removed Pages, Groups and Instagram accounts associated with QAnon when they discussed potential violence while imposing a series of restrictions to limit the reach of other Pages, Groups, and Instagram accounts associated with the movement. Groups and Instagram accounts that represent an identified Militarized Social Movement are already prohibited. And we will continue to disable the profiles of admins who manage Pages and Groups removed for violating this policy, as we began doing in August.

Dkt. 20-18; see Dkt. 20 at 11-13.⁴ Plaintiff admits he "had a page titled QAnon," but it "had no QAnon content on it and was inactive." Dkt. 20 at 13. Plaintiff alleges that, in mid-October, prior to his deactivation, he "in good faith" attempted to delete the QAnon page to follow Facebook's policy, contending he "ultimately had his account disabled even though he was attempting to comply with [Facebook's] policies." Id. at 14.

In addition to these allegations, Plaintiff takes issue with Facebook's acquisition of technology companies such as Instagram, WhatsApp, Oculus, CrowdTangle, and Giphy. See Dkt. 20 at 21. He alleges:

To date, Facebook hold[s] monopoly power in the market for social media. . . . [Facebook is] using anti-competitive practices to obtain total control of the market. . . . The Plaintiff has been harmed by these actions. As you can see above[,] due to Facebook dominating the market[,] the Plaintiff is unable to use certain products because Facebook has blacklisted him across multiple platforms. Facebook has also changed the status quo to make services blocked by people they blacklist.

Dkt. 20 at 22.

Plaintiff also contends he needs access to "business data" that Facebook provides. See Dkt. 24. Such business data allegedly encompasses the contact information of users, the number of active users, and engagement metrics. See id. Plaintiff avers he needs this information to conduct his businesses and to complete his doctoral coursework, as he allegedly uses such data to secure work and write term papers. See id.

B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 19, 2020, Plaintiff filed an Original Complaint (Dkt. 1) against Facebook, wherein Plaintiff alleges Facebook defrauded Plaintiff twice, is strictly liable in tort, violated the American Disabilities Act, violated the Sherman and Clayton Acts, committed data theft, and breached its contract(s) with Plaintiff. See id. Thirteen days later, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (Dkt. 5) and the present Motion (Dkt. 6), which seeks emergency injunctive relief based solely on his Sherman Act claim: "This motion is made on the grounds that . . . [Plaintiff] is likely to succeed on the merits of [his] claims that Facebook's conduct violates [the] Sherman Act." Dkt. 6 at 1; see Dkt. 24 (confirming, on the record, Plaintiff's Motion for a TRO and preliminary injunction is based solely on his Sherman Act claim).

Based on Plaintiff's Motion and statements made at the Hearing, Plaintiff urges the Court to enter the following forms of injunctive relief:

(1) Facebook shall reinstate Plaintiff's access to "all accounts[,] including Facebook App, Instagram, Messenger, CrowdTangle, Oculus and all associated features;"

(2) Facebook shall be enjoined from disabling any access to Plaintiff's accounts until such time as a judge can make an order on the injunction;"

(3) Facebook and its employees shall be "restrain[ed]" from "taking any adverse action against Plaintiff;"

(4) Facebook shall provide Plaintiff "the data;" and(5) "[A]nother order basically stating that due to the fact that [Plaintiff] is a shareholder, information that needs to be provided to [Plaintiff] that would not otherwise be available to [him]."

Dkt. 6 at 1 (first three prayers for injunctive relief, as stated in the Motion); Dkt. 24 (last two prayers for injunctive relief, as stated during the Hearing).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, Plaintiff consented to proceed before the undersigned United States Magistrate judge for all proceedings in this matter including, but not limited to, the Motion. See Dkt. 4. Facebook consented to have the undersigned rule on the Motion with final authority. See Dkt. 23.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy that requires the applicant to unequivocally show the need for its issuance. See Valley v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 118 F.3d 1047, 1050 (5th Cir. 1997). Courts in the Fifth Circuit have made clear that preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders constitute "extraordinary and drastic remed[ies]," which are "not to be granted routinely, but only when the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion." White v. Carlucci, 862 F.2d 1209, 1211 (5th Cir. 1989); see also Albright v. City of New Orleans, 46 F. Supp. 2d 523, 532 (E.D. La. 1999) ("Temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions are extraordinary relief and rarely issued.").

To obtain such relief, a party seeking a temporary restraining order ("TRO") and/or preliminary injunction must demonstrate: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a likelihood the movant will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in the movant's favor, and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. See Texas Midstream Gas Servs., LLC v. City of Grand Prairie, 608 F.3d 200, 206 (...