Moates v. Hamilton Cnty.

• Citation: 976 F.Supp.2d 984
• Decision Date: 04 September 2013
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:11–CV–00293.
• Parties: Gayla A. MOATES, Plaintiff, v. HAMILTON COUNTY, Tennessee Hamilton County Register of Deeds Office, and Pam Hurst, Register of Deeds, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee

976 F.Supp.2d 984

Gayla A. MOATES, Plaintiff,

v.HAMILTON COUNTY, Tennessee Hamilton County Register of Deeds Office, and Pam Hurst, Register of Deeds, Defendants.

Case No. 1:11–CV–00293.

United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee.

Sept. 4, 2013.

Donna J. Mikel, Harry F. Burnette, William H. Payne, IV, Burnette, Dobson & Pinchak, Chattanooga, TN, for Plaintiff.

Charles M. Nicely, Philip B. Byrum Evans Harrison Hackett PLLC, Chattanooga, TN, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

HARRY S. MATTICE, JR., District Judge.

Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed jointly by Defendants Hamilton County, Tennessee, the Hamilton County Register of Deeds Office (hereinafter “Deeds office”), and Pam Hurst. (Doc. 25). The Court has considered Defendants' Motion (Doc. 25), Plaintiff's Response (Doc. 30), and Defendants' Reply (Doc. 32), as well as the accompanying evidence. For the reasons stated herein, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment will be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. BACKGROUND

For the purpose of summary judgment, the Court will view the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

In August 1997, Plaintiff began working as a Deputy Clerk in the Deeds office. (Doc. 25–1 at 4). During her employment, Plaintiff worked 10–hour shifts 4 days a week. ( Id. at 8). Her immediate supervisor was the Chief Deputy Clerk, Carrie Millard, who reported to Pam Hurst, the Register of Deeds. ( Id. at 5–6). As a Deputy Clerk, Plaintiff's main duties were typing, reading and delivering documents, loading microfilm, and maneuvering the microfilm machine to do a back-scanning project. (Doc. 30–3 at 39–40). Plaintiff described her duties in working at this position as follows:

The documents came in through the front line and then when they were sent to us or when we picked them up, you went over the document and you made sure the title on it was correct that was in the computer. And if the typed name or the name of the financial organization didn't match somewhere on that first page or had an also known as with the name, you would be sure it was entered as well in the screen.

And if the person signed their name differently from the way it was printed in the document, you made sure that was there as well. But you just double checked to be sure and make sure the pages were counted and in order and that the last page was really the last page and they hadn't been transposed.

( Id. at 5:1–16).

Throughout the last five years of her employment, Plaintiff was treated for rheumatoid arthritis. (Doc. 30–2 at 7–8). Rheumatoid arthritis was described by Plaintiff's rheumatologist, Dr. Richard Brackett, as a systemic disease that causes “your joints [to get] eaten up by your immune system.” ( Id. at 9). Typical symptoms of rheumatoid arthritis include pain, swelling, and stiffness of the joints. ( Id. at 9–10). Dr. Brackett testified that Plaintiff specifically had difficulty walking, lifting things, sleeping, and suffered from weakness due to pain in her joints. ( Id. at 12). Plaintiff testified that she has pain in her feet, elbows, legs, and shoulders and that her knees “feel kind of watery like Jello sometimes,” which affects her ability to stand. (Doc. 30–1 at 7–8).

During Plaintiff's employment, Hurst suggested that Plaintiff may be able to get disability benefits. ( Id. at 24). On one occasion, Hurst also required Plaintiff to move her car to her assigned parking spot rather than parking in the public handicapped spot. ( Id. at 26–27). Plaintiff interpreted this comment as discriminating against her alleged “disability.” ( Id.).

In 2009, all employees at the Deeds office were assigned to work on an extra project involving scanning older records. (Doc. 30–3 at 28, 30). Hurst permitted Plaintiff to scan fewer records than other employees, although she informed Plaintiff that it was very important that she complete the back-scan project because incomplete performance may reflect negatively on her employment. ( Id. at 27). On April 15, 2009, Hurst performed an evaluation of Plaintiff, wherein she indicated that Plaintiff was not performing satisfactorily because of: excessive sick leave; lateness to work; unbelievable excuses for absences; unscheduled short-term absences; “goofing off;” excessive personal telephone calls; refusal to follow procedures; and disregarding work orders. (Doc. 30–5 at 3). In January 2010, Hurst informed Plaintiff that she would need to complete scanning of two books a day to be fit for work and that if she was not able to do this, she would be reduced to part-time employment. (Doc. 30–4 at 2).

Plaintiff met with Dr. Brackett in June 2010, and he referred her for an MRI. (Doc. 25–3 at 4–5). The MRI showed that she had a torn right rotator cuff and needed to have corrective surgery. ( Id.). Dr. Brackett testified that it is possible that Plaintiff's rheumatoid arthritis caused her rotator cuff tear. ( Id. at 5). When asked if a patient with rheumatoid arthritis is more prone to injure her shoulder, he stated that “[that patient's] tissues themselves tend to be weaker and [if] subjected to minor injuries can cause major problems.” (Doc. 30–2 at 15–16). Plaintiff's orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Mark Sumida, performed her rotator cuff surgery on August 20, 2010. (Doc. 30–11 at 2). After consulting with Dr. Sumida in October 2010, Plaintiff planned to return to work after her Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) time expired in November.¹ ( Id.). Plaintiff's FMLA leave officially expired on November 3, 2010, but the Deeds office permitted her to continue unpaid leave through November 11, 2010. (Doc. 30–13 at 2).

While Plaintiff was out on leave, Dr. Sumida was given a job description detailing Plaintiff's position so that he could accurately determine when she would be able to return to work. (Doc. 30–3 at 22). On November 11, 2010, Dr. Sumida cleared Plaintiff to return to work on November 15, 2010. (Doc. 30–9 at 9–11). Plaintiff was placed on certain medical restrictions, including only typing for an hour at a time, with a ten to fifteen minute break between typing sessions, no overhead filing, and no lifting over five pounds at a time. ² ( Id. at 8). Plaintiff was also required to attend physical therapy, which could be scheduled on her day off. (Doc. 30–15 at 2).

Hurst reviewed the restrictions and, after talking with Plaintiff's physical therapist and legal counsel, determined that the Deeds office could not permit Plaintiff to take a fifteen minute break every hour.³ (Doc. 25–2 at 21–22). On November 16, 2010, Hurst terminated Plaintiff, stating that her breaks would cause too much “disruption” in the office. (Doc. 30–18 at 2). When Hurst was later asked whether the Deeds Office could reasonably accommodate Plaintiff, she discussed the possibility that Plaintiff could have worked in the front part of the office, which would have involved Plaintiff working with customers and running the copying machine. (Doc. 30–3 at 71). Hurst testified that she did not consider the possibility of offering Plaintiff part-time work during her recovery or permitting her to do other tasks during the ten to fifteen minute breaks. ( Id. at 72). At Plaintiff's unemployment hearing on February 8, 2011, Hurst explained that, in determining whether to terminate Plaintiff, Defendants considered the amount of leave she had left as well as her productivity. (Doc. 30–19 at 3). Plaintiff's medical restrictions were lifted on April 25, 2011. (Doc. 25–1 at 33). Following Plaintiff's termination, other employees were able to assume her work, and no new employees were hired to fill her position. (Doc. 30–3 at 67).

Plaintiff initiated this action on October 14, 2011. (Doc. 1). In her First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff claims that Defendants subjected her to various unlawful employment practices.⁴ (Doc. 15 at 1–7). Specifically, Plaintiff claims that Defendants should be liable for both interference and retaliation under the FMLA, age discrimination under the Tennessee Disability Act (“TDA”) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ( Id. at 4–6). Defendants now seek summary judgment. ( See Docs. 24, 25).

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 instructs the Court to grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A party asserting the presence or absence of genuine issues of material facts must support its position either by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record,” including depositions, documents, affidavits or declarations, stipulations, or other materials, or by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). As previously noted, when ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the facts contained in the record and all inferences that can be drawn from those facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (1986); Nat'l Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Eliadis Inc., 253 F.3d 900, 907 (6th Cir.2001). The Court cannot weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, or determine the truth of any matter in dispute. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The moving party may discharge this burden either by producing evidence that demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact or simply “by ‘showing’...