Moats v. Preston County Com'n, No. 25829
| Decision Date | 15 July 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 25830., No. 25829 |
| Parties | Charles A. MOATS, Administrator of the Estate of Joanie Elliott, Plaintiff, v. PRESTON COUNTY COMMISSION, a Political Subdivision; and Valley Comprehensive Community Health Center, Inc., a West Virginia Corporation, Defendants. |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Jacques R. Williams, Esq., Hamstead, Hamstead & Williams, Morgantown, West Virginia, Attorney for the Plaintiff.
Bruce A. Kayuha, Esq., Kelly J. Kimble, Esq., Rose, Padden & Petty, Morgantown, West Virginia, Attorneys for Preston County Commission.
Stephen R. Brooks, Esq., Carol Ann Marunich, Esq., Furbee, Amos, Webb & Critchfield, Fairmont, West Virginia, Attorneys for Valley Comprehensive Community Health Center, Inc.
John Preston Bailey, Esq., Christopher Paul Riley, Esq., Northwood Health Systems, Inc., for Amicus Brief. MAYNARD, Justice:
The Circuit Court of Preston County presents us with four certified questions1 from a wrongful death action arising out of an incident where an involuntary commitment detainee committed suicide in a bathroom adjacent to the Preston County Jail. The questions presented concern the liability of the Preston County Commission2 and Valley Comprehensive Community Health Center, Inc. (hereinafter "Valley").
The certified questions and the circuit court's answers are as follows:
These questions were presented to this Court following the circuit court's denial of the defendants' motions for summary judgment. In Syllabus Point 5 of Bass v. Coltelli, 192 W.Va. 516, 453 S.E.2d 350 (1994), we held that:
West Virginia Code, 58-5-2 (1967), allows for certification of a question arising from a denial of a motion for summary judgment. However, such certification will not be accepted unless there is a sufficiently precise and undisputed factual record on which the legal issues can be determined. Moreover, such legal issues must substantially control the case.
Because there is a sufficiently precise and undisputed factual record on which the legal issues can be determined and because these legal issues substantially control the case, we find that the questions are properly certified under W.Va.Code § 58-5-2.
The facts in this case are undisputed. On January 9, 1995, a mental hygiene commissioner entered an order committing Joanie Elliott (hereinafter "Elliott") to the custody of the Preston County Sheriff's Department (hereinafter referred to as "Sheriff" or "Sheriff's Department") for transport to William Sharpe Hospital for examination. The order was entered following an involuntary commitment hearing wherein Jack Torsney (hereinafter "Torsney"), a representative of Valley, testified regarding Elliott's mental condition. The order indicated that Elliot had attempted to commit suicide the day before.
After the hearing, Torsney took Elliott to the Preston County Jail to await transport to the hospital. Torsney told Robert Chambers, the jail administrator, that he was going to the circuit clerk's office to pick up the order remanding Elliott to the Sheriff. He left Elliott sitting in a chair in the jail office. While Torsney was gone, Elliott entered a bathroom adjacent to the jail office and consumed an unspecified amount of bathroom cleaner causing injuries and resulting in her death approximately eight months later.
On July 30, 1997, Elliott's father, Charles A. Moats (hereinafter "plaintiff"), instituted a wrongful death action in the Circuit Court of Preston County against the Preston County Commission and Valley. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that the Preston County Commission breached its legal duty to exercise due care in its supervision of Elliott so as to minimize the risk that she would injure herself. The complaint also asserted that Valley failed to exercise that degree of care, skill, and learning required or expected of a reasonable, prudent health care provider in the profession or class to which the health care provider belongs acting in the same or similar circumstances.
In March 1997, both the Preston County Commission and Valley filed motions for summary judgment. On April 17, 1998, the circuit court entered an order denying both motions. Thereafter, the circuit court certified the four questions set forth above to this Court.
"The appellate standard of review of questions of law answered and certified by a circuit court is de novo." Syllabus Point 1, Gallapoo v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 197 W.Va. 172, 475 S.E.2d 172 (1996).
The first question asks us whether the Preston County Commission is immune from suit and liability for damages to the plaintiff under the West Virginia Governmental Tort Claims and Insurance Reform Act, W.Va.Code § 29-12A-1 to -18 (1986) (hereinafter sometimes referred to as "the Act"), by reason of enforcing and executing the order of the mental hygiene commissioner. The record indicates that at the time Elliott injured herself, there was a written court order issued by the mental hygiene commissioner remanding her to the custody of the Sheriff. Elliott was being held pursuant to said order by the Sheriff, who had knowledge of the order but had not yet received a written copy of the order.
The Commission contends that the Sheriff was executing the order of the mental hygiene commissioner and therefore, is entitled to immunity pursuant to W.Va.Code § 29-12A-5(a)(3). According to the Commission, it is undisputed that a written order was signed contemporaneously with the pronouncement of the order by the mental hygiene commissioner. Likewise, it is undisputed that Chambers, the jail administrator, accepted custody of Elliott with the belief that he was compelled to do so by virtue of the court order. Thus, the Commission argues that the Sheriff was executing a lawful order and therefore, is entitled to immunity pursuant to the Act.
The plaintiff responds that the Sheriff's Department was not executing or enforcing the order because it did not have a written copy of said order in its possession at the time Elliott injured herself. The plaintiff maintains that Chambers just voluntarily assumed responsibility for Elliott as a favor to Torsney. According to the plaintiff, the Sheriff cannot enforce or execute an order until he receives it, and consequently, there is no immunity under the Act. Alternatively, the plaintiff argues that even if the Sheriff's Department was acting pursuant to the order of the mental hygiene commissioner, it, nonetheless, breached a special duty owed to Elliott thereby rendering it liable for its negligent acts.
W.Va.Code § 29-12A-5(3) provides that "a political subdivision3 is immune from liability if a loss or claim results from ... [e]xecution or enforcement of the lawful orders of any court." Accordingly, in the case sub judice, if the Sheriff's Department was acting pursuant to the order entered by the mental hygiene commissioner, it would be immune from suit pursuant to the Act. Given the facts of this case, we believe that the Sheriff was acting pursuant to the mental hygiene commissioner's order.4
As noted above, the mental hygiene commissioner's order was reduced to writing and was filed with the circuit clerk at the time Elliott was placed into the custody of the Sheriff. Although the Sheriff's Department did not have a copy of said order in its possession, it had knowledge of the order and accepted custody of Elliott from Torsney based on the order. Generally, an order is effective when a court announces it. See 56 Am.Jur.2d Motions, Rules, and Orders § 35 (1971). An oral order has the same force, effect, and validity in the law as a written order. In other words, the actual physical possession of a written order is not required to effectuate said order.
For example, in Syllabus Point 3 of State ex rel. Walker v. Giardina, 170 W.Va. 483, 294 S.E.2d 900 (1982), this Court held that In Giardina, the respondents, two deputy sheriffs who were custodians of the Jefferson County Jail on the evening of February 9, 1982, refused to obey a stay order of this Court. On that date, Gary William Walker was being held on a fugitive warrant at the jail. About a month...
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