Moats v. Scott

• Decision Date: 09 May 2000
• Docket Number: No. 108,108
• Citation: 751 A.2d 462,358 Md. 593
• Parties: Ronald F. MOATS, Warden Maryland Correctional Training Center v. Thomas SCOTT.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

751 A.2d 462

358 Md. 593

Ronald F. MOATS, Warden Maryland Correctional Training Center v. Thomas SCOTT.

No. 108, Sept. Term, 1999.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

May 9, 2000.

Karl A. Pothier, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen. of Maryland, on brief), Baltimore, for petitioner.

Stephen Z. Meehan (David C. Wright, Joseph B. Tetrault, on brief), Chestertown, for respondent.

Argued before BELL, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL and HARRELL, JJ.

WILNER, Judge.

For the fourth time in less than three years, we are called upon to determine the proper method of calculating good conduct credits for an inmate sentenced to the Division of Correction. See Md. House of Correction v. Fields, 348 Md. 245, 703 A.2d 167 (1997),

Beshears v. Wickes, 349 Md. 1, 706 A.2d 608 (1998), and Dept. of Corrections v. Henderson, 351 Md. 438, 718 A.2d 1150 (1998). In Fields and Wickes, we attempted directly to divine legislative intent from the text of the two relevant statutes. In Henderson and in this case, the problem arose principally from what we said and did in Fields or Wickes.

Preface

One of the problems that lurks in this case—a discrete one which neither party has addressed—arises from the supposition that, when a court imposes a sentence of imprisonment, immediately suspends execution of all or part of that sentence in favor of probation, and later revokes the probation and orders the defendant incarcerated, the court has, at that time, "reimposed" the prison sentence. We have contributed to that false notion by occasionally using the term "reimpose" when describing the effect of the revocation. As we pointed out in Coleman v. State, 231 Md. 220, 189 A.2d 616 (1963) and in Hanson v. Hughes, 52 Md.App. 246, 447 A.2d 892,aff'd for reasons set forth by Court of Special Appeals, 294 Md. 599, 451 A.2d 664 (1982), that is not, in fact, what occurs.

When a defendant is convicted of a crime that carries a penalty of incarceration, the court may, of course, impose a prison sentence up to the maximum term allowed, and, unless the court orders otherwise, that sentence will, routinely, be immediately executed; the defendant will be delivered promptly to the custody of the appropriate correctional agency to commence serving the sentence. Maryland Code, Article 27, § 641A(a) gives a court four other options. Section 641A(a)(1) permits the court to "suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the defendant on probation upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper." (Emphasis added). Under that subsection, the court may either defer actual imposition of the sentence in favor of probation or it may impose the sentence and suspend execution of all of it in favor of probation. A third option—one that is frequently used—is the "split sentence" provided for in § 641A(a)(3). That subsection allows a court to "impose a sentence for a specified period and provide that a lesser period be served in confinement, suspend the remainder of the sentence and grant probation for a period longer than the sentence but not in excess of 5 years." Finally, under § 641A(a)(2), applicable at the moment in only five counties, the court is authorized to impose incarceration as a condition of probation. That approach, which is much in the nature of the "split sentence" provided for in § 641A(a)(3), normally involves either a short incarceration in a local detention center or some form of home detention as part of a longer period of probation. See Bailey v. State, 355 Md. 287, 734 A.2d 684 (1999)

.

In Coleman, we called attention to the distinction between the deferral of imposition of sentence, on the one hand, and the imposition of a sentence coupled with a suspension of execution of the sentence, on the other. In Coleman, the Court imposed a two year sentence and immediately suspended execution of all of it in favor of probation. Some 18 months later, the court revoked the probation, which the clerk, in his/her docket entry, treated as the imposition of a new sentence. We held that to be error:

"When the sentence in a criminal case is imposed and execution of the imposed sentence is conditionally suspended, as distinguished from the suspension of the imposition of sentence, and the defendant placed on probation, and thereafter the probation is stricken out, the defendant should not be re-sentenced. His original sentence is effective with the probationary provisions stricken out."

Coleman, 231 Md. at 222, 189 A.2d at 618.

That view was confirmed in Johnson v. State, 274 Md. 29, 33, 333 A.2d 37, 39 (1975),Kaylor v. State, 285 Md. 66, 73-74, 400 A.2d 419, 424 (1979), and Hanson, 52 Md.App. at 252,447 A.2d at 895. Through our concurrence with the views expressed by the Court of Special Appeals in Hanson, we noted again that "there is a distinction between suspending the initial imposition of a sentence and suspending execution of a sentence already (or contemporaneously) imposed," and that, when imposing a "split sentence" under § 641A(a)(3), "[t]he court must impose the full sentence; it may then suspend execution of a part of it." Id. at 252-53, 447 A.2d at 895. Unfortunately, though not departing from this consistent view, we sometimes have lapsed into speaking in terms of the suspended part of the sentence being "reimposed" upon the striking of probation. See, for example, Songer v. State, 327 Md. 42, 49, 607 A.2d 557, 560 (1992). In most instances, that misstatement was harmless. Regrettably, in Fields, as we shall see, it was not entirely harmless.

We take this opportunity once again to confirm what we said in Coleman and clarify that, when a court imposes a sentence and then, acting under either § 641A(a)(1) or (3), suspends execution of all or part of that sentence in favor of probation, and later strikes the probation and directs execution of all or part of the previously suspended part of the sentence, the court does not, at that time reimpose all or any part of the sentence. The full sentence has already been imposed and does not need any reimposition. The effect of the court's action is simply to lift the previously ordered suspension and direct execution of the now unsuspended part. In those rather rare situations in which the court, acting under § 641A(a)(1), has deferred imposition of sentence in favor of probation and later revokes the probation, it proceeds then to impose sentence for the first time.

Fields, Wickes, and Henderson

As we pointed out in both Fields and Henderson, inmates in the State correctional system are eligible to earn four kinds of credits against their sentences— credits for good conduct, for performing work tasks assigned to them, for satisfactory progress in vocational or other educational and training courses, and for special work projects. Credits for work tasks (five days a month), vocational and educational courses (five days a month), and special projects (up to ten days a month) are awarded monthly, as earned. Good conduct credits, however, are deducted in advance, subject to being rescinded if the inmate misbehaves in various ways.

Until October 1, 1992, good conduct credits were deducted for all inmates at the rate of five days a month. The aggregate deduction was made in advance from the inmate's "term of confinement," which was defined as the length of a single sentence or, if the inmate was serving multiple sentences, whether concurrent or consecutive, as the period from the first day of the sentence beginning first through the last day of the sentence ending last. See former Maryland Code, Article 27, § 700; current §§ 3-701 and 3-704 of the Correctional Services Article. In 1992, the Legislature made the first of two changes that unintendedly complicated this fairly simple arrangement. By 1992 Md. Laws, ch. 588, the General Assembly (1) amended former § 700(d)(2) to retain the good conduct credit of five days a month for inmates "whose term of confinement includes a consecutive or concurrent sentence for either a crime of violence as defined in Article 27, § 643B of the Code" or certain controlled dangerous substance offenses prohibited by § 286 of Article 27, and (2) enacted a new § 700(d)(3) to increase the rate for all other inmates to ten days a month. An uncodified § 2 of the 1992 Act made the new law applicable only to a term of confinement imposed on or after October 1, 1992.

As we noted in Henderson, that law, for the beneficent purpose of doubling the good conduct credit for certain inmates, not only created a distinction between the two classes of inmates—those serving sentences for violent crimes or crimes listed in § 286 and those serving sentences for all other crimes—but:

"[t]hat, when coupled with the prospectivity language of Section 2 of the Act, created a double problem: it brought into question whether an inmate serving a sentence imposed prior to October 1, 1992 as well as a sentence imposed after that date was entitled to the additional five days a month credit on the later sentence and, even if such an inmate ordinarily would get the additional credit, it raised the question of whether that would be the case if the earlier sentence was for a violent or listed drug offense."

Henderson, 351 Md. at 442,718 A.2d at 1152.

Fields involved three inmates who had been sentenced prior to October 1, 1992, either paroled or released on mandatory supervision, and reincarcerated after October 1, 1992, to serve a remaining part of the pre-1992 sentence as well as one or more new sentences imposed after October 1, 1992, for conduct committed while they were on release. The common issue presented in all three cases was whether those inmates were entitled to good conduct credits at the 10-day a month rate on the sentences imposed after October 1, 1992. The Division of Correction, in accordance with the general legislative directive in former § 700 of Article 27, consolidated all of the sentences into one term of confinement, which...