Mobile Light & R. Co. v. Walsh

• Decision Date: 03 April 1906
• Citation: 40 So. 560,146 Ala. 295
• Parties: MOBILE LIGHT & R. CO. v. WALSH.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

40 So. 560

146 Ala. 295

MOBILE LIGHT & R. CO. v. WALSH.

Supreme Court of Alabama

April 3, 1906

Appeal from Circuit Court, Mobile County; Wm. S. Anderson, Judge.

"To be officially reported."

Action by Catherine Walsh against the Mobile Light & Railroad Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

This was an action by appellee against appellant to recover damages for personal injury to her as a passenger, under a complaint charging that while a passenger upon one of defendant's cars she had been injured by reason of the negligence of the defendant company in bringing its car to a stop at an improper and dangerous place of exit, and negligently inviting her to alight therefrom, wherefore she fell and suffered a fracture of her leg, permanently disabling her. The pleas were the general issue to both counts; and to the first count, "that the plaintiff saw the height of the step of the car from which she alighted above the ground before she attempted to alight, and, after seeing the height of the step above the ground, she negligently attempted to alight, and that her said negligence proximately contributed to the injury complained of;" and to the second count, "that the plaintiff, before alighting, saw the height of the step above the ground, and also saw the irregular conformation of the ground complained of, and nevertheless negligently alighted from the step of the car, and that her negligence in so alighting proximately contributed to the injuries complained of;" and to both counts, "that at the point where defendant car stopped it was safe for plaintiff to alight from said car on one side thereof, with the assistance of the conductor upon said car and when said car stopped said conductor invited plaintiff to alight on said safe side, and was ready to assist her in so alighting, of which plaintiff had notice, but that plaintiff negligently failed to alight on said side, and voluntarily alighted on the more dangerous side, and that her said negligence proximately contributed to the injuries complained of."

The evidence tended to show that plaintiff was a passenger on defendant's car, and requested to be put off at a certain crossing; that the car was run past this crossing some 50 or 100 feet, and stopped; that plaintiff asked the motorman to run the car back to the crossing, as the point at which it stopped was low and rough; that the car was not backed back and in attempting to alight plaintiff received the injuries complained of. There was conflict in the testimony as to the distance between the step and the ground, as to the condition of the ground at that point, as to whether or not the conductor asked the plaintiff to get off on the other side of the car and offered to assist her to so alight, and as to whether or not there was an invitation to alight at that point.

The oral charge is set out in full in the transcript, to portions of which the defendant excepted as follows: "The law requires of a railroad carrying passengers--such a railroad as this--the highest degree of care in the operation of its cars to protect the lives and limbs of its passengers; that is, they are required to exercise the highest degree of care in providing places for passengers to alight from their cars and a failure to exercise that degree of care is negligence upon the part of the defendant." And: "Where the car stopped at or near where the passenger gives the signal for it to stop, or has directed or requested it to stop, or where it is stopped just beyond such point a short distance that may be taken as an invitation to alight." And "If the car was brought to a standstill, and nothing more was done, that would properly be held to be an invitation from the servants of the defendant in charge of the car for the passengers to alight there."

The court gave the following charges at the request of the plaintiff: "(1) If the evidence shall reasonably satisfy the jury that the defendant carried Mrs. Walsh beyond the point where it had been requested to stop the car for her to alight, and stopped the car for her to leave it at an unusual and improper place, where she left it and was hurt in doing so, and that in getting off at that place she did no more than an ordinarily careful prudent person would have done under like circumstances, then she was not guilty of contributory negligence." Charge 3: "The court charges the jury that if the defendant, by its employés, stopped its car for plaintiff to alight at a place where the step was so high from the ground that she could not alight without great danger of falling, such place was an improper one for such stop to have been made."

The defendant requested the following written charges, which were refused by the court: Charge B: "The court charges the jury that, the plaintiff in this case having alleged that the defendant negligently invited her to alight from the car upon which she was a passenger at the place of the injury, the plaintiff cannot recover without establishing to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury that the defendant did issue such an invitation; and the court charges the jury that the mere fact that a car is brought to a stop after having passed the proper stopping place, by reason of the failure of the conductor to ring the bell in time, does not, without more, constitute an invitation to passengers to alight at an improper place of exit; nor can such an invitation be implied from the mere stopping of the car until a reasonable time has elapsed in which to enable those in charge of the car to start the car back to the proper place of exit." Charge C: "The court charges the jury that the mere negligent passing of the proper place of exit by an electric car, owing to the neglect of the conductor to give the signal for stopping soon enough to enable the motorman to stop the car at the proper place, does not constitute the proximate cause of an injury received by a passenger who attempts to get off of the car as soon as it is stopped and at an improper place without first applying to the conductor to have the car returned to the proper place, and without giving the conductor an opportunity to do so." Charge 5: "The court charges the jury that if they believe from the evidence that the plaintiff, Mrs. Catherine Walsh, saw the condition of the street, and the distance from the street to the step, before she undertook to alight, and, judging of the matter for herself, came to the conclusion that she could alight in safety, and voluntarily undertook to do so without the assistance of any person, and that her effort to so alight proximately contributed to her injury, then the jury should find for the defendant." Charge 6: "The court charges the jury that if the condition of the street at the point of the injury was such as to make it negligence on the part of those in charge of the car to stop the car at such points, and if the jury further believe from the evidence that the plaintiff, before attempting to alight, saw and knew the surrounding conditions, and was in a position to judge for herself as to their safety, and nevertheless undertook to alight voluntarily without assistance, and in doing so fell and was injured, then the jury should find for the defendant." Charge 7: "The court charges the jury that if the motorman, the conductor, and all the passengers on an electric car all see the surrounding condition, and have equal opportunities to judge of the safety of the passenger alighting at that place, then such conditions known to both parties, and which were so dangerous as to make it negligence on the part of those in charge of the electric car to stop at that place for the exit of passengers, would also be so dangerous as to make it contributory negligence on the part of the passenger to voluntarily attempt to alight at such place without assistance." Charge 10: "The court charges the jury that if they believe from the evidence that plaintiff saw the surrounding conditions, and calculated the distance for herself, and concluded that she could step down in safety, and voluntarily undertook to do so, but miscalculated the distance, and that it was this fact that caused her to fall and be injured, then the jury should find for the defendant." Charge 14: "If a person of ordinary prudence, seeing what plaintiff saw, would have doubted whether it was safe for her to alight where the car stopped, the jury ought to find a verdict for the defendant." Charge EE: "The court charges the jury that there is no evidence in this case tending to show any negligence on the part of the motorman which was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury." Charge F: "The court charges the jury that if they believe from the evidence that the conductor in this case got upon the ground to assist the plaintiff to alight from the car, and that the plaintiff saw that he had done so, and nevertheless undertook to alight from the car on the other side without any assistance, and if the jury believe from the evidence that the...