Mobley v. City of Detroit
| Decision Date | 04 December 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 10–10675. |
| Citation | 938 F.Supp.2d 669 |
| Parties | Ian MOBLEY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF DETROIT, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Daniel S. Korobkin, Michael J. Steinberg, American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan, Julie H. Hurwitz, Kathryn Bruner James, William H. Goodman, Goodman and Hurwitz, P.C. Detroit, MI, for Plaintiffs.
Jerry L. Ashford, Detroit City Law Department, Detroit, MI, for Defendants.
Pending before the Court are three dispositive motions arising from events that occurred on May 31, 2018:
1. Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment against the City of Detroit (“the City”) (Doc. 81). Plaintiffs say that all of the actions taken by Defendant police officers on May 31, 2008, (arrest, search, seizure of property, excessive force, prosecution and due process violations) were pursuant to unlawful policies and customs of the City and the Detroit Police Department (“DPD”).
This motion is GRANTED IN PART. The Court GRANTS summary judgment on Plaintiffs' § 1983 unlawful arrest, search, and seizure of property claims. Trial will proceed on damages on these claims. It DENIES summary judgment with respect to Plaintiffs' malicious prosecution, excessive force and due process claims.
2. The City, Gregory McWhorter “(McWhorter”), Anthony Potts (“Potts”), Charles Turner (“Turner”), Michael Brown (“Brown”), Brandon Cole (“Cole”), Tyrone Gray (“Gray”), Sheron Johnson (“Johnson”) and Kathy Singleton's (“Singleton”) Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 84). Defendants claim Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate a City policy or custom that was behind their detention or prosecutions. They argue there is no evidence of excessive force against any Plaintiff. Finally, they argue that the officers had probable cause to arrest, prosecute and seize vehicles, and that qualified immunity shields them because their conduct did not violate clearly established law.
This motion is DENIED IN PART AND GRANTED IN PART. The Court grants Defendants' motion with respect to the excessive force, malicious prosecution and due process claims but DENIES it in all other aspects. As already stated, trial will proceed against all Defendants on the issue of damages for Plaintiffs' unlawful arrest, search, and seizure of property claims.
3. Defendant Vicki Yost (“Yost”) and Daniel Buglo's (“Buglo”) Amended Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 85). Defendants argue the facts do not demonstrate that Plaintiffs' constitutional rights were violated, either in their seizure or in the seizures of vehicles. They contend also, that even if the Court finds they made a mistake, their mistake was reasonable and they are entitled to qualified immunity.
This motion is DENIED IN PART AND GRANTED IN PART. The Court grants Defendants' motion with respect to the excessive force, malicious prosecution and due process claims but DENIES it in all other aspects. Trial will proceed on the issue of damages for Plaintiffs' unlawful arrest, search, and seizure of property claims against these Defendants.
The Court holds that:
1. Plaintiffs establish several violations of constitutional rights:
A. Defendants had no probable cause to arrest them; Defendants were unaware of whether each Plaintiff had engaged in criminal conduct.
B. Defendants had no probable cause or reasonable suspicion to search them.
C. Defendants had no probable cause to seize vehicles.
2. The right of Plaintiffs to be secure in their persons and property is clearly established.
3. Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity; any mistake they made was not reasonable under the circumstances.
4. The individual Defendants acted pursuant to a custom or policy of the City to enforce its ordinance, City Code § 38–5–1 (“disorderly conduct ordinance”), even when there is no probable cause to believe that the persons against whom it is being enforced, have knowledge of illegal activity. In other words, the City had a practice of arresting persons for loitering and searching them, even when there was no probable cause to believe they intended to engage in unlawful conduct.
5. The individual Defendants acted pursuant to a custom or policy of the City to enforce M.C.L. § 600.3801 (“Nuisance Abatement” statute) against cars, even when there was no probable cause to believe that the cars were knowingly used for an illegal purpose described in the statute. This custom or policy of the City allowed police officers to seize vehicles simply because they were driven to a location where unlawful conduct occurred.
Plaintiffs were patrons at the Contemporary Art Institute of Detroit (“CAID”) in the City on the evening of May 31, 2008. They attended a popular late-night event known as “Funk Night,” which occurred the last Friday of each month. Funk Night occurred after hours, i.e., after 2:00 am, and involved the service of alcohol. Although CAID could have obtained a special license to serve alcohol after hours, it did not have that license on May 31, 2008; It did not have a license to serve any alcohol, any time.
DPD had CAID under surveillance before May 31, 2008. Yost, then commanding officer of DPD's Vice Unit, received and investigated complaints of unlicensed, after hours liquor sales at CAID. She and Buglo conducted surveillance outside of CAID on March 29, 2008. They observed many parked cars and young people entering CAID. They heard loud music, and observed patrons concealing and drinking intoxicants. They smelled marijuana coming from a fenced, outdoor area belonging to CAID.
On April 26, 2008, Yost and Buglo entered CAID as undercover patrons, in response to “blind pig” activity complaints. A “blind pig” is a regional Prohibition–Era term for a “speakeasy,” an establishment that sells and service alcoholic beverages illegally. See American Heritage Dictionaryof the English Language 196, 1680 (5th ed. 2011); Karen Blumenthal, Bootleg: Murder, Moonshine, and the Lawless Years of Prohibition 64, 81, 128 (2011). Yost and Buglo observed patrons purchase beer; they purchased it themselves. They went to the outdoor patio and observed patrons drinking and smoking marijuana. Buglo purchased beer both before and after 2:00 am. When Yost and Buglo left at 2:20 am, a long line of patrons waited to get into CAID.
On May 24, 2008, Buglo conducted a third investigation, an outdoor surveillance. His observations were consistent with what he and Yost observed on April 26, 2008. They also confirmed that CAID was neither licensed to conduct business in the City nor to sell liquor in the State of Michigan.
Yost and Buglo documented their observations and investigations in reports Buglo used to obtain an Anticipatory Search Warrant for CAID on May 29, 2008. The Anticipatory Search Warrant gave authority to DPD officers to search the CAID and to seize: (1) firearms; (2) property such as contraband and things associated with illegal drug activity and gambling; (3) alcohol and profits associated with its sale, and (4) computer equipment associated with the operation of the CAID. It did not authorize any arrests or searches of patrons.
On May 31, 2008 the prior observations of Yost and Buglo were confirmed; they observed alcohol sold and purchased before and after 2:00 am; they smelled marijuana. Shortly after 2:00 am, Yost gave the go-ahead to assembled officers to enter the CAID and execute the warrant.
Plaintiffs Ian Mobley, Paul Kaiser, Angie Wong, James Washington, Nathaniel Price, Stephanie Hollander, Jason Leverette–Saunders and Darlene Hellenberg were among 130 patrons detained, searched and charged with loitering in a place of illegal occupation. Defendants say authority for these actions was the City's disorderly conduct ordinance.
The criminal charges against Plaintiffs were eventually dismissed.
Also, Kimberly Mobley, Angie Wong, Jerome Price, Wanda Leverette, Darlene Hellenberg and Laura Mahler were among 44 patrons whose cars were seized for forfeiture under the Nuisance Abatement statute.
Plaintiffs Kimberly Mobley, Jerome Price, Wanda Leverette and Laura Mahler were not at the CAID on May 31, 2008, but owned cars that were seized that night under the Nuisance Abatement statute, solely because they were driven by CAID patrons.
The vehicles of Kimberly Mobley, Wanda Leverette, Laura Mahler, Angie Wong and Darlene Hellenberg were returned to them; the Jerome Price vehicle was stolen from the lot to which it had been towed.
Plaintiffs say that those among them who were arrested, were arrested for their mere presence at the CAID and not because DPD officers had probable cause to arrest them. Indeed, Plaintiffs allege that Plaintiffs Paul Kaiser, Ian Mobley, Angie Wong, James Washington, Stephanie Hollander and Jason Leverette–Saunders were in the fenced patio where no alcohol was served. They allege that Paul Kaiser and Angie Wong were leaving when the raid occurred and had come there only to pick up a friend. They say Ian Mobley, Paul Kaiser and James Washington had never been to the CAID before May 31, 2008, that Nathaniel Price had just arrived and was still at the front door, and Darlene Hellenberg was in a back room where people danced. They argue that the City's disorderly conduct ordinance required that officers first ascertain whether patrons knew they were in a place of “illegal occupation,”and that the DPD had no probable cause to believe that the patrons knew owners of CAID had failed to obtain the proper licenses to serve alcohol. Plaintiffs contend this lack of probable cause to arrest them violated the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against illegal searches and seizures.
Relatedly, Plaintiffs argue that the DPD officers had no reasonable suspicion that Plaintiffs were armed and dangerous, so there was no basis to search them. Plaintiffs contend the Anticipatory Search Warrant did not authorize the search and detention of any person.
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