Moderate Party of R.I. v. Lynch

• Decision Date: 09 February 2011
• Docket Number: CA. No. 10–265 S.
• Citation: 764 F.Supp.2d 373
• Parties: MODERATE PARTY OF RHODE ISLAND, Plaintiff,v.Patrick C. LYNCH, in his official capacity as Attorney General for the State of Rhode Island, and Frank Caprio, in his official capacity as General Treasurer for the State of Rhode Island, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island

764 F.Supp.2d 373

MODERATE PARTY OF RHODE ISLAND, Plaintiff,

v.Patrick C. LYNCH, in his official capacity as Attorney General for the State of Rhode Island, and Frank Caprio, in his official capacity as General Treasurer for the State of Rhode Island, Defendants.

CA. No. 10–265 S.

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island.

Feb. 9, 2011.

Mark W. Freel, Esq., Edwards Angell Palmer & Dodge LLP, Providence, RI, Attorneys for Plaintiffs.Rebecca Tedford Partington, Esq., Michael W. Field, Esq., Office of the Attorney General, Providence, RI, Attorneys for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

WILLIAM E. SMITH, District Judge.

In this case the fledgling Moderate Party of Rhode Island (“Moderate Party” or “MPRI”) continues its efforts to nibble at the two-party structure of Rhode Island's election laws. But the Moderate Party's partial success in knocking down one of the two barriers to party recognition in Block v. Mollis, 618 F.Supp.2d 142 (D.R.I.2009), does not repeat here for the reasons explained below.

Moderate Party filed a motion to preliminarily enjoin the distribution of funds from the “nonpartisan account” under Rhode Island General Laws § 44–30–2(d)(2) scheduled for September 1, 2010. The parties subsequently filed cross motions for summary judgment. Because of fast-approaching elections, the Court held a hearing and then, on August 13, 2010, issued an order denying Plaintiff's motions for preliminary injunction and summary judgment, and granting Defendant's motion for summary judgment. That order indicated that an opinion setting forth the legal analysis supporting these rulings would be forthcoming. This is the promised opinion.

I. Background

MPRI is a political party that participated in the November 2010 elections. It was officially recognized by the State of Rhode Island in August 2009, becoming one of three parties (along with the Democrats and Republicans) entitled to this status for the 2010 election cycle.

R.I. Gen. Laws § 44–30–2(d) provides for a credit against state personal income tax for contributions to an account for the public financing of the electoral system. Under § 44–30–2(d)(1), a taxpayer may contribute five dollars (ten dollars if married and filing jointly) to this account. The first two dollars (four dollars if married and filing jointly) go to a party designated by the taxpayer or, if the taxpayer wishes, to a “nonpartisan account.” The moneys contributed to the nonpartisan account are distributed, under § 44–30–2(d)(2), “to each political party in proportion to the combined number of votes its candidates for Governor received in the previous election, after five percent (5%) of the amount in the account is allocated to each party for each general officer elected in the previous statewide election.” This means the parties occupying the offices of Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, General Treasurer, and Secretary of State receive five percent of the nonpartisan funds for each of the foregoing five offices which they occupy. This makes up 25 percent (five times five percent) of the nonpartisan fund. The remaining 75 percent goes to each political party in proportion to the number of votes its candidates for Governor received in the previous election.¹ The total amount of contributions to the parties and the nonpartisan account cannot exceed $200,000. R.I. Gen. Laws § 44–30–2(d)(1). The remainder goes to the State's general revenue fund. Id.²

MPRI contends that the statutory distribution scheme for the nonpartisan account violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, because it relies on one- to four-year-old election results and does not make any provision for parties recognized between the previous election and the time of the distribution. This, says MPRI, amounts to an unconstitutionally discriminatory state subsidy to the established Democratic and Republican parties to the detriment of fledgling parties like MPRI. Such state-sponsored assistance allegedly undermines the ability of newly recognized parties to compete against established parties on an equal footing. Accordingly, the Moderate Party requested that the Court declare the statutory scheme for the distribution of funds in the nonpartisan account unconstitutional and enjoin the distribution that was scheduled to occur by September 1, 2010.

II. Threshold Defenses

The State argues that threshold defenses of res judicata, nonjoinder, and unclean hands justify dismissing MPRI's claims before reaching their merits. These arguments are unavailing. Res judicata does not apply because MPRI's challenge to the constitutionality of R.I. Gen. Laws § 17–1–2(9) in Block v. Mollis, while implicating election laws generally, plainly involved different issues than those raised in this case. See Porn v. Nat'l Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 93 F.3d 31, 34 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that for res judicata to apply, there must be “(1) a final judgment on the merits in an earlier action, (2) sufficient identity between the causes of action asserted in the earlier and later suits, and (3) sufficient identity between the parties in the two suits”).³

As for nonjoinder, the Moderate Party, at this Court's suggestion, contacted the Democratic and Republican Parties to inquire whether they would be interested in participating in this suit. Neither responded affirmatively. Finally, the State has not made the necessary showing of unreasonable delay and prejudice for the defense of laches, or of bad faith for the defense of unclean hands. See Dobson v. Dunlap, 576 F.Supp.2d 181, 187 (D.Me.2008) (“[L]aches is an affirmative defense and a defendant claiming laches has the burden of proving both unreasonableness of the delay and the occurrence of prejudice.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); Texaco Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Dep't of Consumer Affairs, 60 F.3d 867, 880 (1st Cir.1995) (discussing bad faith and unclean hands).

III. The MeritsA. Standard of Review

In assessing the constitutionality of election laws, the Supreme Court has abandoned the categorical use of strict scrutiny in favor of “a more flexible measuring stick.” Block, 618 F.Supp.2d at 149 (citing Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983)); see also Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433–34, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992) (rejecting the invitation to “subject every voting regulation to strict scrutiny” and applying instead “a more flexible standard”). As this Court explained in Block, 618 F.Supp.2d at 149:

This test prompts the Court back and forth on a sliding scale, where the applicable level of scrutiny corresponds to the constitutional burden: the lighter the burden, the more forgiving the scrutiny; the heavier the burden, the more exacting the review. When a law imposes only reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions on individual rights, the burden is slight, and the State's regulatory interests are, in the normal course, sufficient to justify the constitutional restraint. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059. However, if the restrictions are severe, the burden is great, and the law must be narrowly drawn to advance a “state interest of compelling importance.” Norman [ v. Reed] , 502 U.S. [279,] 289, 112 S.Ct. 698 [116 L.Ed.2d 711 (1992) ].

The balance, then, pits the state's interest in the regulation of elections against the burden imposed on the plaintiff's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. In striking this balance, the Court must first consider the character and magnitude of the burden imposed on a plaintiff's rights, then evaluate the precise state interests advanced as justifications for imposing the burden. Id. “In passing judgment, the Court must not only determine the legitimacy and strength of each of those interests; it also must consider the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights.” Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789, 103 S.Ct. 1564.⁴

B. Constitutional Challenges to State Election Laws

In assessing the Moderate Party's challenge to the distribution of the nonpartisan fund, this Court is guided by Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976), the Supreme Court's seminal pronouncement on the constitutionality of distributions made pursuant to a scheme for public financing of elections. One of the issues in Buckley was a challenge to the constitutionality of Subtitle H of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), 26 U.S.C. § 9001 et seq., which provided for public funding of presidential nominating conventions and general election and primary campaigns. Subtitle H allocated the funding according to three categories: (1) “Major” parties—i.e., those whose presidential candidate received 25 percent or more of the vote in the most recent election—were to receive full funding; (2) “minor” parties—those whose candidate received between five and 25 percent of the vote in the most recent election—were to receive partial funding; and (3) “new” parties, meaning all other parties, were to receive no pre-election funding. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 87–88, 96 S.Ct. 612. There were other eligibility criteria, strings attached, and expenditure limits. See id. at 88–90, 96 S.Ct. 612.

In upholding the constitutionality of Subtitle H, the Court began with the general proposition that public financing of elections “furthers a significant governmental interest.” Id. at 96, 96 S.Ct. 612. It further held that—in view of important governmental interests against “funding hopeless candidacies with large sums of public money” and “providing artificial incentives to splintered parties and unrestrained factionalism”—it is permissible to condition the receipt of public funding on a “preliminary showing of a significant modicum of support.” Id. at 96, 96 S.Ct. 612 (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974), and Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442, 91 S.Ct. 1970, 29 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971)).

For the same reasons, “...