Modern Finance Co. v. Martin

• Decision Date: 26 May 1942
• Parties: MODERN FINANCE CO. v. MARTIN et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

311 Mass. 509

42 N.E.2d 533

MODERN FINANCE CO.

v.MARTIN et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

May 26, 1942.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Allen G. Buttrick, Judge.

Action of contract by the Modern Finance Company against Richard Martin, alias, and another to recover on a recognizance. The trial judge denied certain requests of the defendants for rulings and directed the jury, subject to defendants' exceptions, to return a verdict for plaintiff in the penal sum of the recognizance.

Exceptions overruled.

Before FIELD, C. J., and DONAHUE, DOLAN, COX, and RONAN, JJ.

Samuel Bornstein, of Boston, for plaintiff.

Max L. Glazer, of Boston, for defendant.

COX, Justice.

The defendant Martin, hereinafter referred to as the debtor, was arrested on April 12, 1939, on an execution in favor of the plaintiff, and, on that day, he recognized with the defendant Mede as his surety for his appearance in court. On May 12, 1939, the debtor filed an application to be heard, which was denied on May 18, 1939. The foregoing appears as of record. This is an action of contract to recover on the recognizance, the writ being dated May 16, 1939. The trial judge denied certain requests of the defendants for rulings and directed the jury, subject to the defendants' exception, to return a verdict for the plaintiff in the penal sum of the recognizance.

General Laws (Ter.Ed.) c. 224, § 6, provides, among other things, that a debtor, arrested on execution, shall be allowed a reasonable time to procure sureties for his recognizance, conditioned that he will have a time and place appointed for his examination before some court having jurisdiction, which time shall be within thirty days after the time of his arrest, giving notice of the time and place thereof as provided in said chapter. The only points argued by the defendants in support of their exception to the direction of the verdict are that the recognizance was not signed by them, and that this action was prematurely brought. This last contention will be dealt with hereinafter.

A recognizance is an obligation of record, entered into before a court or magistrate duly authorized for that purpose, with a condition to do some act required by law, which is therein specified. It constitutes a contract. Warner v. Howard, 121 Mass. 82, 84;National Surety Co. v. Nazzaro, 233 Mass. 74, 76, 123 N.E. 346. The act of recognizing is performed by assenting to the words of the magistrate. Martin v. Campbell, 120 Mass. 126, 128, 129. The proceeding is a familiar one in the courts, and there is no ground for the contention, even by implication, that a recognizance must be signed.

The defendants having entered into the recoganizance (see Warburton v. Gourse, 193 Mass. 203, 205, 206, 79 N.E. 270, and cases cited; Bryer v. American Surety Co. of New York, 285 Mass. 336, 189 N.E. 109, and cases cited) on April 12, 1939, it could have been found that the debtor went with his attorney to the appropriate court on May 12, 1939, and, after some conversation with the clerk, an application, signed by his attorney, to be heard on arrest on execution was filed, by which the court was requested to appoint a time and place for the debtor's examination, as required by section 6 of said c. 224. On May 12, 1939, the debtor's attorney certified that he gave written notice of the ‘within Motion’ to be heard on May 18, 1939, in the motion session of the court, ‘together with a copy of said Motion to Samuel Bornstein, Esquire * * * by mailing said copy and notice postage prepaid.’ There was evidence that notice was given in conformity with this certificate. On May 16, 1939, the debtor and his attorney were present in the motion session, together with the attorney for the plaintiff, and, after a hearing ‘on the application,’ it was denied. There was evidence that on May 12, 1939, the debtor's attorney asked the clerk if there was ‘any form’ and that the clerk instructed him to file an application and to notify the attorney for the plaintiff. The bill of exceptions, which recites that it contains all the material evidence, discloses no other evidence as to what took place on May 12, 1939. It does not appear that the application was ever called to the attention of a judge (compare Henderson v. Parsons, 211 Mass. 69, 97 N.E. 613), or that the debtor took any other steps to comply with the condition of the recognizance that required him to have a time and place appointed for his examination, which time ‘shall be within thirty days after the time of his arrest.’ G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 224, § 6. It is to be observed that said section 6 also requires that notice of the time and place for the examination must be given as provided in said c. 224. Provision for notice in said chapter is found in section 9, which, in terms, relates to a defendant arrested on mesne process, who has requested the court to appoint a time and place for examination, and where it is provided that notice shall be served by an officer qualified to serve civil process, by delivering to the plaintiff, or to his agent or attorney, an attested copy thereof, or by leaving such copy at the last and usual place of abode of such plaintiff, or, if such plaintiff is a corporation, then service shall be made upon an officer thereof. It is further provided that service shall be made not less than one hour, or, if service is made at the last and usual place of abode, not less than one day before the time appointed for the examination. See section 14 as to service of the summons on a debtor in supplementary process. Under the condition of the recognizance that the debtor will have a time and place appointed for his examination before some court having jurisdiction, the debtor was required to have the time and place appointed by the court. It was not for the debtor to fix the time. See Barnes...