Modern Holdings, LLC v. Incoporated
| Decision Date | 31 March 2015 |
| Docket Number | Civil No.: 13-405-GFVT |
| Parties | MODERN HOLDINGS, LLC, GAY BOWEN, GREENLEAF PLANT FOOD WHOLESALE, INC., and BOBBIE LEMONS Plaintiffs, v. CORNING INCOPORATED, KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS, N.V., and PHILIPS ELECTRONICS NORTH AMERICA CORPORATION, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky |
This environmental mass tort lawsuit alleges that Defendants Corning Incorporated and Philips Electronics,1 as owners and operators of a glass manufacturing facility in Danville, Kentucky, intentionally or negligently emitted and disposed of hazardous chemicals during the sixty years of the Facility's operation, polluting the groundwater, air, and soil within a five-mile radius. As a result of this contamination, area residents allege that they suffered personal injuries, including illnesses such as Multiple Sclerosis, and area landowners allege property damage.2 Corning and Philips filed motions to dismiss the Plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). [R. 44, 45]. The motions will be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as explained below.
Defendants Corning Incorporated and, later, Philips Electronics North America owned and operated the Danville, Kentucky glass manufacturing facility at issue in this case. Corning constructed the Facility in 1952 and operated its glass manufacturing business there until 1983, when it sold the site to Philips. [Second Am. Class Action Compl., R. 108 at ¶¶ 31-32, 36].3 From 1983 to 2011, Philips manufactured various glass products for the lighting industry on the site. [Id. at ¶¶ 32-33, 37-38]. It sold the Facility back to Corning in 2013. [Id. at ¶ 33].
Plaintiffs, initially defined as individuals and corporations who resided or owned property within a five-mile radius of the Facility between 1952 and 2013, identify a number of hazardous substances used in the course of the Facility's operations, including asbestos, mercury, arsenic, lead, and PCB compounds (). [Id. at ¶¶ 12, 41].4 The complaint alleges that Corning and Philips illegally dumped these hazardous substances in nearby fields, area streams, and sites now owned by Modern Holdings and other area landowner-plaintiffs. [Id. at ¶¶ 46-54]. It also alleges that Defendants improperly maintained their "settling ponds" (filtration systems used to collect chemical run-off) and allowed lead dust and other hazardous substances to accumulate on the roof of the property and wash into the Clarks Run watershed, a source of drinking water for the region. [Id. at ¶¶ 55-56]. According to the complaint, chemicals in wastewater discharge units known as "outfalls" exceeded applicable statutory limits, [id. at ¶¶57-58], and tests recently conducted on the Facility's grounds indicated the presence of heavy metals in the soil, air, and inside the building itself. [Id. at ¶¶ 126-41]. Preliminary tests in the area also indicated elevated concentrations of lead, TCE, DCE, and arsenic in groundwater and surface water samples, [id. at ¶¶ 142-45], as well as lead and arsenic concentrations significantly above industrially accepted soil levels. [Id. at ¶¶ 84-85].
Plaintiffs' complaint sets forth counts for nuisance; trespass; negligence, gross negligence, and recklessness; strict liability for an ultra-hazardous activity; battery; fraudulent concealment; negligent misrepresentation; negligent infliction of emotional distress; and "medical monitoring." [R. 108]. These can be grouped into three categories. First, Plaintiffs allege that toxic exposure has caused them physical and emotional injury, including cancer, autoimmune deficiencies, respiratory problems, dermatitis, and central nervous system problems. [Id. at ¶ 69]. Certain Plaintiffs' decedents have also suffered wrongful death. [Id. at ¶ 71]. Plaintiffs' trespass, nuisance, battery, and strict liability claims allege that their property has been damaged, resulting in diminution in property values, loss of the use and enjoyment or their property, loss of the use of their groundwater, and damaging "stigma associated with being located in the vicinity of the site." [Id. at ¶ 70].
Finally, in their fraudulent concealment and negligent misrepresentation claims, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants knowingly and intentionally permitted the dumpings described above and "failed in their statutory duties to inform state and/or federal regulatory agencies" of this activity. [Id. at ¶ 58; see also id. at ¶¶ 67-69, 79-80, 207-08]. This conduct allegedly prevented regulatory authorities from discovering the extent of the emissions. [Id. at ¶ 76]. Had the Defendants fully disclosed the presence of these substances and the health risks and property damage associatedwith contamination, Plaintiffs claim, they would not have continued to live or own property in the area. [Id. at ¶¶ 48, 211].
Corning and Philips have filed Motions to Dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). [R. 44, 45]. At the parties' request, the Court heard oral argument on this and other related motions on February 9, 2015. [R. 83]. Although Philips' initial briefs were confined to the claims of strict liability, battery, negligent misrepresentation, and fraudulent concealment, as well as two threshold standing issues, the Court granted its oral motion during the hearing to adopt and join all of Corning's arguments.5 [R. 83].
On March 13, 2015 - nine months after the motions to dismiss stood fully briefed and over one month after oral arguments - Plaintiffs filed a "Revised Response" to Corning's Motion to Dismiss. [R. 102]. While this eleventh-hour revision is less than timely under the circumstances, see 5 Charles A. Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1194 (3d ed.) (), Corning promptly submitted a reply to the revised response, [R. 103]. The Court has considered all the briefs, including these revised responsive documents.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to seek dismissal of acomplaint which fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). However, as is now well known, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). While a plaintiff need not provide "detailed factual allegations," she must advance more than "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A court reviewing a 12(b)(6) motion must "accept all the Plaintiffs' factual allegations as true and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs," Hill v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 409 F.3d 710, 716 (6th Cir. 2005), but it is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Ultimately, a plaintiff must "plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Two threshold standing issues must be addressed at the outset. First, Philips argues that Plaintiff Gay Bowen lacks standing to bring claims against them. Plaintiffs concede that Ms. Bowen moved away from Danville prior to Philips' purchase of the site on August 31, 1983, so her injuries cannot be attributed to Philips. [R. 45-1 at 5; R. 53 at 14]. As against Philips and KPNV, then, Ms. Bowen's claims must be dismissed. Ms. Bowen is not dismissed as against Corning, however.
Philips also argues that Corporate Plaintiff Greenleaf Plant Food Wholesale lacksstanding to maintain suit because it was administratively dissolved by the Secretary of State before the complaint was filed. A corporate entity may be administratively dissolved if it fails to comply with certain requirements, including the filing of an annual report. Ky. Rev. Stat. (KRS) § 14A.7-010(a). Once administratively dissolved, the entity still exists, but only for the purpose of winding up and liquidation. KRS § 14A.7-023(3). It cannot bring a lawsuit against others while under this status. E.g., Diktic, Inc. v. Somerset Refinery, Inc., 2003 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1025, *6-7, 2003 WL 21673962 (Ky. Ct. App. July 18, 2003). However, Greenleaf has since notified the Court that it has been reinstated, [R. 74], and this reinstatement relates back to the effective date of the administrative dissolution. KRS § 14A.7-030(3)(a)-(b). Philips' motion to dismiss Greenleaf on this ground is therefore denied as moot.
In their nuisance claim, Plaintiffs allege that the hazardous substances from the Facility were discharged "into the air and groundwater, and thereby into Plaintiffs' [properties]," causing damage and interference with their use and enjoyment of the property. [Second Am. Class Action Compl., R. 108 at ¶¶ 146-59]. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to plausibly plead interference with their properties and to specify the nature and quantity of the substances that caused their harm.
A nuisance "arises from the unreasonable, unwarrantable, or unlawful use by a person of his own property and produces such material annoyance, inconvenience, discomfort, or hurt that the law will presume a consequent damage." Smith v. Carbide & Chems. Corp., 507 F.3d 372, 379 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting City of Somerset v. Sears, 313 Ky....
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