Modine Mfg. Co. v. Pollution Control Bd.

• Decision Date: 20 July 1976
• Docket Number: No. 74--381,74--381
• Citation: 40 Ill.App.3d 498,351 N.E.2d 875
• Parties: MODINE MANUFACTURING CO., Petitioner-Appellant, v. POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD of the State of Illinois, and Environmental Protection Agency of the State of Illinois, Respondents-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 875

351 N.E.2d 875

40 Ill.App.3d 498

MODINE MANUFACTURING CO., Petitioner-Appellant, v. POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD of the State of Illinois, and Environmental Protection Agency of the State of Illinois, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 74--381.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, Second Division.

July 20, 1976.

Rehearing and Certificate of Importance Denied Aug. 24, 1976.

Martin, Craig, Chester & Sonnenschein, Richard J. Kissel, Sydney G. Craig, Thomas H. Donohoe and Rodney W. Osborne, Chicago, Ill., for petitioner-appellant.

William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Marvin I. Medintz, Chicago, Ill., for respondents-appellees.

THOMAS J. MORAN, Presiding Justice:

Petitioner, Modine Manufacturing Company, appeals from an order of the respondent, Pollution Control Board, in which respondent granted petitioner a variance from specific water and effluent standards but rejected petitioner's request to have a stream reclassified as secondary-contact water.

Petitioner operates a plant in Ringwood, Illinois, where it manufactures air conditioning condensors and evaporators. The plant uses a substantial amount of water which is drawn from its wells and discharged into a three-stage lagoon treatment system. From the lagoons, the waste flows into a stream leading to Dutch Creek.

In 1972, petitioner investigated alternative methods of treating the plant's discharge in order to comply with respondent's effluent standards. It rejected several conventional osmosis systems as economically unfeasible, and decided upon a novel system which would allow approximately 90% Of the waste water to be recycled for use by its plant. Since this plan was virtually untested, petitioner decided it would be more convenient to test the system at its Tennessee plant where other environmental equipment was scheduled to be installed. There, the system proved a success and petitioner prepared for a similar installation at its Ringwood plant. On January 9, 1974, as part of this preparation, petitioner applied to respondent for a one year variance from the applicable effluent standards, the year being the time it would require to construct the new system.

Specifically, petitioner sought a variance from the regulations which (1) limit the amount of zinc allowed in waste water, and (2) establish the requirements for a three stage lagoon. The petition averred that if the requested variance were granted, at year's end, the plant's discharge into the stream would comply with the effluent standards applicable to secondary-contract water. At the time the petition was filed, however, the stream was classified as general-use water for which the applicable effluent standards were more stringent than those applied to secondary-contact water. Thus, petitioner additionally sought to have respondent reclassify the stream as secondary-contact water.

Respondent had 90 days within which to act upon the petition (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch 111 1/2, § 1038; see Rule 408 ¹) but this time limit was extended by stipulation of the parties. On July 11, 1974, respondent rendered its opinion wherein the variance was granted and the stream was reclassified as secondary-contact water. The respondent relied on Regulation 302(k) which provides that secondary-contact waters are those 'in which, by reason of low flow or other conditions, a diversified aquatic biota cannot be satisfactorily maintained even in the absence of contaminants.' The opinion summarized the evidence and, in concluding that the reclassification was warranted, found that the evidence established that a diverse aquatic biota could not be satisfactorily maintained.

Subsequent to this decision, the Environmental Protection Agency (Agency) filed, and respondent granted, a petition for reconsideration pursuant to Rule 334. ² Respondent, on October 17, 1974, without having held an additional evidentiary hearing, but, upon briefs and argument, issued a new opinion in which it affirmed its prior grant of the requested variance but reversed its earlier reclassification of the stream.

Under the second opinion, petitioner's stream discharge will not conform to the applicable effluent standards regardless of the success of the new water treatment system. Further, it would be necessary for petitioner to obtain periodic variances from the standards. Petitioner appeals contending that respondent lacked the power to reconsider the matter and, even if it had the power, the refusal to reclassify the stream as secondary-contact water is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In addition, petition contends that although it did stipulate to extend the time for a decision on its variance petition, respondent's decision was rendered after the stipulated date. Petitioner argues that respondent thus violated the 90-day rule and its petition, including the stream reclassification, should have been granted as a matter of law.

Section 38 of the Environmental Protection Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 111 1/2, § 1038) provides, 'If the Board fails to take final action upon a variance request within 90 days after the filing of the petition, the petitioner may deem the request granted * * *.' Petitioner initially agreed, by letter, to extend the date of decision to April 6, 1974. Subsequently, however, it stipulated to another extension--to July 11--the date on which the initial opinion was rendered. Accordingly, we find no merit in this contention.

Regarding petitioner's claim that respondent lacked the power to reconsider its first opinion, Rule 334 states that within 35 days after the Board's entry of a final order, any party may petition for a rehearing. Petitioner contends that nowhere within the Environmental Protection Act has the legislature empowered the Board to allow rehearings after entering a final order.

While an administrative agency is a creature of statute and may allow a rehearing only when authorized to do so by statute (Pearce Hospital v. Public Aid Com., 15 Ill.2d 301, 307, 154 N.E.2d 691 (1958),) the legislature has authorized the Board to conduct rehearings. Section 5 (d) of the Environmental Protection Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 111 1/2, § 1005(d)) details various types of hearings the Board may conduct and then adds that the Board may hold 'such other hearings as may be provided by rule.' In addition, section 26 of the Act empowers the Board to adopt the procedural rules necessary to accomplish the purposes of the Act. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 111 1/2, § 1026.) We hold that these two sections, when read together, provide the necessary authority for the respondent to hold rehearings as a procedure to correct any error, omission or oversight found in its first consideration.

Citing Wachta v. Pollution Control Board, 8 Ill.App.3d 436, 289 N.E.2d 484 (1972), petitioner claims the Board was estopped from reconsidering its first decision. In Wachta some eight months intervened between the time petitioners were granted authority to proceed and action was taken to retract such authority. Meanwhile, petitioners, in reliance upon the original authority, expended large sums of money. Here it is asserted that, in reliance upon the original decision, petitioner, as of October 11, 1974 (a time subsequent to the motion for rehearing being filed and allowed) incurred financial expenditures and commitments in the sum of $173,000 for the construction of a wastewater treatment recycle system. We find petitioner's alleged reliance unwarranted. The Agency had the right, within 35 days of the original order, to either appeal or move for a rehearing. It chose the latter course. Any reliance by the petitioner upon the original decision before it became...